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Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
The European Union (EU) aims to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 80 - 95
% in 2050 compared to 1990 levels (EU Council (2009)). Given the power sector’s dom-
inant share of GHG emissions in Europe and comparatively high technological potential
for abating GHG emissions, the transition towards a low-carbon economy implies an
almost complete decarbonization of Europe’s power sector. Compared to today, massive
GHG emission savings could be achieved along various pathways and through various
technology mixes.
To achieve commitment with the GHG emission reduction targets, the EU has imple-
mented a cap-and-trade system for GHG emissions (EU-ETS) that includes electricity
generation and energy-intensive industries (EU (2009b)). Aside from GHG emission
reduction targets and the EU ETS, the EU has also adopted mandatory renewable en-
ergy targets. In 2020, renewable energy technologies are set to supply 20 % of the EU’s
energy consumption (EU (2009a)) and at least 34 % of the EU’s electricity consumption
(EC (2010b)).
Although supplementary renewable energy targets can hardly be justified from a cli-
mate protection perspective – given the implementation of the EU ETS which limits the
overall GHG emissions in Europe – there is a political will to expand renewable energy
generation across Europe. However, to date, most renewable energy technologies (except
for small-scale hydro power and low-cost biomass power plants) are not yet competitive
in Europe, even when accounting for external costs of GHG emissions. To neverthe-
less encourage renewable energy generation, most EU member states have implemented
renewable energy support schemes.
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Renewable energy support schemes can commonly be classified into price- and quantity-
based regulations, fiscal incentives and public finance (e.g., IRENA (2012) and IPCC
(2011)). While price-based regulations such as feed-in tariffs or feed-in premiums fix
the price paid for renewable electricity, quantity-based regulations such as quota obliga-
tions (in combination with tradable green certificates) and tenders set the quantity of
renewable electricity to be generated.
Feed-in tariffs (FIT) are the most commonly referenced support scheme used by EU
member states, followed by quota obligations and feed-in premiums (CEER (2013)). In
contrast to under quota obligations and feed-in premiums, renewable energy generators
under a FIT system are sealed off from the market price signal. While this limits the
financial risk for renewable energy investors, it also prevents an efficient allocation of
financial resources from the total system perspective.
Aside from these traditional support schemes, the deployment of renewable energy ca-
pacities and particularly photovoltaic (PV) systems is also driven by the emergence
of grid parity in many European countries. Grid parity marks the point in time at
which the electricity generation costs of PV systems have dropped below the level of
end-consumer electricity prices, such that the consumption of self-produced PV elec-
tricity becomes cheaper than the consumption of grid-supplied electricity.2 Since the
consumption of self-produced electricity is exempt from paying taxes, levies and other
surcharges, the concept of grid parity reflects a financial incentive for the deployment
of PV systems. Moreover, network operators traditionally charge energy-related instead
of capacity-related network tariffs. The exemption from additional charges and the cur-
rent network tariff structure incentivize the consumption of self-produced rather than
grid-supplied electricity once the electricity generation costs of PV systems have fallen
below the end-consumer electricity price.
1.2 Structure and scope of the thesis
The thesis consists of five essays investigating various aspects associated with the de-
carbonization of Europe’s power sector and the politically incentivized expansion of
renewable energy generation. All essays can be read independently. In the following,
the content of each essay is briefly outlined.
2Such markets are currently emerging in Germany, Denmark, Spain and Italy, within both the resi-
dential and the commercial sectors (IEA (2013)).
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1.2.1 Decarbonizing Europe’s power sector by 2050: Analyzing the
economic implications of alternative decarbonization pathways
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 discusses the economic implications of alternative
decarbonization pathways for Europe’s power sector up to 2050. It has been published
in the Journal Energy Economics (Ja¨gemann et al. (2013a)).3 The paper was written
in co-authorship with Michaela Unteutsch (ne´e Fu¨rsch), Simeon Hagspiel and Stephan
Nagl and I am the leading author of this paper.
The decarbonization of Europe’s power sector can be achieved along various pathways
up to 2050. By applying a linear electricity system optimization model for Europe, we
find that the costs of decarbonization vary between 139 and 633 bn e2010 up to 2050.
In line with economic theory, the decarbonization of Europe’s power sector is achieved
at minimal costs under a stand-alone CO2 reduction target, which ensures competition
between all low-carbon technologies. If, however, renewable energies are exempt from
competition via supplementary renewable energy targets or if investments in new nu-
clear power and fossil-fuel based power generation with CO2 capture and storage (CCS)
are politically restricted, the costs of decarbonization significantly rise. Moreover, we
find that the excess costs of supplementary renewable energy targets depend on the ac-
ceptance of alternative low-carbon technologies. For example, given a complete nuclear
phase-out in Europe by 2050 and politically implemented restrictions on the application
of carbon capture and storage technologies, supplementary renewable energy targets are
redundant. While in such a scenario the overall costs of decarbonization are compar-
atively high, the excess costs of supplementary renewable energy targets are close to
zero.
1.2.2 The economic inefficiency of grid parity: The case of German
photovoltaics
The essay presented in Chapter 3 analyzes the economic inefficiency associated with
the concept of grid parity for the case of photovoltaic (PV). It has been published
in the Working Paper Series of the Institute of Energy Economics at the University
of Cologne (Ja¨gemann et al. (2013b)).4 The paper was written in co-authorship with
Simeon Hagspiel and Dietmar Lindenberger and I am the leading author of this paper.
PV grid parity has recently been achieved in Germany on the household level, which
incentivizes electricity consumers to invest in PV and battery storage capacities for
3This article is copyrighted and reprinted by permission. The presented article first appeared in
Energy Economics, Vol. 40 .
4A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the second International Workshop on Integra-
tion of Solar Power into Power Systems in Lisbon (2012).
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in-house PV electricity consumption. This paper analyzes the optimization behavior of
households and the economic consequences of the indirect financial incentive for in-house
PV electricity consumption by combining a household optimization model with an elec-
tricity system optimization model. Up to 2050, we find that households save 10 % - 18
% of their accumulated electricity costs by covering 38 - 57 % of their annual electricity
demand with self-produced PV electricity. Overall, cost savings on the household level
amount to more than 47 bn e 2011 up to 2050. However, while the consumption of self-
produced electricity is beneficial from the single household’s perspective, it is inefficient
from the total system perspective. Accumulated to 2050, the single household’s opti-
mization behavior is found to cause excess costs of 116 bn e 2011. Moreover, it leads to
significant redistributional effects by raising the financial burden for (residual) electricity
consumers by more than 35 bn e 2011 up to 2050. In addition, it yields massive revenue
losses on the side of the public sector and network operators of more than 77 and 69 bn
e 2011, respectively, by 2050.
1.2.3 An illustrative note on the system price effect of wind and solar
power - The German case
The essay presented in Chapter 4 analyzes the system price effect of wind and solar
power generation. The paper has not yet been published and I am the sole contributor.
Exposing wind and solar power to the market price signal allows for cost-efficient in-
vestment decisions, as it incentivizes investors to account for the marginal value (MV el)
of renewable energy technologies. As shown by Lamont (2008), the MV el of wind and
solar power units depends on their penetration level. More specifically, the MV el of
wind and solar power units is a function of the respective unit’s capacity factor and
the covariance between its generation profile and the system marginal costs. The latter
component of the MV el (i.e., the covariance) is found to decline as the wind and solar
power penetration increases, displacing dispatchable power plants with higher short-run
marginal costs of power production and thus reducing the system marginal costs in all
generation hours. This so called ‘system price effect’ is analyzed in more detail in this
paper. The analysis complements the work Lamont (2008) in two regards. First of all,
an alternative expression for the MV el of wind and solar power units is derived, which
shows that the MV el of fluctuating renewable energy technologies depends not only on
their own penetration level but also on a variety of other parameters that are specific to
the electricity system. Second, based on historical wholesale prices and wind and solar
power generation data for Germany, a numerical ‘ceteris paribus’ example for Germany
is presented which illustrates that the system price effect is already highly relevant for
both wind and solar power generation in Germany.
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1.2.4 A note on the inefficiency of technology- and region-specific re-
newable energy support - The German case
The essay presented in Chapter 5 adds to the ongoing debate surrounding the cost-
efficient achievement of politically implemented renewable energy targets. The paper
has not yet been published and I am the sole contributor.
Renewable energy (RES-E) support schemes have to meet two requirements in order to
lead to a cost-efficient renewable energy mix. First, RES-E support schemes need to
expose RES-E producers to the price signal of the wholesale market, which incentivizes
investors to account not only for the marginal costs per kWh (MC) but also for the
marginal value per kWh (MV el) of renewable energy technologies. Second, RES-E
support schemes need to be technology- and region-neutral in their design (rather than
technology- and region-specific). That is, the financial support may not be bound to
a specific technology or a specific region. In Germany, however, wind and solar power
generation is currently incentivized via technology- and region-specific feed-in tariffs
(FIT), which are coupled with capacity support limits. As such, the current RES-E
support scheme in Germany fails to expose wind and solar power producers to the
price signal of the wholesale market. Moreover, it is technology- and region-specific in
its design, i.e., the support level for each kWh differs between wind and solar power
technologies and the location of their deployment (at least for onshore wind power). As
a consequence, excess costs occur which are burdened by society. This paper illustrates
the economic consequences associated with Germany’s technology- and region-specific
renewable energy support by applying a linear electricity system optimization model.
Overall, excess costs are found to amount to more than 6.6 Bn e 2010. These are driven
by comparatively high net marginal costs of offshore wind and solar power in comparison
to onshore wind power in Germany up to 2020.
1.2.5 The economic value of storage in renewable power systems: The
case of thermal energy storage in concentrating solar power plants
The last part of this thesis (Chapter 6) analyzes the economic value of storage as a
function of the overall generation mix and illustrates the economic inefficiency arising
from feed-in tariff (FIT) systems for the special case of thermal energy storage units
in concentrating solar power (CSP) plants. The paper was written in co-authorship
with Stephan Nagl and Michaela Unteutsch (ne´e Fu¨rsch). It has been published in the
Working Paper Series of the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne
(Nagl et al. (2011a)) as well as in Nagl (2013).5
5The essey published in this thesis is a revised version.
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Thermal energy storages (TES) can reduce the production costs (per kWh) of CSP
plants due to a higher usage of the capital intensive power plant block. As a conse-
quence, investors have an incentive to build thermal energy storages without considering
the wholesale price signal under a FIT scheme. Our simulation with a linear electricity
system optimization model shows that TES units are not cost-efficient from a system
perspective in today’s electricity systems as CSP plants can directly feed into the grid
when wholesale prices are comparatively high. Hence, FIT systems set an inefficient
incentive to invest in TES units by neglecting wholesale price signals. However, the
value of storage increases in electricity systems with higher shares of fluctuating renew-
able generation. Therefore, CSP plants with integrated thermal storages may play a
significant role in mostly renewable-based electricity systems in the future.
Chapter 2
Decarbonizing Europe’s power
sector by 2050 - Analyzing the
economic implications of
alternative decarbonization
pathways6
2.1 Introduction
In October 2009, the European Council endorsed the objective of the European Union
(EU) to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 80-95 % in 2050 compared to 1990
levels (EU Council (2009)). Given the power sector’s dominant share of CO2 emissions
in Europe and its comparatively high technological potential for abating CO2 emissions,
the transition towards a low-carbon economy implies an almost complete decarboniza-
tion of Europe’s power sector.7 The decarbonization could be achieved through various
6This article is copyrighted and reprinted by permission. The presented article first appeared in
Energy Economics, Vol. 40
7The electricity and heat production accounted for 36.5 % of total CO2 emissions in the EU in 2009
(IEA (2011)).
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technology mixes that all allow for massive CO2 savings in comparison to today’s elec-
tricity systems, as shown by a number of recent studies (e.g., EC (2011), ECF (2010),
Eurelectric (2010), EWI (2011), Greenpeace (2010) and Greenpeace (2012)).
Aside from the European Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) – which acts as the
cornerstone of EU climate policy for electricity generation and energy-intensive indus-
tries (EU (2009b)) – the EU has implemented mandatory renewable energy targets. In
2020, renewable energy technologies are supposed to supply 20 % of the EU’s energy
consumption (EU (2009a)) and at least 34 % of the EU’s electricity consumption (EC
(2010b)).8
If supplementary renewable energy targets are implemented to reduce GHG emissions,
the issue of counterproductive overlapping regulation arises. First-best economic princi-
ples – based on the seminal work of Crocker (1966), Dales (1968) and Montgomery (1972)
– suggest that GHG reduction targets could be achieved at least-cost by the implemen-
tation of a stand-alone cap-and-trade system covering all sources of GHG emissions. A
market for tradable emission certificates is cost-efficient as it establishes a uniform GHG
emission price, which serves as a common benchmark for the marginal costs of each po-
tential GHG abatement option. Boeters and Koorneef (2011) argue that supplementary
instruments, such as mandatory renewable energy targets, interfere with this least-cost
principle by exempting renewables as a particular GHG abatement option from the com-
mon benchmark price. Thus, given the assumption of perfect markets, supplementary
renewable energy targets are either redundant or associated with excess costs. This
argumentation is in line with Tinbergen (1952), who showed that a number of policy
targets is best addressed by an equal number of policy instruments.9
In this paper, we analyze the costs of decarbonization and the excess costs of supplemen-
tary renewable energy (RES-E) targets for Europe’s power sector in over 36 scenarios
up to 2050. Our analysis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we ex-
plicitly account for the fact that the costs of decarbonization and the excess costs of
supplementary RES-E targets depend on two key conditions: the acceptance of alterna-
tive low-carbon technologies (such as new nuclear power plants and CCS technologies)
and the development of the economic conditions (mostly defined by the EU’s electricity
demand, renewable energy investment costs and fossil fuel prices). Second, we apply
a linear electricity system optimization model for Europe, which is characterized by a
8According to the National Renewable Energy Action Plans of the EU member states (EC (2010b)),
the share of renewable energy sources in electricity consumption is targeted to increase to 34.3 % in
2020.
9The theoretical implications of overlapping regulation for the costs of decarbonization (in the first-
and second-best world) have widely been analyzed. Lehmann (2012), Fischer and Preonas (2010) and
Del R´ıo Gonza´lez, P. (2007) provide a survey of recent literature on the theoretical interaction of GHG
emission reduction and renewable energy targets.
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comparatively high technological and regional resolution, to analyze the implications of
alternative decarbonization pathways for Europe’s power sector. Hence, we are able to
accurately capture the technological and economic consequences of political interference
up to 2050.10
Our work complements a number of recent articles published in peer-reviewed journals
(Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a), Haller et al. (2012), Capros et al. (2012a) and Capros et al.
(2012b)) and studies (Dii (2013), Dii (2012), RES2020 (2009), Realisegrid (2010), EC
(2011) and Eurelectric (2010)) analyzing the decarbonization of Europe’s power sector.
All of these articles and studies show that the achievement of ambitious emission reduc-
tion targets for Europe’s power (energy) sector in 2050 is technically feasible. However,
none of these articles or studies quantify the costs of decarbonizing Europe’s power
sector together with the excess costs of supplementary RES-E targets up to 2050, ac-
counting for the availability of alternative low-carbon technologies such as nuclear power
and CCS.11
In the base-case economic scenarios, we find that the decarbonization of Europe’s power
sector in 2050 could be achieved at minimal costs of 171 bn e2010 if competition between
all low-carbon technologies is ensured and no restrictions on the use of nuclear power
and CCS are implemented. However, if renewables are exempt from competition with
alternative low-carbon technologies by prescribing supplementary RES-E targets the
costs of decarbonization significantly rise to at least 408 bn e2010 – corresponding to an
increase of 140 % compared to the minimal costs of decarbonization. The excess costs
of supplementary RES-E targets, on the other hand, can be as high as 237 bn e2010 or
as little as 15 bn e2010 – depending on the acceptance of new nuclear power plants and
CCS technologies. For example, given a complete nuclear phase-out in Europe by 2050
and politically implemented restrictions on the application of CCS to conventional power
plants, supplementary RES-E targets are redundant. While in such a scenario the overall
costs of decarbonization are comparatively high, the excess costs of supplementary RES-
E targets are close to zero (in comparison to a stand-alone CO2 reduction target).
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2.2 relates the paper to existing litera-
ture. Section 2.3 provides a short description of the linear electricity system optimization
model for Europe’s power sector used in the analysis. Section 2.4 defines the scenarios
and Section 2.5 presents the results of our analysis. Conclusions are drawn in Section
2.6.
10However, the model does not account for endogenous learning curve-effects and assumes a price-
inelastic electricity demand (see Section 2.3.7).
11We define the costs of decarbonization as the difference in total system costs between scenarios with
ambitious CO2 reduction targets for Europe’s power sector and scenarios with no CO2 reduction targets.
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2.2 Related literature
A wide range of models can be applied to analyze the consequences of policy interference
for the energy system or sub-systems (such as the power system).12 In general, two
classes of energy system models can be distingushed, as done in Figure 2.1. Following
the explanation of Go¨tz et al. (2012), ‘top-down’ models describe the energy system from
a macroeconomic perspective. By using a full equilibrium framework, they account for
repercussions of the energy system on the rest of the economy. As a consequence, ‘top-
down’ models are generally characterized by high aggregation levels that accompany
low sectoral and technological details of energy conversion (e.g., electricity production).
Important examples of ‘top-down’ energy models are computable general equilibrium,
input-output and macroeconometric models.
‘Bottom-up’ models, in contrast, look at the energy system from a technological perspec-
tive. They are typically characterized by an explicit techno-economic parameterization
and a high degree of technological detail, which allows for a comprehensive analysis of
technological adjustment processes induced by policy interference. As explained by Go¨tz
et al. (2012), Herbst et al. (2012) and Mo¨st and Fichtner (2008), two main approaches
can be distinguished: Simulation models, such as agent-based simulation models or sys-
tem dynamics, describe the development of the energy system as a result of individual
decision-making processes (based on observations and expectations), accounting for as-
pects such as incomplete information or strategic behavior. Optimization models, in
contrast, calculate the optimal development of the energy system given an objective
function and a set of constraints that reflect technological limitations and political tar-
gets. The objective function of optimization models mostly comprises the maximization
of welfare, i.e. the maximization of net total surplus of suppliers and consumers (with
price-elastic energy demands) or the minimization of total energy system costs (with
price-inelastic energy demands). Note that the cost-minimization problem corresponds
to a welfare-maximization approach given the assumption of price-inelastic energy de-
mands. Since repercussions of the energy system on other sectors of the economy are
generally not considered, ‘bottom-up’ models are often termed ‘partial equilibrium mod-
els’.
In this paper we apply a linear optimization model for Europe’s power sector (i.e., a
system costs minimization model with price-inelastic electricity demands) to analyze the
implications of alternative decarbonization pathways for Europe up to 2050.
12The following paragraph is based on Go¨tz et al. (2012), Herbst et al. (2012) and Mo¨st and Fichtner
(2008). The interested reader is referred to these studies for a further discussion of energy system models.
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Macro-economic models Energy/power sector models
General equilibrium models
Macro-econometric models
Top-down Bottom-up
Input-output models
Simulation models
Optimization models
System costs minimization
Welfare maximiziation
Agent-based simulation
System dynamics
Figure 2.1: Classification of energy system models
Source: Own illustration based on Herbst et al. (2012), Go¨tz et al. (2012) and Mo¨st and Fichtner
(2008).
Our paper is related to three strands of literature: the first focuses on the interaction be-
tween systems of tradable GHG emission permits (TEP) and tradable green certificates
(TGC); the second quantifies the costs related to the EU’s renewable energy targets for
2020; the third analyzes long-term decarbonization strategies for Europe’s power sector
up to 2050.
The interaction between TEP and TGC at the European level has, for example, been
analyzed by De Jonghe et al. (2009) and Unger and Ahlgren (2005). De Jonghe et al.
(2009) apply a welfare maximization model to three interconnected regions (France, Ger-
many and the Benelux) and show that different support measures influence each other.
In particular, they find that the price of both TGC and TEP can become zero given
non-binding restrictions. Unger and Ahlgren (2005) analyze the impact of a TGC mar-
ket on both the electricity market and a TEP market by using a welfare maximization
model for four Nordic countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland). They show
that the introduction of a system of TGC reduces the wholesale electricity price and the
price of TEP.13 Moreover, Bo¨hringer and Rosendahl (2010) examine the consequences of
overlapping regulations based on a theoretical analysis. They conclude that a tradable
renewable energy quota imposed on top of a tradable CO2 quota promotes power pro-
duction by the dirtiest fossil fuel technologies, as it will reduce the price of CO2 permits
and therefore benefit emission-intensive technologies.
13Interactions between TEP and TGC within single countries have been analyzed by Amundsen and
Mortensen (2001) and Abrell and Weigt (2008).
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Quantitative evidence of the cost implications of supplementary renewable energy targets
– as an integral part of the EU’s climate policy for 2020 – has recently been provided
by Aune et al. (2012), Bo¨hringer et al. (2009), Bo¨hringer et al. (2009), Boeters and
Koorneef (2011) and Capros et al. (2011).14 Their quantiative results for 2020 confirm
the theoretical argumentation concerning counterproductive overlapping regulation. As
compared to a stand-alone GHG emissions regulation, the EU’s 20 % renewable energy
target (in total energy consumption) by 2020 is found to lead to excess costs.15 Fischer
and Newell (2008) and Palmer and Burtraw (2005) confirm the results for the U.S.
electricity sector. They find that renewable portfolio standards are not as cost-effective
as a cap-and-trade system in achieving GHG emission reductions.
In contrast to the existing quantitative evidence considering the EU’s 20 % renewable
energy target for 2020, our work complements a number of recent articles published in
peer-reviewed journals and studies analyzing longer-term decarbonization strategies for
Europe’s power sector up to 2050, already referred to in Section 1. As shown in Table
2.1, the articles and studies vary with regard to both the modeling approach and the
assumptions made about the availability of alternative low-carbon technologies such as
nuclear power and CCS.
Capros et al. (2012b) and Capros et al. (2012a) analyze the decarbonization of Europe’s
economy up to 2050 by applying a partial equilibrium hybrid model for the EU energy
markets. Their decarbonization scenarios highlight the strong role of the power sector
for decarbonizing Europe’s economy by 2050. Moreover, they confirm that strategies
excluding some decarbonization options are more costly than strategies combining all
decarbonization options.
In contrast, Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a) and Haller et al. (2012) both use an optimization
model for Europe’s power sector (plus North Africa (NA) and Middle East and North
Africa (MENA), respectively) and focus on the role of grid expansions in a cost-efficient
transformation of the European electricity system towards having significant shares of
renewable energies by 2050. Given their assumption that ambitious CO2 reduction
targets are achieved via the large-scale deployment of renewables across Europe, they
do not account for the fact that a mixture of nuclear power, CCS and renewables may
14Aune et al. (2012) use LIBEMOD, a ‘multi-market energy equilibrium model’. Bo¨hringer et al.
(2009) and Bo¨hringer et al. (2009) apply three ‘multi-regional, multi-sectoral general equilibrium models’
(DART, PACE and Gemini-E39). Boeters and Koorneef (2011) use the computable general equilibrium
model ‘WorldScan’, and Capros et al. (2011) apply the ‘PRIMES’ model, a ‘partial equilibrium hybrid
model which combines bottom-up engineering detail with a micro-economic foundation of economic
decisions by agents’ (Capros et al. (2012b)).
15However, Boeters and Koorneef (2011) also identify specific cases in which the EU’s 20 % renewable
energy target for 2020 acts as a correction of pre-existing inefficiencies – resulting from second-best
effects caused by initial taxes on fossil fuels – and hence enhances total welfare.
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be cost-efficient from a system point of view.16 Moreover, the geographical scope of
the electricity system optimization model applied in Haller et al. (2012) (‘LIMES-EU+’)
differs from the one applied in this paper.17 The ‘LIMES-EU+’ model covers the power
system of the EU-27 member countries, Norway, Switzerland, and the MENA region.
In total, 20 geographical regions are modeled (i.e., several countries are aggregated to
larger geographical regions), which are connected by 32 transmission corridors. The
electricity system optimization model used in this paper also covers the EU-27 member
countries (except for Cyprus and Malta), Norway and Switzerland. In addition, North
Africa is modeled as a satellite import region. In contrast to Haller et al. (2012), grids
are modeled with one node per country. Hence, our model covers 28 countries connected
by 65 transmission corridors. Moreover, the single countries are further subdivided into
wind and solar power regions in order to better account for regional wind speed and solar
radiation conditions (see Section 2.3.2). Besides the regional resolution, the electricity
system optimization models applied in Haller et al. (2012) and this paper also differ
with regard to their technological scope. While the ‘LIMES-EU+’ model covers nine
generation technologies, we model 34 technologies (see Section 2.3.1).
When analyzing the implications of decarbonizing Europe’s electricity system via the
large-scale deployment of renewables, it is imperative to account for regional differences
in renewable energy technologies and the wide range of electricity generation and storage
technologies. It needs to be ensured that the electricity system is flexible enough to cope
with fluctuating renewable energy generation and that it is provided with sufficient back-
up capacities during times with low-infeed from wind and solar capacities. As our model
accounts for these geographical and technological details, we argue that our model is
an appropriate tool to quantify the costs of alternative decarbonization pathways for
Europe’s power sector by 2050 and is able to capture the implications of renewable
energy targets and restrictions on alternative low-carbon technologies.
16While Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a) model an RES-E quota of 80 % by 2050, Haller et al. (2012) explicitly
exclude nuclear power and CCS as investment options in their economic analysis up to 2050.
17Note that Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a) apply the same electricity system optimization model as used in this
paper. However, in contrast to Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a), we do not account for endogenous grid extensions
(see Section 2.3.2).
Chapter 2. Decarbonizing Europe’s power sector by 2050 - Analyzing the economic
implications of alternative decarbonization pathways 14
T
a
b
l
e
2
.1
:
R
ecen
t
a
rticles
an
d
stu
d
ies
a
d
d
ressin
g
th
e
lo
n
g
er-term
d
eca
rb
o
n
iza
tio
n
of
E
u
rop
e’s
p
ow
er/en
ergy
sector
u
p
to
2050
M
o
d
el
S
ecto
r
R
egion
T
im
e
h
orizon
In
vestm
en
t
op
tion
C
C
S
N
u
clear
A
rticles
F
u¨
rsch
et
a
l.
(2
013
a
)
O
p
tim
izatio
n
(S
y
stem
co
st
m
in
im
iza
tio
n
)
P
ow
er
E
u
ro
p
e
+
N
A
2050
Y
es
Y
es
H
a
ller
et
a
l.
(2
012
)
O
p
tim
izatio
n
(S
y
stem
co
st
m
in
im
iza
tio
n
)
P
ow
er
E
u
ro
p
e
+
M
E
N
A
2050
N
o
N
o
‘L
IM
E
S
-E
U
+
’
C
a
p
ro
s
et
a
l.
(2
0
12a
),
H
y
b
rid
*
E
n
erg
y
E
u
rop
e
2050
Y
es
Y
es
C
a
p
ro
s
et
a
l.
(2
0
12b
)
‘P
R
IM
E
S
’
S
tu
d
ies
D
ii
(201
3
),
O
p
tim
izatio
n
(S
y
stem
co
st
m
in
im
iza
tio
n
)
P
ow
er
E
u
ro
p
e
+
M
E
N
A
2050
Y
es
Y
es
D
ii
(201
2
)
‘P
o
w
erA
C
E
’
R
E
S
2
0
20
(2
009
)
O
p
tim
izatio
n
(W
elfa
re
m
a
x
im
iza
tio
n
)
E
n
erg
y
E
u
rop
e
2030
Y
es
Y
es
‘P
a
n
E
u
ro
pen
T
IM
E
S
’
R
ealiseg
rid
(20
1
0)
O
p
tim
izatio
n
(W
elfa
re
m
a
x
im
iza
tio
n
)
E
n
erg
y
E
u
rop
e
2030
Y
es
Y
es
‘P
a
n
E
u
ro
pen
T
IM
E
S
’
E
C
(2
011
)
H
y
b
rid
*
E
n
erg
y
E
u
rop
e
2050
Y
es
Y
es
‘P
R
IM
E
S
’
E
u
relectric
(2
0
10)
H
y
b
rid
*
E
n
erg
y
E
u
rop
e
2050
Y
es
Y
es
‘P
R
IM
E
S
’
*
T
h
e
‘P
R
IM
E
S
’
m
o
d
el
is
a
‘p
a
rtia
l
eq
u
ilib
riu
m
h
y
b
rid
m
o
d
el
w
h
ich
co
m
b
in
es
b
o
tto
m
-u
p
en
g
in
eerin
g
d
eta
il
w
ith
a
m
icro
-eco
n
o
m
ic
fo
u
n
d
a
tio
n
o
f
eco
n
o
m
ic
d
ecisio
n
s
b
y
a
g
en
ts’
(C
a
p
ro
s
et
a
l.
(2
0
1
2
b
)).
Chapter 2. Decarbonizing Europe’s power sector by 2050 - Analyzing the economic
implications of alternative decarbonization pathways 15
2.3 Model description
In order to quantify the cost implications of alternative decarbonization pathways, we use
a linear electricity system optimization model for Europe. The model is an extended
version of the linear electricity system optimization model of the Institute of Energy
Economics (University of Cologne) as presented in Richter (2011). Earlier versions of
the model have been applied e.g. by Paulus and Borggrefe (2011) and Nagl et al. (2011b).
The possibility of endogenous investments in renewable energy technologies has recently
been added to the model (Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a), Nagl et al. (2011a)).18 In the following,
a basic overview of the applied model is given. For a detailed mathematical description
of the model, the interested reader is referred to Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a).
2.3.1 Technological resolution
The model incorporates investment and generation decisions for all types of power plants:
conventional (potentially equipped with CCS technology), combined heat and power
(CHP), nuclear, renewable energy technologies and storage technologies (pump, hydro
and compressed air energy (CAES)). In contrast to investments in generation and stor-
age capacities, the extension of interconnector capacities, which limit the inter-regional
power exchange, is exogenously defined.
Today’s power plant mix is represented by several vintage classes for hard coal, lig-
nite and natural gas-fired power plants. With regard to renewable energy technologies,
the model encompasses onshore and offshore wind turbines, roof and ground photo-
voltaic (PV) systems, biomass (CHP-) power plants (solid and gas), hydro power plants,
geothermal power plants and concentrating solar power (CSP) plants (including thermal
energy storage devices).19
To account for technological progress, several future plant developments of both conven-
tional and renewable energy sources are modeled. Regarding conventional technologies,
technological progress is assumed to increase the net efficiency. Moreover, CCS can be
applied to conventional power plants from 2030 onwards. For renewable energies the
technological process is modeled by the availability of new technologies in later years.
For example, existing onshore wind turbines are assumed to have a turbine capacity of
3 MW on average. In the event of investments in new wind turbines, the model has
18In earlier model versions, investments in renewable energy technologies took place along a predefined
expansion path.
19Biogas is assumed to be produced by silage (silo maize and grass), liquid manure, dung or biogenic
settlement waste. Solid biomass is assumed to include energy crops such as wood from short rotation
plantation, corn, agricultural residues (like straw), logging residues, used wood and dry sewage sludge.
Chapter 2. Decarbonizing Europe’s power sector by 2050 - Analyzing the economic
implications of alternative decarbonization pathways 16
the option to install 6 MW turbines with higher full load hours (due to higher turbine
heights and increased efficiency) from 2015 onwards.
2.3.2 Regional resolution
The model covers all 27 countries of the European Union, except for Cyprus and Malta,
but includes Norway and Switzerland. In addition, North Africa is modeled as a satellite
import region.20 Grids are modeled with one node per country. Hence, the model covers
28 countries connected by 65 transmission corridors. Moreover, to account for regional
wind speed and solar radiation conditions, the model considers several subregions within
the countries, which differ with regard to the hourly electricity feed-in profiles and the
achievable full load hours of wind turbines (onshore and offshore) and solar power plants
(PV and CSP) per year. Overall, the model distinguishes between 47 onshore wind, 42
offshore wind and 38 solar subregions across Europe.
2.3.3 Temporal resolution
The model determines the cost-efficient investment and dispatch strategy for meeting
the electricity demand of each country in 5-year time steps from 2010 until 2050.21 The
dispatch of generation and storage capacities is calculated for 4 typical days per year that
are scaled to 8760 hours in the model. Each typical day defines the electricity demand per
country (in MW) based on historical hourly load data by ENSTO-E (2012). Moreover,
the typical days determine the hourly water inflow of hydro storages and the hourly
electricity feed-in of wind and solar power plants per subregion (in MW/MWinstalled)
– including hours with both very high and very low wind and solar-based electricity
generation – based on historical hourly wind speed and solar radiation data by EuroWind
(2011). The use of typical days allows for a reduction of the calculation time of the model
while maintaining the characteristic daily and seasonal features of the demand, water
inflow (of hydro storages) and electricity feed-in profiles (of wind and solar power plants).
2.3.4 Objective function
The objective of the model is to minimize accumulated discounted total system costs
(5 % discount rate) – which include investment costs, fixed operation and maintenance
20By assumption, only solar-based renewable energy technologies can be deployed in North Africa.
North African wind conditions are also relatively favorable, but not modeled within this analysis. By
2050, an additional 14 GW of net transfer capacities are installed between North Africa and Spain.
21In addition, the model years 2060 and 2070 are included in order to account for long lifetimes of
capital-intensive generation capacities.
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costs, variable production costs and costs due to ramping thermal power plants.22 The
total system costs do not include investment costs for the necessary infrastructure and
operational costs for grid management. Investment costs occur for new investments in
generation and storage units and are annualized with a 5 % interest rate for the depre-
ciation time. The fixed operation and maintenance costs represent staff costs, insurance
charges, interest rates and maintenance costs. For CCS power plants, fixed operation
and maintenance (FOM) costs include fixed costs for CO2 storage and transportation.
23
Variable costs are determined by the fuel price, net efficiency and total generation of
each technology. Depending on the ramping profile additional costs for attrition occur.
Combined heat and power (CHP) plants can generate income from the heat market,
thus reducing the objective value.24 All assumptions regarding fuel prices (Table A.1),
investment costs (Table A.2 and Table A.5), electricity demand (Table A.3), maximum
potential for heat generated in CHP plants (Table A.4), FOM costs (Table A.6 and
Table A.7) and net efficiencies (Table A.6 and Table A.7) are listed in the Appendix.
2.3.5 Techno-economic constraints
The accumulated discounted total system costs are minimized, subject to several techno-
economic constraints. The match of electricity demand and supply needs to be ensured
in each hour and country, taking storage options and inter-regional power exchange into
account. The maximum electricity generation of dispatchable power plants (conven-
tional, nuclear, storage, biomass and geothermal plants) per hour is restricted by their
seasonal availability which is limited due to unplanned or planned shutdowns (e.g., be-
cause of repairs).25 Unlike dispatchable power plants, the maximum power exchange
per hour between two neighboring countries is limited by the net transfer capacities.
The minimum electricity generation per hour of dispatchable power plants and storage
options is given by their minimum part-load level. The maximum ramp-up speed of
dispatchable power plants is limited by their specific start-up time. The deployment of
22The model’s optimization premise (minimization of accumulated discounted total system costs)
implies a cost-based competition of electricity generation and perfect foresight.
23The assumption of fixed rather than variable costs for CO2 storage and transportation is based on
the fact that the construction of the pipeline and the storage system accounts for the largest part of the
costs for transporting and storing CO2 (McKinsey & Company (2008)). The costs do not to increase
with the cumulative amount of CO2 already stored (due to limited potentials for storing CO2 ), given
the assumption that the storage potential is sufficient to cover all CO2 emissions captured in CCS plants
in the scenarios.
24However, we account for a maximum potential for heat in cogeneration within each country that is
compensated by the heating market.
25The availability of dispatchable power plants is the same for each country, year and hour, but differs
for each season. The maximum electricity generation of storage technologies is additionally restricted
by the storage level of a particular hour.
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wind and solar power technologies is restricted by a space potential in km2 per subre-
gion, while the use of lignite and biomass sources (solid and gaseous) is restricted by a
yearly potential in MWhth per country.
26
Moreover, the peak demand of each country needs to be ensured by securely available ca-
pacities and net imports in the peak-demand hour. While the securely available capacity
of dispatchable power plants within the peak-demand hour is assumed to correspond to
the seasonal availability, the securely available capacity of wind power plants (onshore
and offshore) within the peak-demand hour (capacity credit) is assumed to amount to
5 % based on TradeWind (2009) and the German Energy Agency (2005).27 In contrast,
PV systems are assumed to have a capacity credit of 0 % due to the assumption that
peak demand occurs during evening hours in the winter.28 This peak-demand constraint
accounts for back-up capacity needs to meet security of supply requirements within a
system with high shares of fluctuating renewable energy technologies.
2.3.6 Political constraints
In addition to techno-economic constraints, the model also accounts for the possibil-
ity to consider politically implemented restrictions and requirements. For example,
the accumulated CO2 emissions within Europe’s power sector can be restricted to a
predefined CO2 cap per year. The approach of modeling a quantity-based regulation
(CO2 cap) instead of a price-based regulation (CO2 price) ensures that the same level
of CO2 emission reductions is achieved in all simulated scenarios – which facilitates the
comparability of results. Moreover, given the formulation of an EU-wide CO2 cap, the
CO2 abatement target is achieved at minimal costs, i.e., at equalized marginal costs per
ton of CO2 additionally abated within Europe’s power sector.
In addition to restrictions on CO2 emissions, EU-wide technology-neutral or national
technology-specific renewable energy (RES-E) quotas can be implemented in the model.
26The Institute of Energy Economics bought data of onshore wind potentials from EuroWind (Eu-
roWind (2009)) and data of biomass fuel potentials from the Leipzig Institute for Energy (IE (2008)).
The space potentials for offshore wind are taken from a study by the European Environment Agency
(EEA (2009)), which is publicly available. The potential for PV systems has been determined as part
of the study EWI (2010), which is also publicly available. All sources used account for alternative land
uses. EEA (2009) and EWI (2010) offer a description of how the potentials have been derived.
27Hence, 5 % of the total installed wind power capacities within a country are assumed be securely
available within the peak demand hour.
28This assumption is based on a detailed analysis of historical electrical load data (based on ENSTO-E
(2012) and historical solar radiation data based on EuroWind (2011)) for all EU member states for the
years 2007-2010 (Ackermann et al. (2013)). The analysis has shown that in southern European countries,
such as Greece, electricity demand may not only peak during the evening hours in the winter, but also
during midday in the summer, for example due to the increased use of air conditioners. However, due
to the fact that peak demand hours still occur during the evening in the winter (when the sun is not
shining), we chose the conservative approach of assuming PV to have a securely available capacity of 0
% at times of peak demand.
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In the case of EU-wide technology-neutral RES-E quotas, defined as a percentage of
Europe’s electricity demand, RES-E technologies are used where they are cheapest, i.e.,
when the marginal costs per additional unit power generation from RES-E technologies
are equalized. Moreover, political restrictions regarding the construction of new nuclear
power plants or conventional power plants equipped with CCS can be implemented by
limiting the option to invest in those technologies.
2.3.7 Limitations and scope
The chosen modeling approach is a profound tool to derive a comprehensive set of
technically feasible and economically efficient development pathways for Europe’s power
sector by 2050. Specifically, the implications of alternative decarbonization pathways can
be analyzed by varying political regulations for given economic framework conditions.
The model is characterized by a high technological and regional resolution, allowing
the impact of supplementary RES-E targets and restrictions on alternative low-carbon
technologies to be accurately captured.
However, there are also limitations of the modeling approach. An important assumption
is the exogeneity of the electricity demand. As a consequence of assuming a price
inelastic electricity demand, we do not capture the possible long-term effect, i.e., that
an increase in end consumer electricity prices triggered by supplementary renewable
support mechanisms may in turn reduce electricity demand.29
Moreover, instead of modeling endogenous learning curve effects, we assume exogenous
cost degressions of non-mature technologies (i.e., RES-E and CCS technologies). The
learning curve concept states that every time the cumulative (i.e., worldwide) volume of
installed capacities doubles, costs fall by a constant percentage (learning rate). However,
predictions of future costs based on the learning curve concept must be approached with
caution, as there is no guarantee that the past trend, on which the learning rate is
determined, will apply in the future (Parsons Brinckerhoff (2012), Nemet (2006) and
UKERC (2010)). Moreover, learning-by-doing is not the only factor influencing future
cost degressions. Specifically, cost reductions due to technology breakthroughs (induced
by research and development activities) are not captured by the learning curve concept
(Parsons Brinckerhoff (2012)).30 Despite the caveats stated above, the learning curve
concept can provide valuable insights into possible future cost degressions of non-mature
technologies. However, given the fact that we model the European (and not the global)
29Lijesen (2007) provides an overview of empirical data on the real-time, short-term (i.e. one year or
less) and long-term elasticity of electricity demand.
30UKERC (2010) provides a further discussion of uncertainties and caveats associated with the learning
curve concept.
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electricity system up to 2050, we do not account for endogenous learning curve effects
for non-mature technologies in the model, but assume exogenous cost degressions.31 As
such, we abstract from possible cost degression effects induced by different investment
levels in key technologies within the different scenarios. However, we argue that the
potential effects are rather low, especially in the long run, due to two reasons: First,
cost degressions of non-mature technologies are driven by capacity expansions across
the entire world (and not only across Europe). Second, learning curves are typically
double logarithmic, such that the necessary additional investments to achieve additional
cost degressions increase exponentially with the installed capacity. Hence, the larger the
worldwide installed capacity of non-mature technologies becomes, the lower the actual
impact of further capacity expansions in Europe on the investment costs will be.
In addition, we disregard potential benefits of renewables in our analysis (other than
no CO2 emissions), which are often brought forward to motivate supplementary RES-E
targets and support mechanisms. One argument, for example, is that learning-by-doing
can create a source of positive externality (technology spillover), which would in prin-
ciple provide a justification for some short-term support to aid the adoption of new
technologies (Sorrell and Sijm (2003); Goulder and Parry (2008)).32 However, in order
to efficiently internalize the positive externality via the implementation of a renewable
energy support mechanism, the subsidy would need to equal the value of the technology
spillover, which is in fact very difficult to measure (Mankiw (2011)). Another line of
argumentation is that the deployment of renewables may serve other policy objectives
besides GHG abatement (Sijm (2005)), namely job creation and enhanced energy secu-
rity (EU (2009a)). However, Frondel et al. (2010) argue that the net employment effect
of renewable energy support mechanims may not be positive, as rising end consumer
electricity prices (as a consequence of renewables support schemes) result in a loss of
purchasing power and investment capital, thereby causing negative employment effects
in other sectors. On the other hand, the argument of improved security of supply may
have merit via the promotion of diversity in generation sources and a lower import de-
pendency on fossil fuels. However, we do not account for potential benefits of renewables
in our analysis, other than the fact that they are low-carbon technologies, because the
potential benefits often brought forward to justify renewable energy suppourt mecha-
nisms are either likely to be non-existent or difficult to quantify and thus to include in
the model.
31Moreover, accounting for endogenous learning in the model significantly increases the complexity
(and solvability) of the model, as learning curves render the optimization problem non-linear.
32When a positive externality (technology spillover) exists, the social costs of adopting a new tech-
nology are less than the private costs of the investor. As a consequence, less investments are made than
the socially optimal level.
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2.4 Scenario definitions
The decarbonization of Europe’s power sector can be achieved through various technol-
ogy mixes, each allowing for massive CO2 savings in comparison to today’s electricity
system. To systematically analyze the implications of alternative decarbonization path-
ways for Europe’s power sector under different economic conditions to 2050, a matrix of
36 scenarios is defined (Table 2.2).
Table 2.2: Scenario matrix
Political regulations Economic conditions
CO2 and RES-E Nuclear CCS Low-cost Base High-cost
investment investment
No target
Option Option 1-I-L 1-I-B 1-I-H
Option No option 1-II-L 1-II-B 1-II-H
No option Option 1-III-L 1-III-B 1-III-H
No option No option 1-IV-L 1-IV-B 1-IV-H
CO2 target
Option Option 2-I-L 2-I-B 2-I-H
Option No option 2-II-L 2-II-B 2-II-H
No option Option 2-III-L 2-III-B 2-III-H
No option No option 2-IV-L 2-IV-B 2-IV-H
CO2 & RES-E target
Option Option 3-I-L 3-I-B 3-I-H
Option No option 3-II-L 3-II-B 3-II-H
No option Option 3-III-L 3-III-B 3-III-H
No option No option 3-IV-L 3-IV-B 3-IV-H
The scenarios differ with regard to political regulations (‘CO2 ’, ‘RES-E’, ‘Nuclear’ and
‘CCS’) and economic conditions (‘Low-cost’, ‘Base’ and ‘High-cost’). Below, the exact
specifications of both the alternative political regulations and the economic conditions
assumed in the different scenarios are presented. These include:
• No target: Neither CO2 nor RES-E quotas are implemented.
• CO2 target: EU-wide CO2 quotas are implemented until 2050 (see Table 2.3).
• CO2 & RES-E target: In addition to EU-wide CO2 quotas, EU-wide technology-
neutral RES-E quotas are implemented until 2050 (see Table 2.3).33
33RES-E imports from North Africa can be used to fulfill the EU-wide RES-E quota from 2025
onwards.
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• Nuclear investment option: Investments in new nuclear power plants are possible
across Europe from 2025 onwards.
• No nulcear investment option: While the usage of existing nuclear power plants is
not restricted, investments in new nuclear reactors are. This leads to a complete
nuclear phase-out in Europe until 2050.34
• CCS investment option: CCS becomes a commercially available investment option
after 2030.
• No CCS investment option: Investments in CCS are restricted.
Table 2.3: EU-wide CO2 and EU-wide (technology-neutral) RES-E quotas
2020 2030 2040 2050
CO2 reduction in comparison to 1990 levels 20 % 42 % 65 % 90 %
RES-E generation in % of Europe’s electricity demand 36 % 50 % 66 % 85 %
Due to the fact that the costs of decarbonization under alternative political targets
(CO2 and RES-E quotas) and restrictions (investments in nuclear power and CCS)
critically depend on the economic conditions in place, we control for three economic
scenarios (‘Low-cost’, ‘Base’ and ‘High-cost’). As shown in Table 2.4, the difference
between the economic scenarios refers to the level of RES-E investment costs, fossil fuel
prices, the gas-to-coal spread and total electricity demand. The scenario specifications
serve the purpose of deriving high and low costs of decarbonization.35
Table 2.4: Specification of economic conditions
‘Low-cost’ scenario ‘Base’ scenario ‘High-cost’ scenario
RES-E investment costs low medium high
Fossil fuel prices low medium high
Gas-to-coal spread low medium high
Europe’s electricity demand decrease constant increase
Regarding future RES-E investment costs, the scenario assumptions cover very pes-
simistic (‘High-cost’) and optimistic projections (‘Low-cost’), as shown in Table A.2
34While Germany is assumed to phase-out its existing nuclear power plants before 2022, as current
legislation stipulates (Deutscher Bundestag (2011)), all other existing nuclear power plants throughout
Europe are assumed to remain in operation until the end of their technical lifetimes.
35In other words, the assumptions of the ‘Low-cost’ scenario imply lower costs of decarbonization (in
comparison to the assumptions of the ‘Base’ scenario), while the assumptions of the ‘High-cost’ scenario
imply higher costs of decarbonization.
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of the Appendix. In all three economic scenarios (‘High-cost’, ‘Base’ and ‘Low-cost’),
RES-E investment costs are assumed to decrease over time, with the less mature RES-
E technologies (such as offshore wind, CSP and PV) realizing higher cost degression
rates towards 2050 than technically mature RES-E technologies (such as biomass power
plants and onshore wind). However, the actual level of future RES-E investment costs
significantly differs between the scenarios. In particular, the difference in future RES-
E investment costs between the pessimistic (‘High-cost’) and the optimistic scenario
(‘Low-cost’) is larger for less mature technologies (than for more mature technologies),
since the future cost development of less mature technologies is associated with greater
uncertainty.
Besides the future level of RES-E investment costs, the costs of decarbonization depend
on the development of fossil fuel prices and, in particular, on the development of the gas-
to-coal spread. The higher the fossil fuel prices are, the lower the costs of switching from
fossil to renewable technologies, and thus the costs of decarbonization, become. Besides
the switch from fossil to renewable technologies, the switch from coal- to gas-fired power
plants is another option to reduce CO2 emissions. The costs of this mitigation option
depend on the gas-to-coal spread, and not on the absolute level of the gas and coal
prices. The higher the gas-to-coal spread becomes (i.e., the more expensive gas becomes
relative to coal), the higher the costs of switching from coal to gas (in order to reduce
CO2 emissions), and hence the costs of decarbonization, become. In all three economic
scenarios, the fossil fuel prices and the gas-to-coal spread are assumed to increase over
time.36 However, the specific rate of increase differs across the scenarios (see Table
A.1 of the Appendix). In order to achieve a wide range of decarbonization costs, we
assume a large increase in fossil fuel prices and the gas-to-coal spread in the ‘High-
cost’ scenario and a low increase of fossil fuel prices and the gas-to-coal spread in the
‘Low-cost’ scenario.
Moreover, the costs of decarbonization also depend on the level of the electricity de-
mand. In particular, the higher the electricity demand becomes, the more costly the
achievement of ambitious CO2 emission reduction targets (in comparison to historically
observed emission levels) will be. In the three economic scenarios, Europe’s electricity
demand is assumed to either decrease by 15 % (‘Low-cost’), to stay constant at 2010
levels (‘Base’) or to increase by 15 % (‘High-cost’) up to 2050 (compared to 2010 lev-
els). The scenario specifications aim at deriving a wide range of decarbonization costs,
including very high and very low costs of decarbonization. A detailed listing of the
scenario-specific electricity demand per country in TWh can be found in Table A.3 of
the Appendix.
36In the scenarios, the gas-to-coal spread increases due to the fact that the gas price increases at a
higher rate than the coal price.
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Except for RES-E investment costs, fossil fuel prices and electricity demand, all other
parameters are kept constant throughout the scenarios.37 In particular, the development
of Europe’s electricity grid up to 2050 is assumed to be the same in all scenarios. While
power transfers within the single market regions are assumed to face no transmission
constraints (as market regions are modeled as copper plates), power exchange between
the market regions is limited by exogenously defined interconnection capacities, which
are assumed to increase overall by a factor of 2.5 by 2050 (compared to 2010 levels).
Specifically, interconnection capacity extensions are limited to projects that have already
entered the planning or permission phase today, based on the ENTSO-E’s 10-Year Net-
work Development Plan (ENTSO-E (2010)), but whose commissioning is assumed to be
delayed. As such, the assumed interconnection capacity expansions correspond to the
values assumed in Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a) (Scenario B: Moderate transmission grid). This
increase allows for the deployment of renewable energy technologies at favorable regions
across Europe (such as wind power in northern Europe and solar power in southern
Europe), as well as the corresponding power flows from market regions with favorable
renewable energy potentials to market regions with less favorable renewable energy po-
tentials. However, the assumed expansion of interconnection capacities cannot be seen
as optimal from a total system perspective.38 Nevertheless, the assumption of limited
(instead of optimal) interconnection capacity expansions seems appropriate for several
reasons: First, many grid extension projects are currently facing significant delays, of-
ten due to long planning and authorization procedures and local opposition based on
health and environmental concerns (Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a) and Buijs et al. (2011)). Thus,
the assumed interconnector capacity increase (factor of 2.5 by 2050) seems rather am-
bitious, especially when taking into consideration that intra-regional transmission lines
will need to be massively expanded in order to integrate renewable energies. Second, it
is questionable to what extent a country with favorable RES-E potentials would go to
exploit their own resources, possibly jeopardizing their landscapes, in order to provide
neighboring countries with cheaper RES-E electricity – even though it may minimize
overall power generation costs. Third, the cost savings from an optimal interconnection
capacity expansion, in comparison to the assumed expansion factor of 2.5 by 2050, are
found to be moderate (Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a)).39
37The most important parameters with regard to the total system costs (and hence the costs of decar-
bonization) are listed in the Appendix, including investment costs and fixed operation and maintenance
costs of renewable, conventional, nuclear and storage technologies, as well as fuel prices, electricity de-
mand per country and year, efficiency factors (generation), CO2 emission factors and technical lifetimes
of all technologies.
38Within the single market regions, which are subdivided into several subregions for wind and solar
power generation, renewable energy technologies are cost optimally deployed, given the implicit assump-
tion of no transmission constraints within the market regions (copper plate).
39Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a), who analyze the role of grid expansions in a cost-efficient transformation of
the European electricity system (to an 80 % RES-E share) by 2050, find that large grid extensions (both
within and between countries) allow for the full exploitation of the most favorable RES-E sites throughout
Europe and are thus beneficial from a least-cost perspective. However, the cost savings due to an optimal
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In addition, overnight investment costs of nuclear power plants are assumed to amount
to 3,160 e2010/kWel in all scenarios. This is in line with the assumption made in the
IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2011, which estimates the overnight costs of new nuclear
power plants to lie between 2,700 - 3,600 e/kWel (i.e. 3,500 - 4,600 USD/kWel) in OECD
countries (IEA (2011)). Note that these figures exclude financing costs, which commonly
account for a significant share of the total cost of building a nuclear plant (IEA (2011)).
However, if plants are built by publicly-owned (instead of privately-owned) utilities,
the costs of financing are significantly lower due to access to cheap government-backed
financing (IEA (2011)).40
2.5 Scenario results
The subsequent analysis is structured as follows: Section 2.5.1 provides a general over-
view of the total system costs associated with the alternative decarbonization pathways
for different economic framework conditions. Section 2.5.2 analyzes the minimal costs
of decarbonization given a stand-alone CO2 reduction target of 90 % in 2050 (compared
to 1990 levels) and discusses the cost implications of both the economic framework
conditions and politically implemented restrictions on the use of nuclear power and
CCS. Thereupon, Section 2.5.3 analyzes the excess costs of supplementary RES-E targets
depending on the economic framework conditions and the availability of alternative low-
carbon technologies. Moreover, the cost implications of national technology-specific
instead of EU-wide technology-neutral targets in 2020 are discussed.41
2.5.1 Overview of total system costs and costs of decarbonization
Table 2.5 lists the discounted scenario-specific total system costs and the costs of decar-
bonization, accumulated to 2050 in billion (bn) e2010. Total system costs are defined as
the sum of discounted investment, fixed operation and maintenance and variable gen-
eration costs of the electricity generation system accumulated from 2010 until 2050.42
dimensioning of interconnection capacities are rather small. Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a) compare the overall
cost-efficient system transformation (scenario A) to a scenario in which interconnector capacities are only
moderately extended (scenario B). The difference in accumulated investment costs between scenario A
and scenario B up to 2050 amounts to only 1.7 %.
40Note that construction delays, which are commonly observed in new nuclear programs or when
building non-standard designs, can greatly increase costs, as shown by the two evolutionary power
reactors (EPRs) currently being built in Finland and France (IEA (2011)).
41The general focus of the analysis is on the cost implications of politically implemented targets and
restrictions, rather than the cost-efficient development of regional capacities or generation throughout
Europe. Nevertheless, an overview of the cost-efficient capacity and generation mix in 2050 for the
different scenarios can be found in Table A.9 of the Appendix.
42Total system costs also include the annualized investment costs of all existing conventional, renewable
and storage capacities in 2010, which are assumed not to be completely depreciated by the year 2010.
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Total system costs do not include investment costs for the necessary infrastructure and
operational costs for grid management. The costs of decarbonization correspond to the
difference in total system costs between the scenarios with a CO2 target and the scenar-
ios with ‘no target’. For example, the costs of decarbonization of Scenario 2-III-B (431
bn e2010) are derived by substracting the total system costs of Scenario 1-III-B (1,345
bn e2010) from the total system costs of Scenario 2-III-B (1,776 bn e2010).43
Table 2.5: Total system costs (and costs of decarbonization) accumulated (up to
2050) and discounted (5 %) [bn e2010]
Political scenario Economic scenario
CO2 and RES-E
Nuclear CCS Low-cost Base High-cost
investment investment [L] [B] [H]
No target
Option Option [1-I] 1,248 1,331 1,415
Option No option [1-II] 1,248 1,331 1,415
No option Option [1-III] 1,261 1,345 1,430
No option No option [1-IV] 1,261 1,345 1,430
CO2 target
Option Option [2-I] 1387 (139) 1502 (171) 1588 (173)
Option No option [2-II] 1394 (146) 1518 (187) 1616 (201)
No option Option [2-III] 1506 (258) 1776 (431) 1948 (516)
No option No option [2-IV] 1541 (280) 1858 (513) 2051 (621)
Option Option [3-I] 1466 (218) 1739 (408) 1879 (464)
CO2 & RES-E
Option No option [3-II] 1469 (221) 1741 (410) 1882 (467)
target
No option Option [3-III] 1512 (264) 1811 (466) 1984 (554)
No option No option [3-IV] 1546 (285) 1873 (528) 2063 (633)
The scenario matrix provides several important insights on the effects of alternative
energy policies on both the total system costs and the costs of decarbonization under
different economic framework conditions (‘Low-cost’, ‘Base’ and ‘High-cost’). First, to-
tal system costs are the lowest in scenarios with no politically implemented targets or
restrictions (Scenario 1-I-L to 1-IV-H). In this case, however, CO2 emissions increase
by 25-68 % by 2050 (compared to 1990 levels) due to a massive increase in electricity
generation from low-cost coal-fired power plants across Europe.44 Second, if a stand-
alone CO2 reduction target is implemented and both low-carbon technologies – nuclear
power and CCS – are available for power generation (2-I-L to 2-I-H) the decarbonization
of Europe’s power sector can be achieved at moderate costs. Third, the costs of decar-
bonization significantly rise with the number of political targets and restrictions in place.
43Equally, the costs of decarbonization of Scenario 3-I-H (464 bn e2010) are derived by substracting
the total system costs of Scenario 1-I-H (1,415 bn e2010) from the total system costs of Scenario 3-I-H
(1,879 bn e2010).
44This is in line with Haller et al. (2012), who estimate that in the absence of emission caps, investments
in coal-fired power plants take place, causing emissions in 2050 to be 20-40 % higher than in 2010.
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Specifically, costs of decarbonization are the highest given both supplementary RES-E
targets and politically implemented restrictions on the use of nuclear power and CCS
(3-IV-L to 3-IV-H). Fourth, the impact of the economic scenario on the costs of decar-
bonization increases with the number of political targets and restrictions in place. For
example, the rise in the costs of decarbonization due to supplementary RES-E targets
(in comparison to a stand-alone CO2 reduction target) is the largest in the ‘High-cost’
economic scenarios (compare Scenario 3-I-H with Scenario 2-I-H).
Overall, the costs of decarbonization vary between 139 and 633 bn e2010 depending
on the political and economic framework conditions in place. This corresponds to
an increase of between 11 % and 44 % compared to the total system costs when no
CO2 reduction targets are implemented. In the following sections, the cost implications
of different political targets and restrictions are analyzed in more detail.
2.5.2 Minimal costs of decarbonization given a stand-alone EU-wide
CO2 target
The decarbonization of Europe’s power sector is achieved at minimal costs given a stand-
alone EU-wide CO2 reduction target and no restrictions on the usage of nuclear power
and CCS. Total system costs increase from 1,331 bn e2010 in Scenario 1-I-B – where no
CO2 reduction targets are implemented – to 1,502 bn e2010 in Scenario 2-I-B – where
Europe achieves a 90 % CO2 reduction target by 2050 (compared to 1990 levels). As
such, the decarbonization of Europe’s power sector up until 2050 is achieved at moderate
costs of 171 bn e2010, or plus 13 %.
As shown in Figure 2.2, the 90 % CO2 reduction target in 2050 is accomplished through
the expansion of nuclear power, renewable energies and CCS technologies in Scenario
2-I-B. Specifically, the expansion of nuclear power accounts for 770 Mt CO2 in 2050, the
expansion of renewables for 207 Mt CO2 and the application of CCS for 149 Mt CO2 .
45
These scenario results point out the cost advantage of nuclear power in low-carbon power
systems. However, our cost assumptions for nuclear power do not account for the risk
costs of nuclear accidents (but do account for the costs of nuclear waste disposal).
As shown in Figure 2.3, installed nuclear power capacities increase from 135 GW in 2010
to 221 GW in 2050 in Scenario 2-I-B – with the largest expansions occuring in Italy, Great
Britain, Germany and Spain. In 2050, 48 % of Europe’s electricity demand is supplied by
nuclear power. Aside from nuclear power, renewables play a crucial role in achieving the
90 % CO2 reduction target. In 2050, total onshore wind capacities amount to 130 GW,
45The CO2 savings are derived by comparing the CO2 emissions of Europe’s electricity generation mix
in 2050 with the emissions in 2010.
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supplying 377 TWh or 11 % of Europe’s electricity demand. Moreover, biomass CHP-
power plants (plus 18 GW) and geothermal capacities (plus 15 GW) are expanded across
Europe up until 2050. Conversely, no investments take place in offshore wind and solar
power technologies (PV and CSP). In total, renewables account for 36 % of Europe’s
electricity demand in 2050. CCS applied to thermal power plants plays an important
part in countries with traditionally high shares of lignite-fired power generation, such as
Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic. In 2050, installed capacities of lignite-CCS
power plants amount to over 23 GW in Germany, 9 GW in Poland and 7 GW in the
Czech Republic.46 In total, lignite-fired power plants equipped with CCS technology
supply 11 % of Europe’s electricity demand in 2050 in Scenario 2-I-B.
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Figure 2.2: Total CO2 savings in 2050 compared to 2010 levels [Mt CO2 ]
2.5.2.1 Implications of the economic framework
The costs of decarbonization in the ‘Low-cost’ (2-I-L) and ‘High-cost’ scenarios (2-I-H)
hardly differ from the costs of decarbonization in the ‘Base’ scenario (2-I-B). While the
costs of decarbonization amount to 139 bn e2010 in the ‘Low-cost’ scenario (2-I-L), the
costs of decarbonization amount to 173 bn e2010 in the ‘High-cost’ scenario (2-I-H),
which corresponds to a plus of 11 % and 12 %, respectively, compared to the total
46CCS applied to coal- and gas-fired power plants is not a cost-efficient investment option. This is due
to the fact that renewables depict a lower cost CO2 abatement option to achieve commitment with the
EU-wide CO2 reduction targets in the long run compared to coal- and gas-fired power plants equipped
with the CCS technology.
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Figure 2.3: Capacity and generation mix in 2050 in Scenario 2-I-B
(The historical 2010 values are based on EURELECTRIC (2012).)
system costs if no CO2 reduction targets are implemented (Scenarios 1-I-L and 1-I-
H). These results highlight the fact that the decarbonization of Europe’s power sector
does not need to be associated with a drastic increase of total system costs up until
the year 2050. Even in the ‘High-cost’ scenario (2-I-H), the costs of decarbonization
are manageable as long as competition between all low-carbon technologies – including
nuclear power and CCS – is ensured.
So far, it has been shown that the decarbonization of Europe’s power sector is achieved
at minimal costs under a stand-alone CO2 reduction target and no restrictions on the
use of nuclear power and CCS. However, nuclear power and CCS are currently facing
strong headwinds in several EU member states, primarily due to public concerns about
the associated risks. For reasons of policy relevance, we quantify the implications of
politically implemented restrictions on the use of nuclear power and CCS for both the
costs of decarbonization and the marginal costs of compliance with the CO2 reduction
targets.
2.5.2.2 Implications of restrictions on the use of nuclear power and CCS
After the Fukushima disaster in March 2011, several EU member states decided to either
phase out their existing nuclear power plants, postpone plans to construct new nuclear
power plants or reinforced the decision to stay a nuclear-free country. Given the current
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policy situation, we analyze the cost implications of politically implemented restrictions
on the use of nuclear power in Europe.
If the construction of new nuclear power plants is restricted across Europe, the costs of
decarbonization increase by 152 % to 431 bn e2010 in Scenario 2-III-B compared to the
minimal costs of decarbonization in Scenario 2-I-B (171 bn e2010).47 The corresponding
excess costs of 260 bn e2010 primarily occur due to the large-scale replacement of nuclear
power plants by more expensive RES-E technologies.
In comparison to Scenario 2-I-B, total installed capacities across Europe significantly
increase in Scenario 2-III-B due to the massive expansion of fluctuating wind (on- and
offshore) and solar power (PV) plants, which exhibit significant lower full load hours
than nuclear power plants. While total installed capacities amount to 726 GW in the
case of no political restrictions on the use of nuclear power across Europe (Scenario 2-I-
B), total installed capacities amount to 1,185 GW (plus 63 %) given a complete nuclear
phase-out in Europe by 2050 (Scenario 2-III-B).48
Besides the availability of nuclear power, the availability of CCS also significantly affects
the costs of decarbonization up to 2050. From a technical viewpoint, CCS technology
could play an important role in the transition towards a decarbonized power sector in
Europe. However, it remains uncertain whether CCS will be commercially available for
application in conventional power plants after 2030, primarily due to public concerns
regarding the transportation and storage of CO2 .
If CCS does not become commercially available for application in conventional power
plants in Europe after 2030, the costs of decarbonization increase by 9 % to 187 bn
e2010 in Scenario 2-II-B compared to the minimal costs of decarbonization in Scenario
2-I-B (171 bn e2010). Overall, Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic replace 39
GW of lignite-CCS power plants (in Scenario 2-I-B) with 27 GW of additional nuclear
capacities, 6 GW of additional gas capacities and 10 GW of additional lignite power
plants (in Scenario 2-II-B).49 However, if nuclear power is also not an investment option,
the cost increase due to a restriction of CCS is more pronounced. Specifically, the costs
of decarbonization increase by over 13 %, which can be explained by the fact that lignite-
CCS power plants need to be replaced with more expensive RES-E technologies instead
of nuclear power plants.
47The restriction on the construction of new nuclear power plants leads to a complete phase-out of
nuclear power in Europe by the year 2050 due to the assumption that all existing nuclear power plants
are shutdown at the end of their technical lifetimes.
48Specifically, 221 GW of nuclear capacities are replaced by 144 GW of additional onshore wind
capacities, 172 GW of additional offshore wind capacities and 136 GW of additional PV capacities
in 2050. Moreover, 189 GW of gas-fired power plants and 45 GW of storage capacities (CAES) are
additionally deployed by 2050 to ensure the countinuous balance of demand and supply.
49This is in line with Capros et al. (2012a), who find that if nuclear is an investment option, the
absence of CCS only causes moderate changes in the cumulative energy system costs.
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If the construction of both new nuclear power plants and conventional power plants
equipped with CCS technology is restricted across Europe, the costs of decarbonization
rise by 200 % to 513 bn e2010 in Scenario 2-IV-B compared to the minimal costs of
decarbonization in Scenario 2-I-B (171 bn e2010). For comparison, the costs of decar-
bonization increase by 100 % to 280 bn e2010 in the ‘Low-cost’ scenario (2-IV-L), and by
260 % to 621 bn e2010 in the ‘High-cost’ scenario (2-IV-H) as a consequence of politically
implemented restrictions on the use of nuclear power and CCS.
In addition to the rise in the costs of decarbonization, the impact of politically imple-
mented restrictions on the use of nuclear power and CCS can also be identified by an
increase in the marginal costs of compliance with the annual CO2 reduction targets, as
shown in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Marginal costs of compliance with the annual CO2 reduction targets
[e2010/t CO2 ] (not discounted)
Nuclear investment CCS investment Scenario 2020 2030 2040 2050
‘Low-cost’
Option Option [2-I-L] 36 16 29 62
Option No option [2-II-L] 36 29 41 68
No option Option [2-III-L] 36 27 65 65
No option No option [2-IV-L] 36 50 79 73
‘Base’
Option Option [2-I-B] 41 19 28 78
Option No option [2-II-B] 41 34 32 76
No option Option [2-III-B] 41 27 103 91
No option No option [2-IV-B] 42 58 128 99
‘High-cost’
Option Option [2-I-C] 39 17 36 82
Option No option [2-II-C] 35 35 72 83
Nooption Option [2-III-C] 41 26 101 177
No option No option [2-IV-C] 38 61 129 197
The marginal costs of compliance reflect the change in the total system costs associated
with the abatement of the last ton of CO2 needed to achieve the CO2 reduction target
for a specific year. As such, the marginal costs of compliance present the additional costs
of the last CO2 abatement option chosen compared to that of the replaced technology.
As per assumption, the politically implied CO2 reduction targets become more restrictive
over time (CO2 target increases from 20 % in 2020 to 90 % in 2050), whereas the
costs of existing low-carbon technologies decrease over the years and new technologies
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become available. Hence, the marginal costs of compliance do not need to increase
steadily over time. An example for the impact of new technologies on the marginal
costs of compliance is the introduction of CCS from 2030 onwards, which causes the
marginal costs of compliance in Scenario 2-I-B to drop from 41 e2010/t CO2 to 19
e2010/t CO2 between 2020 and 2030. Conversely, in Scenario 2-II-B, where CCS does
not depict an investment option, marginal costs of compliance decrease only from 41
e2010/t CO2 to 34 e2010/t CO2 between 2020 and 2030.50
Likewise, the availability of nuclear power – as a comparatively low-cost CO2 abatement
option – has a significant impact on the marginal costs of compliance with the annual
CO2 reduction targets. The effect can, for example, be seen when comparing Scenario
2-III-B with Scenario 2-I-B. If no restrictions on the use of nuclear power across Europe
are implemented, then the marginal costs of compliance in 2050 amount to 78 e2010/t
CO2 . However, if Europe pursues a complete nuclear phase-out by 2050, marginal costs
increase to over 91 e2010/t CO2 in 2050.
Naturally, the marginal costs of compliance with the EU-wide CO2 reduction targets also
depend on the assumed economic framework conditions (‘Low-cost’, ‘Base’ and ‘High-
cost’). The less favorable the economic conditions are (towards achieving low costs of
decarbonization), especially considering higher RES-E investment costs or total electric-
ity demand, the higher the marginal costs of compliance with the annual CO2 reduction
targets will be, especially in the target year 2050.
After having analyzed the minimal costs of decarbonization under a stand-alone CO2 tar-
get and the associated cost implications of both the economic framework conditions and
the availability of nuclear power and CCS, we analyze the excess costs associated with
the supplementary RES-E targets.
2.5.3 Excess costs of supplementary RES-E targets
Supplementary RES-E targets interfere with the least-cost idea of implementing a stand-
alone CO2 reduction target by exempting a particular CO2 abatement option from the
common benchmark price. Hence, supplementary RES-E targets may lead to excess
costs. However, the actual amount of excess costs significantly depends on the avail-
ability of other low-carbon technologies such as nuclear power and CCS as well as the
economic framework conditions.
50The decrease is due to the fact that both the investment costs of existing RES-E technologies decrease
and more advanced RES-E technologies become available. For example, to account for technological
progress expected in the wind power sector, 8 MW onshore and offshore wind turbines can be built from
2030 onwards, which are characterized by higher full load hours, lower specific investment costs and a
lower space requirement per MW installed (km2/MW).
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Figure 2.4: C pacity and generation mix in 2050 in Scenario 3-I-B
(The historical 2010 values are based on EURELECTRIC (2012).)
Our scenario analysis shows that the costs of decarbonization significantly increase – in
comparison to a stand-alone CO2 reduction target – if supplementary RES-E targets
(of up to 85 % in 2050) are implemented and the use of nuclear power and CCS is not
restricted. Overall, the costs of decarbonization increase to 408 bn e2010 in Scenario
3-I-B, which corresponds to a plus of almost 140 % compared to the minimal costs of
decarbonization under a stand-alone CO2 target in Scenario 2-I-B (171 bn e2010). Hence,
given no politically implemented restrictions on nuclear power and CCS, supplementary
RES-E targets lead to excess costs of over 237 bn e2010 until 2050.51 Interestingly, the
excess costs of supplementary RES-E targets (237 bn e2010) lay in the same range as
the excess costs of a complete nuclear phase-out in Europe by 2050 (274 bn e2010). This
is due to the fact that in both cases, the decarbonization of Europe’s power sector is
largely achieved through the expansion of renewable energies by 2050.
As shown in Figure 2.2, renewables account for 978 Mt CO2 or 91 % of total CO2 savings
in 2050 in Scenario 3-I-B. In comparison to Scenario 2-I-B, offshore wind turbines and
solar power capacities are also deployed to achieve commitment with the RES-E targets
(see Figure 2.4).52 Overall, 245 GW of onshore wind turbines, 197 GW of offshore
wind turbines, 121 GW of PV systems, 53 GW of CSP plants, 26 of GW biomass
power plants (incl. CHP-plants) and 16 GW of geothermal power plants are installed
51However, given the fact that our cost assumptions for nuclear power account for the costs of nuclear
waste disposal, but not for the risk costs of nuclear accidents, the excess costs of supplementary RES-E
targets represent an upper bound estimate.
52However, unlike onshore wind, investments in offshore wind and solar power capacities do not take
place before 2020.
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by 2050 in Scenario 3-I-B. In comparison to Scenario 2-I-B, total installed capacities
across Europe increase by 65 % in Scenario 3-I-B due to the large-scale expansion of
fluctuating wind (onshore and offshore) and solar power (PV) plants with comparatively
low full load hours per year. However, given the formulation of EU-wide (technology-
neutral) RES-E targets, the deployment of capacities takes place at the most favorable
sites across Europe. Onshore and offshore wind turbines are primarily deployed in
northern European countries with good wind conditions such as Great Britain (97 GW),
(northern) France (96 GW), Germany (78 GW), the Netherlands (36 GW) and Norway
(23 GW). PV systems are primarily installed in southern European countries such as
Italy (52 GW), Spain (17 GW) and (southern) France (20 GW). Moreover, 45 GW of
CSP plants equipped with thermal storage devices are deployed across southern Europe
by 2050 (mostly in Spain).
Table 2.7: Marginal costs of compliance with the annual CO2 reduction targets
[e2010/t CO2 ] (not discounted) given supplementary RES-E targets
Nuclear investment CCS investment Scenario 2020 2030 2040 2050
‘Low-cost’
Option Option [3-I-L] 18 7 54 37
Option No invest. option [3-II-L] 18 17 68 37
No invest. option Option [3-III-L] 35 19 58 55
No invest. option No invest. option [3-IV-L] 35 43 79 72
‘Base’
Option Option [3-I-B] 23 7 49 42
Option No invest. option [3-II-B] 22 12 68 42
No invest. option Option [3-III-B] 39 18 69 80
No invest. option No invest. option [3-IV-B] 38 46 95 97
‘High-cost’
Option Option [3-I-C] 28 6 37 50
Option No invest. option [3-II-C] 27 13 66 55
No invest. option Option [3-III-C] 39 22 79 94
No invest. option No invest. option [3-IV-C] 38 54 104 159
In addition to the increase in the costs of decarbonization, the impact of supplementary
RES-E targets can also be identified by a change in the marginal costs of compliance
with the annual CO2 reduction targets. Table 2.7 lists the marginal costs of compliance
in e2010/t CO2 for the scenarios assuming supplementary RES-E targets. Overall, the
supplementary RES-E targets – which increase from 36 % in 2020 to 85 % in 2050 – have
a clear downward pressure on the marginal costs of compliance with the CO2 reduction
Chapter 2. Decarbonizing Europe’s power sector by 2050 - Analyzing the economic
implications of alternative decarbonization pathways 35
targets across the scenarios (compare Table 2.7 with Table 2.6).53 Nevertheless, the
marginal costs of compliance with the annual CO2 reduction targets are always greater
than zero, meaning the implied CO2 reduction targets are binding in all years.
2.5.3.1 Implications of the economic framework
The excess costs associated with supplementary RES-E targets significantly depend
on the assumed economic development. In the ‘Base’ economic scenario, excess costs
amount to 237 bn e2010 (increase of 140 % compared to the minimal costs of decar-
bonization), whereas excess costs amount to only 79 bn e2010 (increase of 60 %) in the
‘Low-cost’ scenario (3-I-L) and to more than 291 bn e2010 (increase of 170 %) in the
‘High-cost’ scenario (3-I-H). These results are primarily driven by the assumptions re-
garding the future development of RES-E investment costs. Obviously, excess costs of
supplementary RES-E targets decrease as the level of RES-E investment costs decreases.
Moreover, given a limited potential of favorable renewable energy sites across Europe,
excess costs of supplementary RES-E targets decrease as the level of Europe’s electricity
demand decreases – given the assumption that the RES-E targets are formulated as a
percentage of Europe’s total electricity demand.
So far, we have shown that supplementary RES-E targets lead to significant excess costs
in comparison to a stand-alone CO2 target. However, the preceding analysis was based
on the assumption that no politically implemented restrictions on the use of nuclear
power and CCS exist up until the year 2050. In the following section, we show that
supplementary RES-E targets may be redundant if the use of nuclear power and CCS
is restricted. In such a scenario the overall costs of decarbonization are comparatively
high, whereas the excess costs of supplementary RES-E targets are close to zero (in
comparison to a stand-alone CO2 reduction target).
2.5.3.2 Implications of restrictions on the use of nuclear power and CCS
The costs of decarbonization significantly increase (in comparison to a stand-alone
CO2 target) if supplementary RES-E targets and restrictions on the use of nuclear
power and CCS are implemented. Specifically, the costs of decarbonization increase to
528 bn e2010 in Scenario 3-IV-B, corresponding to a plus of almost 310 % in compar-
ison to the minimal costs of decarbonization under a stand-alone CO2 target (and no
nuclear or CCS restrictions) in Scenario 2-I-B (171 bn e2010). However, the excess costs
53This effect has also been shown by Tsao et al. (2011) for the California electricity market, by Unger
and Ahlgren (2005) for the northern European electricity markets and by De Jonghe et al. (2009) for
the Belgian, French and German electricity markets.
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of supplementary RES-E targets amount to only 15 bn e2010 (compare Scenario 3-IV-B
with Scenario 2-IV-B), which can be explained by the fact that Europe’s power sector
will already be based on RES-E technologies to achieve the decarbonization target by
2050 – if the construction of new nuclear power plants and conventional power plants
equipped with CCS technology is restricted. Hence, supplementary RES-E targets are
quasi redundant.
This effect can also be seen when analyzing the marginal costs of compliance with the
annual RES-E targets, which reflect the change in the total system costs associated
with the supply of the last MWh of RES-E electricity production needed to achieve
the RES-E target in a specific year. As shown in Table 2.8, the marginal costs of
compliance with the annual RES-E targets significantly depend on the availability of
alternative low-carbon technologies. For example, the marginal costs of compliance with
the RES-E targets can drop to zero in scenarios that combine challenging CO2 reduction
targets with restrictions on the usage of nuclear power and CCS.54 Thus, the additionally
implemented RES-E targets are rendered non-binding. This is, for example, the case in
Scenario 3-IV-L, 3-IV-B and 3-IV-C for the year 2050.
Moreover, the marginal costs of compliance with the RES-E targets also depend on the
assumed economic scenario (‘Low-cost’, ‘Base’ and ‘High-cost’). The less favorable the
economic conditions (towards achieving low costs of decarbonization) are, the higher the
marginal costs of compliance with the RES-E targets will be.
So far, we have shown that supplementary RES-E targets lead to higher costs of de-
carbonization in comparison to a stand-alone CO2 target but that the excess costs
associated with supplementary RES-E targets crucially depend on the availability of
alternative low-carbon technologies such as nuclear power and CCS. The next section
demonstrates that the excess costs of supplementary RES-E targets also depend on the
specific formulation of the RES-E targets. Up to now, the analysis was based on the
assumption that EU-wide technology-neutral targets are implemented, which increase
from 36 % in 2020 to 85 % in 2050. For reasons of policy relevance, a sensitivity analysis
of Scenario 3-I-B is simulated by considering national technology-specific RES-E targets
instead of an EU-wide (technology-neutral) RES-E target in 2020.
54These findings are in line with De Jonghe et al. (2009), who show that at high CO2 emission restric-
tions, the RES-E quota restriction becomes a non-binding constraint and thus yields a zero certificate
price.
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Table 2.8: Marginal costs of compliance with the RES-E targets per year
[e2010/MWh] (not discounted)
Nuclear investment CCS investment Scenario 2020 2030 2040 2050
‘Low-cost’
Option Option [3-I-L] 18 33 19 31
Option No option [3-II-L] 17 32 12 28
No option Option [3-III-L] 2 23 9 3
No option No option [3-IV-L] 3 8 0 0
‘Base’
Option Option [3-I-B] 18 49 71 60
Option No option [3-II-B] 18 46 60 56
No option Option [3-III-B] 6 36 51 2
No option No option [3-IV-B] 7 23 32 0
‘High-cost’
Option Option [3-I-C] 0 55 95 71
Option No option [3-II-C] 0 54 80 72
No option Option [3-III-C] 0 38 63 20
No option No option [3-IV-C] 0 17 45 0
2.5.3.3 Implications of a national technology-specific RES-E targets in 2020
For the sensitivity analysis of Scenario 3-I-B, we assume that the EU member states
achieve the national technology-specific RES-E targets specified in their National Re-
newable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) for 2020 instead of an EU-wide (technology-
neutral) RES-E target of 36 % in 2020. All other assumptions are kept constant. Specifi-
cally, we assume that the national technology-specific RES-E targets of the EU member
states’ NREAPs only exist until 2020 and are replaced by the EU-wide (technology-
neutral) RES-E targets of Scenario 3-I-B from 2020 onwards. Hence, both scenarios
achieve a 85 % RES-E target by 2050. They only differ with regard to the 2020 RES-E
target.
Overall, the costs of decarbonization up until 2050 amount to 598 bn e2010 in the
‘Sensitivity’ scenario of 3-I-B, which assumes that the EU member states achieve their
national technology-specific NREAP targets instead of an EU-wide (technology-neutral)
RES-E target of 36 % in 2020. In order to quantify the excess costs of the national
technology-specific RES-E targets for 2020 in comparison to the EU-wide technology-
neutral energy target of 36 % in 2020, the results of the ‘Sensitivity’ scenario need to
be set in relation to the results of Scenario 3-I-B. Overall, the costs of decarbonization
increase by 47 % from 408 bn e2010 in Scenario 3-I-B to 598 bn e2010 in the ‘Sensitivity’
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scenario. Hence, the EU member states’ NREAP targets are associated with excess costs
of more than 190 bn e2010.55
In comparison to the EU-wide (technology-neutral) RES-E target, the EU member
states’ technology-specific RES-E targets lead to excess costs for two reasons: First,
technology-specific targets prevent the utilization of the least-cost RES-E technologies.
Second, national targets prevent the allocation of RES-E technologies at the most fa-
vorable sites in Europe (with the highest full load hours).
The sub-optimal choice of RES-E technologies, in the case of the EU member states’
NREAP targets, is reflected by a significant expansion of PV and offshore wind up to
2020, as shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Scenario-specific capacity and generation mix in 2020, Scenario 3-I-B and
‘Sensitivity’
While the EU member states’ NREAPs forsee more than 83 TWh PV electricity genera-
tion in Europe by 2020 (41 TWh in Germany alone), PV electricity generation amounts
to only 33 TWh in Scenario 3-I-B, assuming an EU-wide (technology-neutral) RES-E
target of 36 % for 2020.56 A similar case holds for offshore wind power. While the
NREAP targets forsee a total offshore wind power generation of 142 TWh in 2020, only
15 TWh offshore wind power is generated in Scenario 3-I-B.
55For comparison, Aune et al. (2012), who apply a multi-market energy equilibrium model to analyze
the cost implications of the EU’s 20 % renewable energy target for the year 2020, estimate that a common
renewable energy target for all member states alongside a EU-wide green certificates trading system may
cut the EU’s total cost of fulfilling the renewable target for 2020 by 70 % compared to a situation with
differentiated national targets for each of the member states with domestic trade of certificates only.
56In Scenario 3-I-B, no additional PV capacities are installed by 2020. Only existing PV capacities
(already installed in 2010) are used to generate power.
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In addition to the sub-optimal choice of RES-E technologies, excess costs also occur
due to an inefficient regional allocation of RES-E technologies. For example, although
total onshore wind capacities in 2020 are 5 % lower in Scenario 3-I-B than in the ‘Sen-
sitivity’ scenario with the NREAP targets, total onshore wind electricity generation is
5 % higher.57 Unlike the national technology-specific NREAP targets, the EU-wide
technology-neutral RES-E target ensures the deployment of wind power turbines at the
most favorable sites in Europe until 2020. As a consequence, the average full load hours
achieved by the onshore (offshore) wind turbines deployed across Europe in 2020 are 11
% (14 %) higher in Scenario 3-I-B than in the ‘Sensitivity’ scenario using the NREAP
targets.
The sub-optimal choice of RES-E technologies and the inefficient regional allocation in
the case of national technology-specific RES-E targets are also reflected by the marginal
costs of compliance with the NREAP targets in 2020, which depict the related system
costs for an additional MWh of a certain RES-E technology produced in a specific coun-
try in 2020. Table 2.9 lists the assumed country-specific onshore wind, offshore wind
and PV targets for 2020, as well as the corresponding marginal costs of compliance.58
The marginal costs of compliance with the national technology-specific (onshore and
offshore) wind and PV targets increase with the target level, due to the fact that the
national potential of favorable wind and solar sites (with high full load hours) is lim-
ited. Hence, wind turbines and PV systems may need to be deployed at less favorable
sites within the country to achieve commitment with the technology-specific targets.59
However, it should be noted that even in the absence of space potential restrictions,
the marginal costs of compliance with the national technology-specific (onshore and off-
shore) wind and PV targets would increase as the target level increases. This is due
to the fact that the marginal value of wind and solar power units (with no short-run
marginal costs of power generation) decreases as the wind and solar power penetration
increases, as explained in Chapter 3.60
Except for Italy and Portugal, the marginal costs of compliance with the national PV
targets are significantly higher than for the national onshore wind targets in 2020, de-
spite the fact that the national PV targets are significantly lower in all countries. In
Germany, for example, the marginal costs of compliance with the national PV target
in 2020 (41.4 TWh) amount to over 293 e2010/MWh, whereas the marginal costs of
57In Scenario 3-I-B: 162 GW and 370 TWh, respectively; in ‘Sensitivity’ scenario with NREAP targets:
170 GW and 352 TWh, respectively. Note that the implied national technology-specific onshore wind
targets in the ‘Sensitivity’ scenario for 2020 are exceeded in Denmark and Ireland.
58The assumed country-specific biomass, geothermal and CSP targets for 2020, as well as the corre-
sponding average marginal costs of compliance, are listed in Table A.8 of the Appendix.
59As explained in Section 2.3.5, the deployment of wind and solar power technologies within a subregion
is restricted by a space potential in km2.
60The marginal value of wind and solar power units is defined as the revenue from selling electricity
on the wholesale market during the unit’s technical lifetime.
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compliance with the national onshore wind target in 2020 (72.7 TWh) amount to only
97 e2010/MWh. Moreover, the marginal costs of compliance with the national onshore
wind targets are always lower than the marginal costs of compliance with the national
offshore wind targets, although the national offshore targets are lower than the onshore
wind targets (except for Belgium).61 These differences reflect the sub-optimal choice of
RES-E technologies.
Table 2.9: National technology-specific RES-E targets [TWh] for 2020 (EC (2010b))
and marginal costs of compliance [e2010/MWh] (not discounted)
Onshore wind Offshore wind PV
[TWh] [e2010/MWh TWh] [e2010/MWh] [TWh] [e2010/MWh]
Austria 4.8 88 - - 0.3 268
Belgium 4.3 14 6.2 99 1.1 373
Bulgaria 2.6 262 - - 0.4 273
Czech Republic 1.5 31 - - 1.7 324
Denmark 6.4 0 5.3 141 - -
Estland 1.0 48 0.6 227 - -
Finland 3.5 31 2.5 210 - -
France 39.9 38 18.0 156 5.9 204
Germany 72.7 97 31.8 125 41.4 293
Great Britain 34.2 31 44.1 77 2.2 367
Greece 16.1 187 0.7 411 2.9 217
Hungary 1.6 125 - - 0.1 240
Ireland 10.2 0 1.7 71 - -
Italy 18.0 127 2.0 328 9.7 113
Latvia 0.5 66 0.4 220 0.0 324
Lithuania 1.3 93 - - 0.0 342
Luxemburg 0.2 75 - - 0.1 339
Netherlands 13.4 84 19.0 69 0.6 340
Poland 13.2 18 1.5 211 0.003 325
Portugal 14.4 146 0.2 199 1.5 123
Romania 8.4 220 - - 0.3 254
Slovakia 0.6 111 - - 0.3 281
Slovenia 0.2 179 - - 0.1 285
Spain 70.5 91 7.8 294 14.3 132
Sweden 12.0 22 0.5 219 - -
The inefficient regional allocation of RES-E technologies is, for example, shown by the
marginal costs of compliance with the offshore wind targets. While compliance with
the German offshore wind target (31.8 TWh) is achieved at marginal costs of more
61Note that the marginal costs of compliance with the national wind onshore targets are 0 e2010/MWh
in Denmark and Ireland. Hence the implemented targets are non-binding and thus exceeded.
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than 125 e2010/MWh, compliance with the British offshore wind target (44.1 TWh) is
achieved at marginal costs of less than 77 e2010/MWh. Hence, given the comparatively
good offshore wind conditions in Great Britain, total system costs could be lowered by
reducing the offshore wind power target in Germany and increasing the offshore wind
power target in Great Britain instead.
Overall, the scenario results show that the national technology-specific RES-E targets
prevent the cost-efficient choice and allocation of RES-E technologies across Europe.
Consequently, significant excess costs arise (190 bn e2010). In the case of the EU member
states’ NREAP targets for 2020, the excess costs are primarily due to two reasons: First,
the NREAP targets forsee a large-scale deployment of PV systems and offshore wind
power turbines, which are characterized by comparatively high investment costs up to
2020. Second, the NREAP targets allocate wind power turbines (onshore and offshore)
and PV systems at comparatively unfavorable sites across Europe.
2.6 Conclusion
The applied electricity system optimization model is a profound tool to derive a compre-
hensive set of technically feasible development pathways for Europe’s power sector up
to 2050. Specifically, the implications of alternative decarbonization pathways are ac-
curately captured from an technical perspective, as the model encompasses current and
future electricity generation technologies in detail, is characterized by a high regional
resolution and accounts for increased flexibility requirements of electricity systems with
high shares of fluctuating renewable energy sources. Our scenario analysis shows that
the costs of decarbonizing Europe’s power sector by 2050 may vary between 139 and
633 bn e2010 depending on the implementation of supplementary RES-E targets, the
availability of nuclear power and CCS technologies for power generation and the eco-
nomic framework conditions. This corresponds to an increase of between 11 % and 44
% compared to the total system costs when no CO2 reduction targets are implemented.
In line with economic theory, the decarbonization of Europe’s power sector is found to
be achieved at minimal costs under a stand-alone CO2 reduction target, which ensures
competition between all low-carbon technologies. If, however, renewable energies are
exempt from competition via supplementary RES-E targets or if investments in new
nuclear and CCS power plants are politically restricted, the costs of decarbonization
rise by between 60 % and 270 % in the scenarios. The drastic cost increase highlights
the necessity to base political interference with regard to supplementary RES-E targets
or restrictions on the use of nuclear power and CCS on a comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis. Only if the potential benefits associated with a renewable-based electricity
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system outweight the additional costs, political interference may be justified from an
economic perspective.
However, it should be stressed that the scenario results are driven by a large number of
parameters associated with uncertainty, such as the investment costs of CCS and nuclear
power plants. Likewise it is to be noted that the model does not account for feedback
effects between different markets with regard to fossil fuel prices and CO2 abatement
opportunities given its sector-specific nature. Moreover, the model assumes a price-
inelastic electricity demand and abstracts from endogenous learning curve effects.
Future research could address the following issues: First, other methodological ap-
proaches could be applied – such as an iterative approach or an reformulation of the
optimization problem as a mixed complementarity problem – to account for endogenous
learning curve effects for non-mature technologies (such as RES-E and CCS technolo-
gies) in the model. Both approaches, however, require valid assumptions regarding the
learning rates of non-mature technologies and their expansion across the world up to
2050. Second, instead of simulating three economic scenarios characterized by differ-
ent developments in RES-E investment costs, electricity demand levels and fossil fuel
prices, a probability function for the costs of decarbonization could be applied. In this
case, a large number of scenarios would need to be simulated based on random draws
(i.e., samples) of uncertain economic parameters up to 2050 – including not only RES-E
investment costs, electricity demand levels and fossil fuel prices but also, e.g., invest-
ment costs of CCS and nuclear power plants or country-specific renewable energy space
potentials. Third, while this paper provides evidence for the cost implications of supple-
mentary RES-E targets, renewable energies are often mentioned to be associated with
benefits (other than no CO2 emissions) that could be quantified and compared to the
respective costs. Most importantly, the use of local renewable energy sources may im-
prove the security of energy supply in Europe, as the diversity in generation sources
increases and the dependency on imported fuels from outside Europe decreases.
Chapter 3
The economic inefficiency of grid
parity - The case of German
photovoltaics
3.1 Introduction
In Germany, the consumption of self-produced electricity is exempt from paying taxes,
levies and surcharges. Moreover, electricity consumers pay energy-related rather than
capacity-related network tariffs, i.e., electricity consumers pay a fixed network tariff
for each kWh purchased from the grid (see Figure 3.1). The exemption from addi-
tional charges and the current network tariff structure incentivize the consumption of
self-produced rather than grid-supplied electricity. This paper analyzes the economic
consequences of this indirect financial incentive for the case of residential photovoltaic
(PV) systems – both from the single household’s and the total system perspective.
Besides the exemption from taxes, levies and surcharges as well as the allocation of grid
costs via energy- rather than capacity-related network tariffs, the government currently
promotes investments in renewable energy technologies via a feed-in tariff system in
which eligible renewable energy producers receive a fixed payment for the amount of
electricity fed into the grid (over a period of 20 years). The additional costs associated
with the promotion of renewable energies are passed on to electricity consumers via
the renewable energy surcharge. Under the current feed-in tariff system, households
typically maximize their profits by maximizing the amount of PV electricity fed into
the electricity grid. However, in 2012, the German government decided to stop the
direct financial incentives for PV electricity generation (feed-in tariff) once a cumulative
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Figure 3.1: Composition of Germany’s flat residential electricity tariff in 2013
Source: Own illustration based on BDEW (2013).
capacity of 52 GW is reached (Deutscher Bundestag (2012)), which corresponds to the
German NREAP target for 2020.62
Meanwhile, ‘PV grid parity’ was recently reached on the household level in Germany (as
a consequence of increasing residential electricity tariffs and falling PV system prices),
which marked the point in time at which the levelized costs of electricity (LCOE) of
rooftop PV systems have reached the level of the residential electricity tariff (Perez
et al. (2012)).63 Since then, the LCOE of rooftop PV systems (14 e ct/kWh - 16
e cent/kWh, Kost et al. (2012)) have fallen well below the flat residential electricity
tariff (28.5 e ct/kWh, BDEW (2013)).
Both (i) the decrease of PV electricity generation costs below the flat residential electric-
ity tariff and (ii) the exemption from taxes, levies and surcharges as well as the allocation
of grid costs via energy- rather than capacity-related network tariffs in Germany, have
made the consumption of a self-produced kWh cheaper than the consumption of a grid-
supplied kWh from the single household’s perspective. Hence, households are given a
financial incentive to install rooftop PV systems, even without receiving any feed-in
tariff.
If the residential electricity tariff further increases and the price of PV system further
decreases, the financial incentive will also continue to increase in the years to come. Sim-
ilary, the price of small-scale battery storage systems, such as lithium-ion batteries, is
62By the end of October of 2013, total installed PV capacity amounted to 35.3 GWp in Germany
(BNetzA (2013)).
63Several studies have tried to identify the point in time at which PV grid parity will be reached in
different countries (e.g., Bhandari and Stadler (2009) for Germany, Ayompe et al. (2010) for Ireland,
and Denholm et al. (2009), Reichelstein and Yorston (2013) and Swift (2013) for the United States).
An analyis of factors influencing the LCOE of PV (and thus the point of time at which PV grid parity
is reached) is, for example, provided by Branker et al. (2011), Darling et al. (2011), Singh and Singh
(2010) and Hernandez-Moro and Martinez-Duart (2013).
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expected to further decrease, allowing an increased share of PV electricity generation to
be consumed in-house. Overall, households will soon be able to significantly reduce their
electricity costs by consuming self-produced PV electricity instead of grid-supplied elec-
tricity, rendering investments in rooftop PV systems combined with small-scale battery
storage systems economically viable from the single household’s perspective.
This paper analyzes the consequences of exempting in-house PV electricity consump-
tion from taxes, levies and surcharges and allocating grid costs via energy- rather than
capacity-related network tariffs from 2020 onwards – both from the single household and
the total system perspective.64 In a case study for Germany, a household optimization
model is applied that minimizes the single households’ electricity costs by determining
(among others) the cost-optimal dimensioning of the combined PV and battery storage
system, the amount of PV electricity generation consumed in-house or sold to the grid
as well as the dispatch of the battery storage system. To best reflect the current situa-
tion, it is assumed that households pay a flat (time-independent) residential electricity
tariff for the amount of electricity purchased from the grid. Moreover, households are
assumed to receive the (time-dependent) wholesale electricity price for the amount of
surplus PV electricity generation fed into the grid.
Our analysis complements a growing body of literature addressing the economic per-
formance of both residential and commercial PV systems from the single customer’s
perspective. Darghouth et al. (2013), Ong et al. (2010), Mills et al. (2008) and Boren-
stein (2007) analyze the impact of the retail electricity tariff structures on the economic
viability of residential PV systems from the customer’s perspective. These papers find
that time-varying retail tariffs (such as time-of-use rates or real-time prices), which re-
flect the utility’s cost of generating (purchasing) electricity on the wholesale electricity
market, lead to higher electricity bill savings from in-house PV electricity consumption
than flat retail tariffs.65 This is due to the generally positive correlation between the
hourly solar power generation profile and the hourly wholesale electricity price profile
in scenarios with low solar power penetration. However, as explained by Darghouth
et al. (2013), electricity bill savings under time-varying retail tariffs may decrease with
increased solar power penetration, as high amounts of PV electricity generation may
cause the temporal profile of the hourly wholesale electricity price to become nega-
tively correlated with the hourly PV electricity generation profile. More specifially, the
64Although investments in PV systems for in-house PV electricity consumption may already be eco-
nomically viable today, we choose 2020 as starting year in our analysis as investments in PV systems
are expected to be driven by the feed-in tariff until 2020, which will be paid until the target of 52 GW
is achieved. Moreover, by 2020, the price of lithium-ion batteries is expected to have significantly fallen
in comparison to today, rendering investments in small-scale storage capacities (to increase the amount
of in-house PV electricity consumption) economically viable.
65While time-of-use rates set various prices for different periods (e.g., daytime vs. nighttime), real-
time pricing forsees prices to change on an hourly basis depending on the hourly wholesale electricity
price (Darghouth et al. (2013)).
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more PV capacity is installed, the larger the short-term merit-order-effect becomes. PV
electricity supply, having (almost) zero variable generation costs, reduces the whole-
sale electricity price and, as such, the (time-varying) retail tariff during sunny hours.66
However, in Germany (and many other European countries), residential customers are
traditionally charged a flat retail electricity tariff for the electricity taken form the grid
– independent of the time of day that the electricity is used.
The applied household optimization model extends the modeling approach of recent
analyses. While Colmenar-Santos et al. (2012), McHenry (2012), Ayompe et al. (2010)
and Hernandez et al. (1998) analyze the profitability of investments in grid-connected
PV systems (with an exogenously given capacity) from the single household’s perspec-
tive, Ren et al. (2009) determine the cost-optimal capacity of a grid-connected PV
system by minimizing the annual electricity costs of a given residential electricity con-
sumer. Castillo-Cagigal et al. (2011), in contrast, abstract from costs and evaluate the
supplementary installation of both a battery storage system and active demand side
management in order to maximize the in-house consumption of self-produced PV elec-
tricity. Only Colmenar-Santos et al. (2012) and Castillo-Cagigal et al. (2011) analyze
the option to install a battery storage system in combination with the PV system. How-
ever, none of the papers cited above jointly optimizes the size of the PV and battery
storage system from the single household’s perspective by minimizing the household’s
annual electricity costs.
Moreover, to the authors’ knowledge, our analysis is the first to account for feedback
effects of the single household’s optimization behavior on the rest of the electricity system
(and vice versa). In particular, an increased penetration of PV systems on the household
level causes changes in the residual load (both in volume and structure), which in turn
affects both the wholesale electricity price (via a change in the provision and operation of
power plants and storage technologies on the system level) and the residential electricity
tariff (primarily via changes in the wholesale electricity price and the renewable energy
surcharge). We account for these feedback effects by running an iteration between the
household optimization model and an electricity system optimization model. Finally,
we are the first to quantify both redistributional effects and excess costs associated with
the indirect financial incentive for in-house PV electricity consumption.
We find that households are able to reduce their electricity costs by investing in PV
and storage battery capacities to meet part of their demand with self-produced elec-
tricity. However, while households reduce their annual electricity costs by consuming
66The effect of renewable energy penetration with no variable generation costs on the wholesale elec-
tricity price (short-term merit order effect) is, for example, analyzed in Gil et al. (2012), Jonsson et al.
(2010), Munksgaard and Morthorst (2008), G. Saenz de Miera and P. del Rion Gonzalez and I. Vizcaino
(2008) and Sensfuß et al. (2008).
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self-produced instead of grid-supplied electricity, this indirect financial incentive yields
two economic consequences:
Firstly, we find that the indirect financial incentive distorts competition of technologies,
which causes excess costs to be born by the society. Due to the exemption from taxes,
levies and surcharges for the amount of in-house PV consumption and the allocation
of grid costs via energy- rather than capacity-related network tariffs, households are
incentivized to undertake investments in small-scale PV and battery storage systems
that are inefficient from an economic perspective, causing total system costs to rise.
Secondly, we find that the indirect financial incentive for the consumption of self-
produced instead of grid-supplied electricity leads to a redistribution of financial re-
sources. For example, as a consequence of an increased in-house PV electricity con-
sumption on the household level, the amount of electricity purchased from the grid
decreases. However, since the additional costs of promoting renewable energies are cur-
rently apportioned to the amount of electricity purchased from the grid, the renewable
energy surcharge (to be paid by the residual electricity consumers) increases with the
amount of in-house PV electricity consumption on the household level. Hence, the fi-
nancial burden for residual electricity consumers rises in order to favor the electricity
bill savings of households that meet part of their electricity demand with self-produced
PV electricity.
In order to incentivize a cost-efficient development of the German electricity system, we
argue that the consumption of self-produced electricity should be treated in the same
manner as the consumption of grid-supplied electricity, i.e., the exemption from taxes,
levies and other surcharges for the amount of self-produced PV electricity consumed
in-house should be abolished. Alternatively, the residential electricity price could be
reduced to the ‘true’ costs of electricity procurement. Moreover, since grid costs are
primarily fixed costs, the traditional (energy-related) grid tariffs should be replaced by
cost-reflecting tariffs that correspond primarily to grid connection capacity.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 presents the applied
methodology used to analyze the consequences of indirect financial incentives for in-house
PV electricity consumption in Germany. Section 3.3 defines the scenarios und Section
3.4 summarizes the model results. Section 3.5 concludes and provides an outlook on
possible further research.
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3.2 Methodology and assumptions
In the following, we first explain the general logic of the applied methodological ap-
proach (Section 3.2.1), before the household optimization model (Section 3.2.2) and the
electricity system optimization model (Section 3.2.3) are described in more detail.
3.2.1 Modeling approach
The general logic of the applied modeling approach used to analyze the consequences
of the indirect financial incentive for in-house PV electricity consumption can best be
described by defining two agents, each characterized by a specific optimization behavior.
Agent A minimizes the single household’s accumulated and discounted electricity costs
subject to techno-economic constraints. Agent A can choose between meeting the single
household’s electricity demand with electricity supplied by the grid or with self-produced
PV electricity. More specifically, he minimizes the single household’s electricity costs by
determining the optimal decisions with respect to the dimensioning of the combined PV
and storage systems and the use of self-produced PV electricity. Hence, Agent A decides
not only on the optimal size of the combined PV and storage capacities installed but
also on the optimal dispatch of the single household’s battery storage systems and the
optimal amount of PV electricity generation that is to be consumed in-house or sold to
the grid.
Agent B, in contrast, minimizes total system costs by making optimal investment and
dispatch decisions with respect to generation and storage technologies on the system
level. Accumulated and discounted system costs are minimized subject to techno-
economic constraints, such as the necessity to meet the electricity demand at each
point in time. Given the assumption of a price-inelastic electricity demand, the cost-
minimization problem of Agent B corresponds to a welfare-maximization approach.
Moreover, both agents minimize costs under the assumption of perfect foresight.
As shown in Figure 3.2, the optimization behavior of Agent A influences the optimization
behavior of Agent B and vice versa. The more PV and storage system capacities Agent A
builds on the household level, the more PV electricity is produced and either consumed
in-house or fed into the grid. As a consequence, the residual load to be supplied by
generation and storage technologies on the system level changes (both in volume and
structure). Agent B subsequently adapts the provision and operation of power plants
and storage technologies on the system level to the new residual load, which in turn
leads to changes in the wholesale electricity price and the residential electricity tariff.
Changes in the wholesale electricity price and the residential electricity tariff, in turn,
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Minimization of 
household electricity cost
Agent B
Minimization of
total system costs
Residual load
Wholesale electricity prices
Residential electricity tariff
Figure 3.2: Interaction of the agents’ optimization behaviors
affect the single household’s optimization behavior. This is due to two facts: Firstly, we
assume that households pay a fixed, i.e., time-independent, residential electricity tariff
for each kWh purchased from the grid, as currently employed in Germany. Secondly, we
assume that the amount of surplus (not self-consumed) PV electricity generation, which
is sold to the grid, is remunerated by the wholesale electricity price.
Agent A and Agent B are assumed to determine their investment and dispatch decisions
given the investment and dispatch decisions of the other agent. Hence, both agents adapt
their optimal invest and dispatch decisions in response to the other agent’s decision until
the equilibrium is reached. In the equilibrium, Agent A no longer has an incentive to
change his behavior, given the exogenously given behavior of Agent B and vice versa.
In order to determine the equilibrium solution, an iterative approach with two linear
optimization models, (i.e., a linear household optimization model (Agent A) and a linear
electricity system optimization model (Agent B)), is applied. Each model minimizes the
respective agent’s costs. The equilibrium is derived by iterating all interrelated variables
(such as the wholesale electricity price, the renewable energy surcharge and the residual
load) until convergence of results is reached. For this, a convergence criterion must to
be defined. A natural possibility is to stop when the relative change in the interrelated
variables is sufficiently small.
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The linear programming environment has been proven to be suitable for solving large-
scale problems such as these ones, which involve millions of variables that require ex-
tensive calculations. In fact, there are very effective algorithms which can efficiently
and reliably solve large linear programming problems, such as the Simplex algorithm
(e.g., Boyd and Vandenberghe (2004), Todd (2002) or Murty (1983)).67 An alternative
approach would be to formulate a non-linear optimization model that minimizes the
sum of the respective agent’s costs. In this case, however, the target function would be-
come non-linear and thus the optimization problem may become difficult to solve since
the algorithms for large-scale non-linear optimization problems are typically far less ef-
fective than the algorithms for linear optimization problems (Boyd and Vandenberghe
(2004)). Another alternative would be to formulate an equilibrium model that solves
each agent’s optimization problem simultaneously within a complementarity system.
However, just like in the case of the non-linear optimization model, the large complexity
of the problem structure suggests that the model may be rather difficult to solve via a
mixed complementarity problem algorithm (Li (2010)).
In the following, the household optimization model (Section 3.2.2) and the electricity
system optimization model (Section 3.2.3), which are iterated to determine the market
equilibrium, are described in more detail.
3.2.2 Household optimization model
The household optimization model determines (among others) the optimal investment
in combined PV and storage systems from the single household’s perspective by the year
2020 and calculates the optimal dispatch of the battery storage system in 5-year time
steps up to 2050, i.e., over the entire lifetime of the PV system (which is assumed to
be 30 years). Moreover, the model determines the optimal share of PV electricity to be
consumed in-house, stored in the battery storage system or sold to the grid.
3.2.2.1 Model equations
The objective of the linear household optimization model is to minimize the accumulated
discounted electricity costs of one- and two-family houses in Germany, given hourly solar
radiation profiles, hourly household electricity consumption profiles, PV and battery
storage system investment costs, hourly wholesale electricity prices and the residential
67Applications of iterative procedures to compute market equilibria can, for example, be found in
Greenberg and Murphy (1985) and Wu and Fuller (1996). Specifically, the iterative procedure pursued
in this paper is comparable to the PIES (Project Independence Evaluation System) algorithm, which
essentially applies a linear programming model in combination with econometric demand equations to
determine fuel prices and quantities (Ahn and Hogan (1982), Hogan (1975) and Gabriel et al. (2001)).
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electricity tariff. Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 lists all sets, parameters and variables of the
household optimization model.
Table 3.1: Sets and parameters of the household optimization model
Abbreviation Dimension Description
Model sets
h ∈ H Hour of the year, H = [1, 2, ..., 8760]
y ∈ Y Year, Y = [2020,...,2050]
i ∈ I Number of residents living in the household, I = [1,2,3,4,5]
b ∈ B Region, B = [northern, central and southern Germany]
Model parameters
ah,b [W/m
2] Solar irradiance on tilted PV cell
a [W/m2] Solar irradiance under standard test conditions
anP Annuity factor for PV investment costs (5% interest rate)
anS Annuity factor for battery investment costs (5% interest rate)
cP [e 2011/kW] PV investment costs
cS [e 2011/kWh] Battery investment costs
dy,h,i,b [kWh] Household electricity demand
discy Discount factor (5% discount rate)
fcP [e 2011/kW] PV fixed operation and maintenance costs
fcS [e 2011/kWh] Battery fixed operation and maintenance costs
n [1/h] Relation of storage capacity [kW] to storage volume [kWh]
py,h [e 2011/kWh] Wholesale electricity price
rety [e 2011/kWh] Residential electricity tariff
tP [years] PV lifetime
tS [years] Battery lifetime
η [%] Efficiency of the battery storage
u [%] Interest rate for annuity and discount factor
zi,b Total number of one- and two-family houses
x Sample households with residents i in region r
ω [%] PV performance ratio
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Table 3.2: Variables of the household optimization model
Abbreviation Dimension Description
Model variables
ADPy,i,b [kW] Commissioning of new PV systems
ADSy,i,b [kWh] Commissioning of new battery systems
CPy,i,b [e 2011] Annualized PV investment costs (5 % interest rate)
CSy,i,b [e 2011] Annualized battery investment costs (5 % interest rate)
ECIPy,h,i,b [kWh] Electricity consumed in-house supplied by the PV system
ECISy,h,i,b [kWh] Electricity consumed in-house supplied by battery system
ECIGy,h,i,b [kWh] Electricity consumed in-house supplied by the grid
ESGPy,h,i,b [kWh] Electricity sold to the grid supplied by the PV system
ESGSy,h,i,b [kWh] Electricity sold to the grid supplied by battery system
ESBPy,h,i,b [kWh] Electricity stored in the battery system supplied by the PV system
ESBGy,h,i,b [kWh] Electricity stored in the battery system supplied by the grid
KPy,i,b [kW] Installed PV system capacity
KSy,i,b [kWh] Installed battery storage volume
LSy,h,i,b [kWh] Storage level
My,i,b [e 2011] Annual O&M cost
Py,i,b [e 2011] Annual costs of purchasing electricity
Ry,i,b [e 2011] Annual revenue from selling electricity
THHC [e 2011] Accumulated and discounted total HH electricity costs
Table 3.3: Variables of the household optimization model calculated ex-post
Abbreviation Dimension Description
HHCy [e 2011] Scaled costs of PV and battery storage capacities
HHDy,h [MW] Scaled amount of household electricity demand
HHESy,h [MW] Scaled amount of electricity sold to the grid
HHGDy,h [MW] Scaled amount of grid-supplied electricity consumed in-house
HHIy [e 2011] Scaled revenue from selling surplus PV electricity
HHSCy,h [MW] Scaled amount of self-produced electricity consumed in-house
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minTHHC =
∑
i∈I
∑
b∈B
∑
y∈Y
discy · (CPy,i,b + CSy,i,b +My,i,b + Py,i,b −Ry,i,b) ·
zi,b
x
(3.1)
s.t.
CPy,i,b = c
P ·ADPy,i,b · anP (3.2)
CSy,i,b = c
S ·ADSy,i,b · anS (3.3)
My,i,b = fc
P ·KPy,i,b + fcS ·KSy,i,b (3.4)
Py,i,b =
∑
h∈H
(ECIGy,h,i,b + ESB
G
y,h,i,b) · rety (3.5)
Ry,i,b =
∑
h∈H
((ESGPy,h,i,b + ESG
S
y,h,i,b) · py,h) (3.6)
KPy,i,b · ω · (
ah,b
a
) = ECIPy,h,i,b + ESB
P
y,h,i,b + ESG
P
y,h,i,b (3.7)
dy,h,i,b = ECI
P
y,h,i,b + ECI
S
y,h,i,b + ECI
G
y,h,i,b (3.8)
LSy,h,i,b ≤ KSy,i,b (3.9)
LSy,h+1,i,b − LSy,h,i,b = ((ESBPy,h,i,b + ESBGy,h,i,b) · η)− ECISy,h,i,b − ESGSy,h,i,b (3.10)
ESBPy,h,i,b + ESB
G
y,h,i,b = l = K
S
y,i,b · n (3.11)
ECISy,h,i,b + ESG
S
y,h,i,b = l = K
S
y,i,b · n (3.12)
The accumulated discounted (5 % discount rate) electricity costs of one- and two-family
houses in Germany (THHC), as defined in Equations (3.1) - (3.6), are the sum of the
single household’s annualized PV system investment costs (CPy,i,b), the annualized storage
system investment costs (CSy,i,b), the annual operation and maintenance (O&M) costs
(My,i,b) and the annual costs for the amount of electricity purchased from the grid (Py,i,b).
Investment costs are annualized with a 5 % interest rate for the depreciation time, i.e.,
the technical liftetime of the PV and battery storage systems. O&M costs account
for the replacement of the inverter. In addition, the electricity costs are decreased by
the revenue acquired from selling surplus (not self-consumed) PV electricity to the grid
(Ry,i,b), which is assumed to be remunerated by the wholesale electricity price (py,h).
The accumulated discounted electricity costs are minimized subject to several techno-
economic constraints.
Power generation constraint (Eq. (3.7)): The power output of the single household’s
PV system, which depends on the solar radiation on the tilted PV cells (ah,b) and
the performance ratio of the PV system (ω), can either be directly consumed in-house
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(ECIPy,h,i,b), stored in the battery storage system (ESB
P
y,h,i,b) or sold to the electricity
grid (ESGPy,h,i,b).
68
Power balance constraint (Eq. (3.8)): The single household’s electricity demand
(dy,h,i,b) needs to be met by electricity supplied by the PV system (ECI
P
y,h,i,b), the
battery storage system (ECISy,h,i,b) or the electricity grid (ECI
G
y,h,i,b).
Battery storage constraints (Eqs. (3.9), (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12)): The maximum
storage level of the single household’s battery system (LSy,h,i,b) is determined by the
storage volume (KSy,i,b). Moreover, the hourly change in the storage level of the single
household’s battery system depends on the storage operation and the losses during
the charging process. Note that the stored PV electricity may not only be used to
meet the household’s electricity demand (ECISy,h,i,b) but also be fed into the electricity
grid (ESGSy,h,i,b). Likewise, the battery storage system may not only be charged using
electricity supplied by the PV system (ESBPy,h,i,b) but also using grid-supplied electricity
(ESBGy,h,i,b).
Equations (3.13) - (3.18) quantify all variables calculated ex-post, which then serve as
input parameters for the electricity system optimization model.
HHESy,h =
∑
i∈I
∑
b∈B
(ESGPy,h,i,b + ESG
S
y,h,i,b) (3.13)
HHSCy,h =
∑
i∈I
∑
b∈B
(ECIPy,h,i,b + ECI
S
y,h,i,b) (3.14)
HHGDy,h =
∑
i∈I
∑
b∈B
ECIGy,h,i,b (3.15)
HHDy,h =
∑
i∈I
∑
b∈B
dy,h,i,b =
∑
i∈I
∑
b∈B
(HHGDy,h +HHSCy,h) (3.16)
HHCy =
∑
i∈I
∑
b∈B
(CPy,i,b + C
S
y,i,b +My,i,b) (3.17)
HHIy =
∑
i∈I
∑
b∈B
Ry,i,b (3.18)
The total calculation time of the household optimization model amounts to 20 hours.
68We note that the curtailment of solar power generation is no option in the household optimization
model.
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3.2.2.2 Numerical assumptions
All country- and year-specific input parameters of the household optimization model
(such as the solar radiation profiles, the single household’s electricity demand profiles or
PV and storage system investment costs) have been defined according to German levels.
Solar radiation profiles: The household optimization model considers three hourly
solar radiation profiles (8760 h) for northern, central and southern Germany (based on
historical solar radiation data of the year 2008 taken from EuroWind (2011)), which
were converted from the horizontal to the tilted surface. The solar cells were assumed
to be oriented to the south (azimuth of 180 degree) and tilted with an optimized angle
of 37degree in southern Germany and 35.3degree in northern and central Germany.69
Given these rather optimal conditions, a conservative performance ratio of 70 % was
chosen to capture losses due to soiling and partial shadowing of rooftop PV systems.
As a result, rooftop PV systems were assumed to exhibit a yield of 868 kWh/kWp per
year in northern Germany, 923 kWh/kWp in central Germany and 1,022 kWh/kWp in
southern Germany.70
Household’s electricity demand profiles: The household optimization model ac-
counts for 250 individual electricity demand profiles for 8760 h of the year, which were
derived using a model developed by Richardson et al. (2010). The model creates syn-
thetic electricity demand data for 24 h (with one-minute resolution) by simulating do-
mestic appliance use dependent on the number of residents living in the house, the day
of the week and the month of the year.71 Deriving individual electricity demand profiles
for 8760 h of the year – instead of using standard load profiles – is of major importance
in order to adequately determine the cost-optimal PV and battery storage capacities
from the single household’s perspective. Individual electricity demand profiles account
for both the high variability of the individual household’s electricity demand and peak
load situations. Standard load profiles for residential customers, in contrast, are based
69The chosen orientation and angle was derived via a PV electricity optimization model that maximizes
the total annual electricity generation of the PV system depending on their location in Europe (in this
case in northern, central or southern Germany) developed by the authors.
70The impact of the orientation of the PV system on both the total annual electricity generation
and the daily profile of PV electricity supply is, for example, discussed in Tro¨ster and Schmidt (2012),
Blumsack et al. (2010), Mehleri et al. (2010) and Mondol et al. (2007). Note that the electricity generation
output during the morning and evening can be increased by splitting the orientation of the PV panel
arrays for an east-west orientation rather than a fixed southern orientation, as explained by Blumsack
et al. (2010). This may be advantageous for residential electricity consumers if the electricity generation
profile of the east-west orientated PV system matches more closely to the customer’s demand profile.
Such an orientation, however, assumes that the customer’s goal is to maximize the in-house consumption
of PV electricity generation. In contrast, if electricity consumers were to maximize revenues from net
metering, they would need to consider the correlation between the PV systems electricity generation
profile and the wholesale electricity price when deciding on the optimal orientation of the PV system
(Blumsack et al. (2010)).
71The basic version of the domestic electricity demand model is distributed under
https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/5786 and documented in Richardson et al. (2010).
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on statistical average values. Hence, taking standard load profiles as an input parameter
for the household optimization problem would not adequately represent the variability
of individual household’s demand and thus distort the results.
The domestic electricity demand model is configured to simulate the use of domestic
appliances in Germany based on data from DESTATIS (2012a), DESTATIS (2012b),
DESTATIS (2012c) and Statista (2012) for 8760 h of the year. The assumed propor-
tions of households equipped with domestic appliances are shown in Table B.1 of the
Appendix.
The model is used to simulate 250 electricity demand profiles, differing with regard to the
number of residents living in the household (1-5 residents) and the household’s configu-
ration of domestic appliances, which are randomly assigned in the domestic electricity
demand model (according to the assumptions shown in Table B.1 of the Appendix).72
The average annual electricity demand of these consumption profiles is presented in
Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Average annual household electricity demand [kWh]
min max average
1 Resident 1,840 5,649 2,888
2 Residents 2,086 6,556 3,871
3 Residents 2,539 9,217 4,200
4 Residents 3,057 8,698 4,519
5 Residents 3,339 10,379 4,833
By combining the 250 electricity demand profiles with the three different solar radiation
profiles, we obtain 750 individual housholds each differing with regard to the number of
residents living in the house (1-5 residents), the equipment (domestic appliances) and
the location of the house. In the model, the 750 sample households are scaled-up by the
actual number of one- and two-family houses in Germany, zi,b (see Table 3.5), in order
to analyze the potential consequences of the indirect financial incentive for in-house
PV electricity consumption for the case in which a large share of residential electricity
consumers invests in combined PV and storage systems. In specific, only 90 % of the
one- and two-family houses are used in scaling the results of the household optimization
72Specifically, 50 electricity demand profiles were generated for each of the five household types (with
1-5 residents), each of which differing with regard to the configuration of domestic appliances.
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model, accounting for the fact that part of the rooftop PV potential of one- and two-
family houses will already be used to achieve Germany’s NREAP target for PV (52
GW).73
Note that scaled-up annual household electricity demand covered by the household op-
timization model amounts to 56 TWh. This corresponds to 9 % of the gross electricity
demand assumed in the electricity system optimization model for Germany in 2020 (612
TWh).
Table 3.5: Number of one- and two-family houses located in Germany (90 %) based
on data by DESTATIS (2008) and DESTATIS (2010)
northern Germany central Germany southern Germany
1 Resident 835,086 1,817,500 1,176,311
2 Residents 1,261,675 2,462,942 1,562,837
3 Residents 528,596 1,016,977 643,481
4 Residents 491,342 942,537 596,034
5 Residents 171,152 326,388 206,157
Wholesale electricity prices and residential electricity tariff: The wholesale
electricity price and the residential electricity tariff are taken from the electricity system
optimization model (described in Section 3.2.3), which determines both input parameters
based on optimal investment and dispatch decisions on the system level.
Other input parameters: All other input parameters of the household optimization
model are listed in Table 3.6. In particular, PV system investment costs (cP ) are assumed
to amount to 1,200 e 20112011/kWp in 2020 (based on Agora Energiewende (2013a) and
Prognos AG (2013)). Moreover, stationary battery storage units are assumed to have
investment costs (cS) of 400 e 20112011/kWh and a technical lifetime (ts) of 15 years,
which reflects expectations for lithium-ion batteries (see, e.g., Bost et al. (2011)).
3.2.3 Electricity system optimization model
The electricity system optimization model used in this analysis is a linear investment
and dispatch model for Europe, incorporating conventional thermal, nuclear, storage and
73By scaling up the results of the household optimization model by the number of one- and two-
family-houses located in Germany, market imperfections such as informational asymmetry, transaction
costs or uncertainty are neglected. In particular, the scaling-up procedure abstracts from the so-called
‘landlord-tenant’ problem (Jaffe and Stavins (1994)), which describes the barriers for landlords in en-
suring appropriate investment returns by including investment costs in the rent. The chosen scaling
procedure serves the purpose of deriving the maximum potential of PV and battery storage systems
that may be optimally deployed on top of one- and two-family-houses in Germany. Because the scaling-
procedure includes all one- and two-family houses, the results should be interpreted as upper bound
estimates and not as most likely estimates.
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Table 3.6: Input parameters of the household optimization model for 2020
Input parameter Unit
cP [e 2011/kWp] 1,200
cS [e 2011/kWh] 400
mP [e 2011/kWp p.a.] 11
mS [e 2011/kWh p.a.] 6
n [1/h] 0.6
tP [years] 30
tS [years] 15
η [%] 95
u [%] 5
x 50
ω [%] 70
a [W/m2] 1,000
ω [%] 70
renewable technologies. The model is an extended version of the long-term investment
and dispatch model of the Institute of Energy Economics (University of Cologne) as
presented in Richter (2011). The possibility of endogenous investments in renewable
energy technologies has been added to the investment and dispatch model, as described
in Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a), Ja¨gemann et al. (2013a) and Nagl et al. (2011a).
In the following, an overview of the applied electricity system optimization model is
given. The model has been adapted to accurately incorporate the feedback effects of
the single households optimization behavior on the residual electricity system and to
quantify the redistributional effects associated with the indirect financial incentive for
in-house PV electricity generation.
3.2.3.1 Technological resolution
The model incorporates investment and generation decisions for all types of technologies:
conventional (potentially equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS)), combined
heat and power (CHP), nuclear, renewable energy and storage (pump, hydro and com-
pressed air energy (CAES)). In contrast to investments in generation and storage ca-
pacities, the extension of interconnector capacities, which limit the inter-regional power
exchange, is exogenously defined. Today’s power plant mix is represented by several
vintage classes for hard coal, lignite and natural gas-fired power plants. With regard
to renewable energy technologies, the model encompasses onshore and offshore wind
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turbines, roof and ground based PV systems, biomass (CHP-) power plants (solid and
gas), hydro power plants, geothermal power plants and concentrating solar power (CSP)
plants (including thermal energy storage devices).
3.2.3.2 Regional resolution
The model is configured to cover all countries of the European Union, except for Cyprus,
Malta and Croatia, and includes Norway and Switzerland. To account for local weather
conditions, the model considers 47 onshore wind, 42 offshore wind and 38 PV subregions,
each differing with regard to both the level and the structure of the wind and solar power
generation (based on historical hourly meteorological wind speed and solar radiation
data from EuroWind (2011)). Given the focus of the analysis, the simulation was run
for Germany and seven neighboring European market regions that were considered most
relevant for dispatch and investment decisions in Germany (Figure 3.3).
Model regions
Simulated market regions
Figure 3.3: Simulated market regions
3.2.3.3 Temporal resolution
For our analysis, the simulation is carried out as a two-stage process: In the first step,
investments in generation and storage capacities are simulated in 5-year time steps until
Chapter 3. The economic inefficiency of grid parity - The case of German photo-
voltaics 60
2050 by the investment and dispatch model. For reasons of computational efforts, the
dispatch of generation and storage capacities is calculated in this step for eight typical
days per year, which are then scaled to 8760 h in the model. Each typical day defines
the electricity demand per country for 24 hours (h) of the day. Moreover, each typical
day determines the hourly water inflow of hydro storages and the hourly electricity
feed-in of wind and solar power plants per subregion (in MW/MWinstalled). For each
of the years simulated, the model determines both investments in new capacities and
decommissionings of existing capacities. Moreover, the dispatch of power plants and
storage technologies is simulated for each typical day and scaled to 8760 h of the year.
In the second step, the capacity mix is fixed for each year and a (high resolution) dispatch
is simulated. Instead of typical days, the dispatch is simulated on the basis of hourly
load profiles (based on historical hourly load data by ENSTO-E (2012)) as well as the
hourly electricity generation profiles of hydro, wind (on- and offshore) and solar power
(PV and CSP) technologies for 8760 h per year (based on historical hourly wind and
solar radiation data by EuroWind (2011)).
3.2.3.4 Model equations
An overview of all model sets, parameters and variables is given in Tables 3.7, 3.8 and
3.9.
The objective of the model (Eq. 3.19) is to minimize accumulated discounted (5 %
discount rate) total system costs which include investment costs, fixed O&M costs,
variable generation costs and costs due to ramping thermal power plants.74
Investment costs arise from new investments in generation and storage units (ADy,a,c)
and are annualized with a 5 % interest rate for the depreciation time.75 The fixed
operation and maintenance costs (fca) represent staff costs, insurance charges, rates
and maintenance costs.76 Variable costs are determined by fuel prices (fuy,a), the net
efficiency (ηa) and the total generation of each technology (GEy,h,a,c). Depending on
the ramping profile, additional costs for attrition occur (aca). Combined heat and
power (CHP) plants can generate revenue from the heat market, thus reducing the
objective value. More specifically, the generated heat in CHP plants (GEy,h,a,c · hra)
is remunerated by the assumed gas price divided by the conversion efficiency of the
assumed reference heat boiler (hpy), which roughly represents the opportunity costs for
74The model’s optimization premise (minimization of accumulated discounted total system costs)
implies a cost-based competition of electricity generation and perfect foresight.
75Note that the interest rate level significantly influences capital cost. However, the impact of the
actual interest rate level (i.e., 3, 5 or 7 %) on the optimal investment mix is only minor.
76For CCS power plants, fixed operation and maintenance costs include fixed costs for CO2 storage
and transportation.
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households and industries. However, only a limited amount of generation in CHP plants
is compensated by the heating market.77
min TSC =
∑
y∈Y
∑
c∈C
∑
a∈A
(discy · (ADy,a,c · ana + INy,a,c · fca (3.19)
+
∑
h∈H
(GEy,h,a,c · (fuy,a
ηa
) + CUy,h,a,c · (fuy,a
ηa
+ aca)−GEy,h,a,c · hra · hpy)))
s.t.
∑
a∈A
GEy,h,a,c +
∑
c′∈C
IMy,h,c,c′ −
∑
s∈A
STy,h,s,c = dy,h,c (3.20)
GEy,h,a,c ≤ avd,h,a,c · INy,a,c (3.21)
GEy,h,a,c ≥ mla · avh,a,c · INy,a,c (3.22)
CUy,h,a,b ≤ INy,a,c − CRy,h,a,c
sta
(3.23)
CRy,h,a,c ≤ avh,a,c · INy,a,c (3.24)∑
a∈A
(cry,h,a,c · INy,a,c) ≥ pdy,h,c (3.25)∑
r∈A
srr · INy,r,c ≤ spr,c (3.26)
∑
h∈H
GEy,h,a,c
ηa
≤ fpy,a,c (3.27)
∑
a∈A
∑
c∈C
∑
h∈H
GEy,h,a,c
ηa
· efa ≤ ccy (3.28)
INy,r,c ≥ nry,r,c (3.29)
77We account for a maximum potential for heat in co-generation within each country, which is depicted
in Table B.5 of the Appendix.
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Table 3.7: Sets and parameters of the electricity system optimization model
Abbreviation Dimension Description
Model sets
a ∈ A Technologies
s ∈ A Subset of a Storage technologies
r ∈ A Subset of a RES-E technologies
c ∈ C (alias c’) Market region
h ∈ H Hours
y ∈ Y Years
Model parameters
aca [e 2011 /MWhel] Attrition costs for ramp-up operation
ana Annuity factor (5 % interest rate)
avh,a,c [%] Availability
dy,h,c [MW] Total demand
discy Discount factor (5 % discount rate)
ccy [t CO2 ] Cap for CO2 emissions
efa [t CO2 /MWhth] CO2 emissions per fuel consumption
fca [e 2011/MW] Fixed operation and maintenance costs
fuy,a [e 2011/MWhth] Fuel price
fpy,a,c [MWhth] Fuel potential
hpy [e 2011/MWhth] Heating price for end-consumers
hra [MWhth/MWhel] Ratio for heat extraction
mla [%] Minimum part load level
nry,r,c [MW] National technology-specific RES-E targets
pdy,h,c [MW] Peak demand (increased by a security factor of 10 %)
spr,c [km
2] Space potential
srr [MW/km
2] Space requirement
sta [hours] Start-up time from cold start
ηa [%] Net efficiency (generation)
cry,h,a,c [%] Securely available capacity
αa,h [%] Capacity factor
 [%] Share of privileged end consumer
RESpc [e 2011/kWh] Renewable energy surcharge for
privileged end consumers
Accumulated discounted total system costs are minimized, subject to several techno-
economic constraints:
Power balance constraint (Eq. (3.20)): The match of electricity demand and supply
needs to be ensured in each hour and country, taking storage options and inter-regional
power exchange into account. In specific, the sum of a country’s electricity generation
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Table 3.8: Variables of the electricity system optimization model
Abbreviation Dimension Description
Model variables
ADy,a,c [MW] Commissioning of new power plants
CUy,h,a,c [MW] Capacity that is ramped up within one hour
CRy,h,a,c [MW] Capacity that is ready to operate
GEy,h,a,c [MWel] Electricity generation
Os,y,h,i [MW] Consumption in storage operation
IMy,h,c,c′ [MW] Net imports
INy,a,c [MW] Installed capacity
STy,h,s,c [MW] Consumption in storage operation
TSC [e 2011] Accumulated discounted total system costs
Table 3.9: Model variables calculated ex-post and shadow variables of the electricity
system optimization model
Abbreviation Dimension Description
Model variables calculated ex-post
CIy,h [e 2011] Revenues from the reserve market
RECy [e 2011] Renewable energy compensation
RESy [e 2011/kWh] Renewable energy surcharge
CPy [e 2011/kWh] Back-up capacity payment
dCONSRy [e 2011] Difference in consumer rents
dPROSRy [e 2011] Difference in rents of ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’
dpiy [e 2011] Difference in producer profits
dWy [e 2011] Difference in sectoral welfare (excess costs)
Shadow variables
µy,h [e 2011/MW] Wholesale electricity price
(shadow variable of the power balance constraint)
κy,h [e 2011/MW] Capacity price
(shadow variable of the security of supply constraint)
(GEy,h,c,a), net imports (IMy,h,c,c′) and electricity lost in storage operation (STy,h,s,c)
needs to equal demand (dy,h,c).
Capacity constraint (Eq. (3.21)): The maximum electricity generation by dispatch-
able power plants (thermal, nuclear, storage, biomass and geothermal power plants) per
hour (GEy,h,a,c) is restricted by their seasonal availability (avd,h,a,c), which is limited
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due to unplanned or planned shutdowns (e.g., because of repairs).78 Unlike dispatchable
power plants, the availability of wind and solar power plants is given by the maximum
possible electricity feed-in per hour.79 The maximum transmission capability per hour
between two neighboring countries is given by the net transfer capacities.
Minimum load constraint (Eq. (3.22)): The minimum electricity generation per
hour (GEy,h,a,c) of dispatchable power plants (thermal, nuclear, storage, biomass and
geothermal power plants) is given by their minimum part-load level (mla).
Ramp-up constraints (Eqs. (3.23) and (3.24)): The start-up time (sta) of dispatchable
power plants limits the maximum amount of capacity ramped up within an hour.
Security of supply constraint (Eq. (3.25)): Equation 3.25 captures system reliabil-
ity requirements by ensuring that the historically observed peak demand level of each
country is met by securely available capacities. Due to the simplification of the annual
dispatch to eight typical days, potential peak demand is not considered as a dispatch
situation in the investment part of the model. To nevertheless ensure security of sup-
ply at all times, i.e., also during times of low solar radiation and low wind infeed, the
peak-capacity constraint is implemented in the model. Whereas the securely available
capacity (cry,h,a,c) of dispatchable power plants within the peak-demand hour is assumed
to correspond to the seasonal availability, the securely available capacity of onshore (off-
shore) wind power plants within the peak-demand hour (capacity credit) is assumed to
amount to 5 % (10 %). Hence, 5 % (10 %) of the total installed onshore (offshore)
wind power capacities within a region are assumed be securely available within the peak
demand hour. In contrast, PV systems are assumed to have a capacity credit of 0 % due
to the assumption that peak demand occurs during evening hours in the winter.80 The
modeled capacity market simply ensures that sufficient investments in back-up capacities
are made to meet potential peak demand situations.81
Space potential constraint (Eq. (3.26)): The deployment of wind and solar power
technologies is restricted by area potentials in km2 per subregion (spr,c).
78The availability of dispatchable power plants is the same for each country, year and hour, but differs
for each season. The infeed of storage technologies is additionally restricted by the storage capacity in
use at a particular hour.
79We note that the electricity system optimization model allows for endogenous wind and solar power
curtailment. Since wind sites are usually larger than solar sites, transaction costs for wind power
curtailment are assumed to be lower than for solar sites. By using negligible small variable costs for
offshore wind and even smaller ones for onshore wind sites, the model chooses offshore wind curtailment
first (i.e., before onshore wind curtailment.
80This assumption is based on a detailed analysis of historical electrical load data (based on ENSTO-E
(2012) and historical solar radiation data based on EuroWind (2011)) for all EU member states for the
years 2007-2010 (Ackermann et al. (2013)).
81However, such investments could also be triggered in an energy-only market in the event of price
peaks.
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Fuel potential constraint (Eq. (3.27)): The fuel use is restricted to a yearly poten-
tial in MWhth per country(fpy,a,c), with different potentials applying for lignite, solid
biomass and gaseous biomass sources.
In addition to techno-economic constraints, politically implemented restrictions are also
modeled:
CO2 emission constraint (Eq. (3.28)): Equation (3.28) states that the accumulated
CO2 emissions of all modeled market regions may not exceed a certain CO2 cap per year
(ccy). The approach of modeling a quantity-based regulation (CO2 cap) rather than
a price-based regulation (CO2 price) ensures that the CO2 emissions reduction target
within Europe’s power sector is met in all scenarios simulated – which allows the results
to be compared to one another.
Renewable capacity constraint (Eq. (3.29)): Equation (3.29) formalizes the polit-
ically implemented restriction that each country must achieve the technology-specific
RES-E targets (nry,r,c), as prescribed by the EU member states’ National Renewable
Energy Action Plans (NREAP’s) for 2020.
The total calculation time of the electricity system optimization model amounts to two
hours.
The most important assumptions of the electricity system optimization model (such
as the gross electricity demand, investment costs and techno-economic parameters of
conventional, storage and renewable technologies as well as fuel prices) are listed in
Tables B.2 - B.10 of the Appendix.
3.3 Scenario definitions and quantification of redistribu-
tional effects
To capture the impact of the single household’s optimization behavior on the residual
electricity system, we iterate the household optimization model in conjunction with
the electricity system optimization model until convergence of results is achieved. The
results of the last iteration step represent the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’. A more detailed
description of the iterative approach and the convergent behavior of the interrelated
variables can be found in the Appendix (see Figure B.1).
Moreover, to quantify the overall economic consequences of the single household’s op-
timization behavior (such as redistributional effects and excess costs), we compare the
results of the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’ with the results of a ‘Reference Scenario’, which
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assumes that the indirect financial incentive for in-house PV electricity consumption is
abolished (Table 3.10). More specifically, households are assumed to meet their elec-
tricity demand with grid-supplied electricity in the ‘Reference Scenario’. However, the
NREAP targets for 2020 are achieved in both scenarios.
Table 3.10: Scenario definitions
‘Grid Parity Scenario’ ‘Reference Scenario’
(GP) (REF)
Household optimization Yes No
Iterative approach Yes No
Achievement of 2020 NREAP targets Yes Yes
Achievement of CO2 reduction targets Yes Yes
Redistributional effects of the household’s optimization behavior are quantified for three
different actors: (i) (pure) electricity producers, (ii) (pure) electricity consumers and
(iii) household electricity consumers who meet part of their electricity demand with
self-produced PV electricity generation in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’, referred to as
‘HH producers and in-house consumers’ in the following. Note that in the ‘Reference
Scenario’, the (former) ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’ become pure consumers,
i.e., they no longer own a combined PV and battery storage system and meet their
total electricity demand with grid-supplied electricity. Since we apply a linear electricity
system optimization model with a price-inelastic electricity demand function, no absolute
values for the consumer rent can be quantified. Instead, we focus on the change of the
consumer rent as a consequence of the single household’s optimization behavior, i.e., the
difference in the consumer rent between the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’ and the ‘Reference
Scenario’. Welfare losses or excess costs due to the single household’s optimization
behavior are given by the accumulated change in the consumer rent, the rent of ‘HH
producers and in-house consumers’ and the producer profit.
In the following, all parameters are discussed which are used to quantify redistributional
effects.
Wholesale electricity prices: The shadow variable of the power balance (Equa-
tion (3.20)) serves as a proxy for the hourly wholesale electricity price in Germany
(µGPy,h ,µ
REF
y,h ).
Producer compensation for providing back-up capacity: The shadow variable
of the security of supply constraint (κy,h) serves as a proxy for the capacity price which
producers receive for their efforts in ensuring security of supply. More specifically, they
are assumed to be compensated for providing back-up capacities. Equations (3.30) and
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(3.31) define the revenue which producers receive from the reserve market by offering
securely available capacity (CIGPy,h , CI
REF
y,h ).
CIGPy,h =
∑
a∈A
(αa,h · INGPy,a · κGPy,h ) (3.30)
CIREFy,h =
∑
a∈A
(αa,h · INREFy,a · κREFy,h ) (3.31)
Back-up capacity payment: The costs for providing back-up capacities are assumed
to be apportioned to electricity consumers and ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’.
Specifically, for each kWh electricity purchased from the grid, a capacity payment (CPy)
is incurred.
CPGPy =
∑
h∈H CI
GP
y,h∑
h∈H(dy,h −HHSCy,h)
(3.32)
CPREFy =
∑
h∈H CI
REF
y,h∑
h∈H dy,h
(3.33)
Producer compensation for providing renewable energy capacities: As pre-
scribed by Equation 3.29, Germany is expected to achieve national, technology-specific
renewable energy targets by 2020 (NREAP targets). To reflect the current renewable
energy promotion system in Germany (feed-in tariff), we assume that renewable en-
ergy producers receive the additional costs, i.e., the difference between annual costs
and revenue from selling renewable energy electricity on the wholesale market (RECGPy ,
RECREFy ).
82 This compensation is assumed to be granted over a period of 20 years for
renewable capacities built up to the year 2020.83
82The annual costs include annualized investment costs, fixed O&M costs and variable generation
costs (for biomass technologies).
83The quantification of the producer compensation for providing renewable energy capacities and of
the renewable energy surcharge builds on the data of EWI (2012).
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RECGPy =
∑
r∈R
(ADGPy,r · anGPy,r + INy,r · fcr) (3.34)
+
∑
h∈H
∑
r∈R
(GEGPy,h,r · (
fuy,r
ηr
)− µGPy,h )
RECREFy =
∑
r∈R
(ADREFy,r · anREFy,r + INy,r · fcr) (3.35)
+
∑
h∈H
∑
r∈R
(GEREFy,h,r · (
fuy,r
ηr
)− µREFy,h )
Renewable energy surcharge: The difference between the producers’ annual costs
and their revenue from selling renewable energy electricity on the wholesale market is
assumed to be apportioned to electricity consumers via the renewable energy surcharge
(RESy), which (non-privileged) electricity consumers pay for each kWh purchased from
the grid (Eqs. 3.36 and 3.37).84
RESGPy =
RECGPy −  ·
∑
h∈H dy,h ·RESpc
(1− ) ·∑h∈H dy,h −∑h∈H HHSCy,h (3.36)
RESREFy =
RECREFy −  ·
∑
h∈H dy,h ·RESpc
(1− ) ·∑h∈H dy,h (3.37)
Residential electricity tariff: The residential electricity tariff (rety) is comprised
of endogenous and exogneous components. The base price (i.e., the average wholesale
electricity price), which serves as a proxy for the average costs of electricity procurement,
the renewable energy surcharge and the back-up capacity payment are the endogenous
components, which are outputs of the electricity system optimization model.85 The
assumptions regarding exogenous components are listed in Table 3.11.
84This reflects the current situation in Germany, where the additional costs for promoting renewable
energy investments via a fixed feed-in tariff scheme are apportioned to (non-privileged) electricity co-
sumers via the renewable energy surcharge. Note that the fixed feed-in tariff, which is granted over
20 years, corresponds approximately to the technology-specific electricity generation costs of renew-
ables. Moreover, the share of priviliged electricity consumers ( = 15 %) pays a lower renewable energy
surcharge (RESpc).
85Note that in reality, the average costs of electricity procurement do not exactly correspond to the base
price. This is due to the fact that electricity supplied by conventional and renewable capacities is not only
marketed via the wholesale electricity market but also via mid- and long-term contracts. Furthermore,
unlike in the electricity system optimization model, market participants do not have perfect foresight in
reality.
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Table 3.11: Composition of the residential electricity tariff [e ct/kWh]
2020 2025 2030 2040 2050
Base price
Endogenous
Renewable energy surcharge
Back-up capacity payment
Value-added tax of 19 %
2020 2025 2030 2040 2050
Concession levy Exogenous 1.79
Offshore liability surcharge Exogenous 0.25 -
Distribution (margin included) Exogenous 2.11
Electricity tax Exogenous 2.05
CHP surcharge Exogenous 0.31
§19 surcharge Exogenous 0.33
Network tariff Exogenous 7.18 8.12 9.19
Source: 50Hertz, Amprion, Tennet and Transnet BW (2012b), 50Hertz, Amprion, Tennet and Transnet
BW (2012a), BNetzA (2012) and BDEW (2013).
After having defined the parameters, the quantification of the redistributional effects is
explained in the following.
Change in producer profit: The difference in producer profits (dpiy) between the
‘Grid Parity Scenario’ and the ‘Reference Scenario’ is defined by Equation (3.38). Pro-
ducers are assumed to earn revenue for providing electricity, heat and securely available
generation capacities. Moreover, producers receive a renewable energy compensation
payment. Producer profits are determined by deducting the annualized investment costs,
fixed O&M costs, variable generation costs, additional variable costs for ramping oper-
ations and costs for pumping electricity into storage units from the sum of producer
revenues.
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dpiy =
∑
a∈A
∑
h∈H
(µGPy,h ·GEGPy,h,a,c) +
∑
a∈A
∑
h∈H
(GEGPy,h,a · hra · hpy) (3.38)
+CIGPy,h +REC
GP
y −
∑
a∈A
(ADGPy,a · anGPa )−
∑
a∈A
(INGPy,a · fcGPa )
−
∑
a∈A
∑
h∈H
(GEGPy,h,a · (
fuy,a
ηa
)−
∑
a∈A
∑
h∈H
(CUGPy,h,a · (
fuy,a
ηa
+ aca))
−
∑
s∈S
∑
h∈H
(OGPs,y,h · µGPy,h )
−
[∑
a∈A
∑
h∈H
(µREFy,h ·GEREFy,h,a,c) +
∑
a∈A
∑
h∈H
(GEREFy,h,a · hra · hpy)
+CIREFy,h +REC
REF
y −
∑
a∈A
(ADREFy,a · anREFa )
−
∑
a∈A
(INREFy,a · fcREFa )−
∑
a∈A
∑
h∈H
(GEREFy,h,a · (
fuy,a
ηa
))
−
∑
a∈A
∑
h∈H
(CUREFy,h,a · (
fuy,a
ηa
+ aca))−
∑
s∈S
∑
h∈H
(OREFs,y,h · µREFy,h )
]
Change in consumer rent: The difference in the consumer rent (dCONSRy) between
the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’ and the ‘Reference Scenario’ is defined by Equation (3.39) as
the difference in the consumers’ expenditures for meeting their electricity demand. Since
the costs for ensuring security of supply and for promoting renewables are apportioned
to electricity consumers via energy-related payments, consumers’ expenditures do not
only include the costs for buying electricity on the wholesale market but also the costs
for being provided with both securely available and renewable capacities.
dCONSRy = (−1) ·
[∑
h∈H
(µGPy,h · (dy,h −HHDy,h)) (3.39)
+
∑
h∈H
(dy,h −HHDy,h) · CPGPy +  ·
∑
h∈H
dy,h ·RESpc
+((1− ) ·
∑
h∈H
dy,h −
∑
h∈H
HHDy,h) ·RESGPy
−
[∑
h∈H
(µREFy,h · dy,h) +
∑
h∈H
dy,h · CPREFy +  ·
∑
h∈H
dy,h ·RESpc
+(1− ) ·
∑
h∈H
dy,h ·RESREFy
]]
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Change in the rent of ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’: Equation (3.40)
defines the difference in the rent of ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’ (dPROSRy)
between the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’ and the ‘Reference Scenario’ as the difference in ex-
penditures that households need to make in order to meet their electricity demand. As
opposed to the ‘Reference Scenario’ in which households meet 100 % of their electricity
demand (HHDy,h) with grid-supplied electricity, households meet part of their electric-
ity demand with self-produced PV electricity in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’. Note that in
the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’ households pay investment and fixed O&M costs for their PV
and battery storage capacities, but also earn revenue from selling surplus PV electricity
generation.
dPROSRy = (−1) ·
[∑
h∈H
(µGPy,h ·HHGDGPy,h ) (3.40)
+
∑
h∈H
HHGDy,h · (CPGPy +RESGPy ) +HHCGPy −HHIGPy
−
[∑
h∈H
(µREFy,h ·HHDy,h) +
∑
h∈H
HHDy,h · (CPREFy +RESREFy )
]]
Welfare loss: The welfare loss or excess costs associated with the single household’s
optimization behavior are defined by Equation (3.41) as the accumulated change in the
consumer rent, the rent of ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’ and the producer
profit between the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’ and the ‘Reference Scenario’.
dWy = dpiy + dCONSRy + dPROSRy (3.41)
3.4 Scenario results
The changes in the optimal capacities of PV and storage systems which take place
during the iterative process are shown in Figure B.2 of the Appendix. Convergence of
results is achieved after nine iteration steps.86 In the following sections, the results of
the household and the electricity system optimization models of the last iteration step
86To demonstrate the robustness of results the iteration is repeated for alternative starting values, as
shown in Figures B.3 and B.4 of the Appendix.
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are analyzed, which are referred to as the results of the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’. These
results are then compared to the results of the ‘Reference Scenario’, which assumes that
the indirect financial incentive for in-house PV electricity consumption is abolished and
thus total system costs are minimized.
3.4.1 Household level
3.4.1.1 Cost-optimal PV and battery storage capacities
The average cost-optimal PV and battery storage capacities (as shown in Table 3.12)
increase with the number of residents living in the household and the annual full load
hours of the PV system, i.e., the further south the house is located, the larger the average
cost-optimal PV and battery storage capacities become. Specifically, cost-optimal PV
capacities built in 2020 vary between 1.7 kWp and 3.6 kWp, and cost-optimal battery
storage capacities between 2.1 kWh and 5.3 kWh.87
Due to their lower technical lifetime of 15 years, battery storage capacities need to
be replaced in 2036. The fact that the optimal average battery storage capacities are
lower in 2036 than in 2020 illustrates the diminished economic value of battery storage
capacities from the single household’s perspective over time.88
3.4.1.2 PV electricity in-house consumption and grid feed-in
Table 3.13 shows the average share of the single household’s annual PV electricity gen-
eration that is consumed in-house and the average share of the single household’s annual
electricity demand that is covered by self-produced PV electricity in 2020.89
Due to the optimal dimensioning of the single household’s PV and storage system capac-
ities, the average shares of the single household’s annual PV electricity generation that
is consumed in-house lie within a high and relatively narrow range between 72 % and
76 % for all configurations. Hence, only 20 - 24 % of the (average) annual PV electricity
generation by households is fed into the grid.90
87As explained in Section 3.2.2.2, for each of the five household types (with 1-5 residents), 50 different
electricity demand profiles were generated and taken as input parameters for the household optimization
model. The results of each household type (with 1-5 residents) present the average values over 50 samples.
88The battery storage investment costs in 2036 are assumed to be the same as in 2020, i.e., 400
e 2011/kWh.
89The average shares achieved in the years 2025-2050 differ only marginally from the shares in 2020.
90Average storage losses lie between 3 % and 4 % of the average annual household PV electricity
generation.
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Table 3.12: Average cost-optimal PV and battery storage capacities in the ‘Grid
Parity Scenario’
northern Germany central Germany southern Germany
Average cost-optimal PV capacities [kWp]
1 resident 1.7 1.9 2.1
2 residents 2.3 2.6 2.9
3 residents 2.5 2.8 3.2
4 residents 2.8 3.1 3.4
5 residents 3.0 3.3 3.6
Average cost-optimal storage capacities [kWh] (replaced in 2036)
1 resident 2.1 (1.8) 2.6 (2.3) 3.0 (2.8)
2 residents 3.0 (2.5) 3.6 (3.2) 4.1 (3.9)
3 residents 3.4 (2.9) 4.1 (3.7) 4.6 (4.4)
4 residents 3.7 (3.2) 4.4 (4.0) 5.0 (4.7)
5 residents 3.9 (3.4) 4.7 (4.2) 5.3 (5.0)
Table 3.13: Average PV in-house consumption and self-supply shares in the ‘Grid
Parity Scenario’ (2020)
northern Germany central Germany southern Germany
Average share of annual PV electricity consumed in-house
1 resident 75% 75% 73%
2 residents 75% 75% 72%
3 residents 76% 75% 73%
4 residents 76% 76% 73%
5 residents 76% 76% 74%
Average share of annual household electricity demand
supplied by PV electricity
1 resident 38% 46% 54%
2 residents 39% 46% 56%
3 residents 40% 48% 57%
4 residents 40% 48% 57%
5 residents 41% 48% 57%
Moreover, given the cost-optimal dimensions of the PV and battery storage capacities,
households cover on average between 38 % and 57 % of their annual electricity demand
by self-produced PV electricity that was either directly consumed (at the moment of
production) or supplied by the battery storage system at a later point in time. Hence, the
annual amount of electricity purchased by the single household from the grid decreases
on average by 38 - 57 %. However, over the course of the year, the average share
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of the household’s electricity demand that is met using self-produced PV electricity
significantly varies. As shown in Table 3.14, households cover 76 - 85 % of their electricity
demand in June, but only 6 - 22 % in December due to the lower PV electricity generation
and higher household electricity demand in the winter.
Table 3.14: Share of monthly household electricity demand met by self-produced PV
electricity
northern Germany central Germany southern Germany
January 6% 12% 31%
February 25% 40% 57%
March 39% 43% 45%
April 56% 54% 61%
May 73% 78% 78%
June 76% 84% 85%
July 74% 79% 81%
August 58% 75% 80%
September 47% 59% 61%
October 27% 39% 57%
November 10% 15% 35%
December 6% 11% 22%
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show exemplaric electricity demand and supply profiles of a
household with three residents in central Germany for a rather extreme week in June
and December 2020, respectively. In June, the household covers most of its electric-
ity demand by self-produced PV electricity (‘PV in-house consumption’). Moreover, a
significant amount of the overall PV electricity generation is neither directly consumed
in-house nor stored in the battery system, but instead fed into the electricity grid (‘PV
grid feed-in’). Given the high solar PV electricity generation and the possibility to store
surplus electricity in the battery system, the amount of electricity purchased from the
grid (‘Electricity purchased’) in June is comparatively small. Only during some night
hours is part of the household’s electricity demand met by using grid-supplied electricity.
In December, in contrast, households meet almost all of their electricity demand with
grid-supplied electricity due to very limited solar power generation. Moreover, all of the
(very limited) PV electricity generation is consumed in-house. Hence, no PV electricity
is fed into the grid by the household in this sample week in December.
3.4.1.3 Investment costs
Depending on the average cost-optimal PV and battery storage system capacities, total
overnight investment costs to be paid by the households lie between 2,853 e 2011 and
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Figure 3.4: Sample week in June (2020): Profiles of a household with 3 residents in
central Germany
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Figure 3.5: Sample week in December (2020): Profiles of a household with 3 residents
in central Germany
6,485 e 2011 in 2020 (Table 3.15). On average, PV system costs account for more than
two thirds (68 %) of total overnight investment costs.
Note that the upfront investment costs may pose a challenge for some households and
may thus form an obstacle to the wide-scale deployment of PV and battery storage
systems on the household level. As argued by R. Schleicher-Tappeser (2012) and Yang
(2010), even if cost-effectiveness of PV systems on the household level is achieved, the
commercial competitiveness may not be guaranteed for reasons of high upfront invest-
ment costs and unfamiliarity with the technology.
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Table 3.15: Overnight investment costs of the average cost-optimal PV and battery
storage capacities in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’ (2020)
northern Germany central Germany southern Germany
PV investment costs [e 2011]
1 resident 2,006 2,249 2,514
2 residents 2,786 3,085 3,485
3 residents 3,042 3,414 3,801
4 residents 3,314 3,671 4,086
5 residents 3,541 3,958 4,353
Battery storage investment costs [e 2011]
1 resident 847 1,059 1,208
2 residents 1,183 1,435 1,651
3 residents 1,372 1,637 1,855
4 residents 1,489 1,767 2,001
5 residents 1,573 1,876 2,132
Total investment costs [e 2011]
1 resident 2,853 3,308 3,722
2 residents 3,969 4,520 5,136
3 residents 4,414 5,051 5,656
4 residents 4,804 5,438 6,087
5 residents 5,115 5,834 6,485
3.4.1.4 Cost savings
In comparison to the ‘Reference Scenario’ in which households meet their total electricity
demand with grid-supplied electricity, households save on average between 1,336 e 2011
and 4,012 e 2011 of their accumulated (2020-2050) and discounted (5 % discount rate)
electricity costs as a consequence of the indirect financial incentive for in-house PV
electricity consumption (Table 3.16). Hence, households avoid on average 10 % - 18 %
of their accumulated discounted electricity costs over the PV system’s liftime (30 years).
As can be seen in Table 3.16, the absolute cost savings in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’
increase with the number of residents living in the house and the annual full load hours
of the PV system, i.e., the further south the house is located, the larger the potential
cost savings per household become.
The cost savings demonstrate that despite the costs of installing and operating the PV
and battery storage systems, households are economically better off if they meet part of
their electricity demand using self-produced PV electricity instead of completely using
grid-supplied electricity. This is due to the fact that the consumption of self-produced
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PV electricity – in contrast to the consumption of grid-supplied electricity – is exempted
from the payment of taxes, levies, surcharges and network tariffs.
Table 3.16: Average cost savings (accumulated up to 2050 and discounted with 5 %)
Accumulated and discounted electricity costs
in the ‘Reference Scenario’ [e 2011]
1 resident 13,222
2 residents 17,702
3 residents 19,160
4 residents 20,542
5 residents 21,874
northern Germany central Germany southern Germany
Accumulated and discounted electricity costs
in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’ [e 2011]
1 resident 11,886 11,509 10,887
2 residents 15,863 15,375 14,502
3 residents 17,191 16,628 15,690
4 residents 18,489 17,881 16,839
5 residents 19,655 18,976 17,862
Accumulated and discounted electricity costs savings [e 2011 (%)]
1 resident 1,336 (10 %) 1,713 (13 %) 2,335 (18 %)
2 residents 1,839 (10 %) 2,326 (13 %) 3,200 (18 %)
3 residents 1,969 (10 %) 2,532 (13 %) 3,470 (18 %)
4 residents 2,053 (10 %) 2,661 (13 %) 3,703 (18 %)
5 residents 2,219 (10 %) 2,898 (13 %) 4,012 (18 %)
3.4.1.5 Grid connection dimensioning
As a consequence of the in-house consumption of self-produced PV electricity, the aver-
age share of the household’s annual electricity demand met by grid-supplied electricity
decreases (from 100 %) to 38 % - 57 %. However, the maximum (peak) amount of elec-
tricity purchased from the grid (within a single hour) decreases by only 2 - 4 %, as shown
in Table 3.17. Hence, if we assume that the single household’s grid connection capacity
was originally dimensioned to meet the household’s peak demand, then the installation
of the PV and battery storage capacity would not allow for the grid connection capacity
to be reduced.
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Table 3.17: Average reduction of the maximum amount of electricity purchased from
the grid in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’ (2020-2050)
northern Germany central Germany southern Germany
1 Resident -3% -3% -4%
2 Residents -3% -3% -3%
3 Residents -3% -3% -4%
4 Residents -2% -2% -3%
5 Residents -2% -2% -3%
3.4.2 System level
As explained in Section 3.2.2.2, the 750 sample households are scaled-up in order to
analyze the potential consequences if a large share of residential electricity consumers
invests in combined PV and storage systems for in-house PV electricity consumption.
As a result of the scaling procedure, 36 GW of rooftop PV capacities are installed on
one- and two-family houses in Germany by 2020 in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’. Note
that these capacities are deployed in addition to the 52 GW of PV capacities already
built by 2020 under the feed-in tariff promotion system. Battery storage capacities built
in combination with these rooftop PV systems amount to 50 GWh, corresponding to
125 % of currently installed pump storage capacities in Germany (40 GWh in the year
2010 (Mahnke and Mu¨lenhoff (2012))). Note that the 50 GWh storage capacities built
in 2020 are decomissioned and replaced in 2036, but with a smaller total capacity of
45 GWh. Moreover, the 50 GWh (45 GWh) storage capacity correspond to a nominal
output of 30 GW (27 GW).
In the following, we analyze the consequences of the single household’s optimization
behavior on the rest of the electricity system. This is done by comparing the results of
the electricity system optimization model for the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’ to those of the
‘Reference Scenario’.
3.4.2.1 Changes in the capacity and generation mix
Figure 3.6 displays the capacity and generation mix per decade in the ‘Grid Parity Sce-
nario’, as well as a comparison to the ‘Reference Scenario’. Note that in both scenarios,
German NREAP targets for 2020 are achieved, including the 52 GW target for PV.
In the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’, an additional 36 GW of PV systems in combination with
30 GW (50 GWh) battery storage capacities are installed on households in 2020 as a
consequence of the indirect financial incentive for in-house PV electricity consumption.
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In contrast, no additional PV and storage capacities (beyond the politically implemented
target of 52 GW) are built before 2020 in the ‘Reference Scenario’, since these technolo-
gies are not a cost-efficient investment option from a total system perspective in 2020.
However, due to further investment cost degressions, PV capacity investments become
cost-efficient by 2030 in both scenarios. In the longer run (2040-2050), more wind power
capacities with comparatively higher full load hours are installed in the ‘Reference Sce-
nario’ to achieve commitment with more ambitious CO2 reduction targets. Moreover,
compressed air energy storage capacities (‘electricity’) are expanded in both scenarios
only after 2040.
Regarding the generation mix, the scenario comparison reveals that the additional PV
electricity generation on the household level induced by the indirect financial incentive
for PV electricity in-house consumption displaces electricity produced by coal-, gas-
and lignite fired power plants in 2020 and 2030. Moreover, net electricity exports from
Germany to neighboring countries significantly increase in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’
compared to the ‘Reference Scenario’.
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Figure 3.6: Capacity [GW] and generation [TWh] mix in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’
and difference to the ‘Reference Scenario’
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3.4.2.2 Changes in the residual load to be supplied by the wholesale elec-
tricity market
The additional PV electricity generation on the household level in the ‘Grid Parity
Scenario’ causes significant changes in the residual load and thus in the provision and
operation of power plants on the system level.91
Figure 3.7 shows the average reduction of the total electricity demand (per hour and
month) in 2020 that is supplied by the wholesale market due to the additional PV
electricity generation on the household level, which is either consumed in-house or fed
into the electricity grid.92 As can be seen in Figure 3.7, the largest reductions in total
electricity demand are observed during midday in the summer (up to 19 %) when PV
electricity generation on the household level is highest. However, total electricity demand
in the summer also decreases significantly in the evening hours due to the consumption
of PV electricity that was stored in the battery system during the day.
January February March April May June July August September October November December
1 0% -1% -1% -1% -2% -2% -2% -2% -1% -1% 0% 0%
2 0% -1% -1% -1% -2% -2% -2% -1% -1% 0% 0% 0%
3 0% -1% -2% -1% -2% -2% -2% -1% -1% 0% 0% 0%
4 0% -1% -3% -2% -3% -3% -2% -2% -2% -1% 0% 0%
5 -1% -1% -1% -2% -3% -4% -3% -2% -2% -1% 0% 0%
6 -1% -2% -2% -4% -8% -8% -7% -6% -3% -1% 0% 0%
7 -2% -4% -5% -8% -13% -13% -11% -9% -8% -5% -1% 0%
8 -2% -6% -7% -10% -17% -16% -14% -12% -10% -7% -2% -1%
9 -3% -7% -10% -12% -18% -18% -16% -14% -12% -8% -4% -3%
10 -4% -7% -8% -12% -19% -19% -16% -15% -12% -8% -4% -4%
11 -3% -7% -9% -12% -19% -18% -15% -15% -12% -8% -4% -4%
12 -3% -8% -9% -11% -16% -16% -14% -12% -9% -6% -4% -4%
13 -3% -8% -8% -9% -13% -12% -10% -9% -7% -6% -4% -4%
14 -3% -8% -7% -8% -11% -10% -9% -8% -7% -5% -3% -3%
15 -1% -7% -6% -7% -9% -9% -8% -7% -7% -5% -2% -2%
16 -1% -3% -7% -9% -10% -10% -9% -8% -8% -6% -3% -2%
17 -1% -4% -5% -10% -11% -10% -10% -11% -10% -7% -3% -2%
18 -1% -3% -5% -9% -11% -10% -9% -11% -9% -7% -2% -1%
19 -1% -3% -4% -6% -9% -8% -7% -7% -6% -5% -1% 0%
20 -1% -3% -3% -5% -8% -9% -7% -6% -4% -3% -1% -1%
21 -1% -3% -3% -4% -8% -9% -8% -6% -3% -2% -1% 0%
22 -1% -3% -3% -4% -7% -8% -7% -5% -3% -2% 0% 0%
23 -1% -2% -2% -3% -5% -5% -5% -4% -2% -1% 0% 0%
24 0% -1% -1% -1% -2% -2% -2% -1% -1% 0% 0% 0%
Month
H
ou
r
Figure 3.7: Average reduction of total electricity demand to be supplied by the
wholesale electricity market (2020)
3.4.2.3 Changes in the residential electricity tariff and its components
As explained in Section 3.3, the residential electricity tariff is derived by exogenous
and endogenous components (see Table 3.11). While the exogenous components are the
91In the following, the residual load to be supplied by the wholesale electricity market is defined as
the total electricity demand in Germany minus the scaled PV electricity in-house consumption and grid
feed-in.
92Note that the average reduction of the total electricity demand in 2020 hardly differs from the
average reduction in the years 2025-2050.
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same for both scenarios, the endogenous components are scenario specific. Table 3.18
and Figure 3.8 illustrate the impact of the household’s optimization behavior on the
endogenous components of the residential electricity tariff.
Table 3.18: Endogenous components of the residential electricity tariff [e 2011
ct/kWh]
‘Reference Scenario’ ‘Grid Parity Scenario’
Base price
2020 3.2 3.1
2030 3.1 2.9
2040 4.1 4.0
2050 4.2 4.3
Renewable energy surcharge
2020 6.1 6.5
2030 2.9 3.1
2040 1.3 1.4
Back-up capacity payment
2020 1.6 1.7
2030 1.3 1.4
2040 1.2 1.3
2050 1.8 1.9
Value-added tax
2020 4.7 4.8
2030 4.4 4.4
2040 4.3 4.3
2050 4.1 4.2
Residential electricity tariff
2020 29.7 30.1
2030 27.4 27.6
2040 26.7 26.8
2050 25.9 26.1
Due to the additional PV electricity generation on the household level, the base price
slightly decreases in 2020-2040. Specifically, as households consume self-produced in-
stead of grid-supplied electricity, the residual load diminishes, and, as surplus PV elec-
tricity is fed into the grid, it displaces power plants with higher variable production
costs (short-term merit order effect). Both effects cause the hourly wholesale electricity
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price and thus the base price to decline.93 As a consequence of this so called merit-order
effect, the marginal value and thus the overall economic attractiveness of additional so-
lar power generation significantly decreases from the total system perspective. This is
analyzed in more detail in Chapter 4 and 5.94
In 2050, in contrast, the base price slightly increases. This can be explained by the fact
that in the ‘Reference Scenario’, more wind power (instead of PV power) is deployed
in 2050 to achieve commitment with the long-term CO2 reduction target (see Figure
3.6), which displaces conventional power plants at the steeper end of the merit-order
curve (since wind generation is largest during the winter when the electricity demand is
highest).
At the same time, however, the renewable energy surcharge increases as a consequence
of the single household’s optimization behavior. This is due to two factors: Firstly,
the market value of the renewable energy generation – based on renewable capacities
promoted via the feed-in tariff to achieve the 2020 NREAP targets – decreases with the
additional PV electricity generation (short-term merit order effect). As a consequence,
the additional costs, i.e., the difference between the producers’ annual costs and their
revenue from selling renewable energy electricity on the wholesale market, increase.
Secondly, the total amount of grid-supplied electricity purchased by (non-privileged)
electricity consumers – on which the additional costs are apportioned – decreases due
to the increased in-house PV electricity consumption.
The decrease in the total amount of grid-supplied electricity purchased from electricity
consumers in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’ also explains the slight increase in the back-
up capacity payment. Specifically, the costs for providing securely available capacities
are apportioned to a lower share of electricity consumers (i.e., a lower amount of grid-
supplied electricity purchased from electricity consumers) in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’.
Finally, the value-added tax payment also increases due to the fact that the value-added
tax of 19 % is levied on the sum of all components, which is larger in the ‘Grid Parity
Scenario’ than in the ‘Reference Scenario’.
In sum, the increase in the renewable energy surcharge, the back-up capacity payment
and the value-added tax payments compensates the decrease in the base price (which
serves as a proxy for the average costs of electricity procurement). Thus, the residential
electricity tariff increases.
93However, we note that the hourly wholesale prices do not drop below zero since the electricity system
optimization model allows for endogenous curtailment of wind and solar power generation.
94See also Joskow (2011), who argues that comparing the economic attractiveness of fluctuating wind
and solar power units to that of conventional dispatchable generation capacities based on the levelized
costs of electricity (LCOE) is flawed since it fails to account for the fact that the value of electricity
supplied (i.e., the wholesale price) varies over the course of the day and the year.
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Figure 3.8: Impact of the single household’s optimization on the residential electricity
tariff [e 2011 ct/kWh]
Notably, the increase in the residential electricity tariff due to the additional PV electric-
ity generation constitutes a self-reinforcing effect, since a higher residential electricity
tariff in turn increases the attractiveness of consuming self-produced instead of grid-
supplied electricity from the single household’s perspective.
3.4.2.4 Welfare loss and redistributional effects associated with the house-
hold’s optimization behavior
After having analyzed the impact of the single household’s optimization behavior on
the generation and capacity mix, the residual load and the residential electricity tariff,
we quantify the welfare loss and redistributional effects associated with the in-house
consumption of self-produced PV electricity generation on the household level.
Figure 3.9 illustrates the redistributional effects associated with the household’s opti-
mization behavior. Specifically, it shows the difference in the consumer rent, the rent
of ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’, the producer profit, the payments of con-
sumers to the public sector and network operators, the payments of ‘HH producers and
in-house consumers’ to the public sector and network operators as well as the revenues
of the public sector and network operators between the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’ and the
‘Reference Scenario’ accumulated up to 2050 in bn e 2011 (not discounted). Table 3.19,
moreover, shows the change in the single components of the consumer rent, the rent of
‘HH producers and in-house consumers’ and producer profit accumulated up to 2050 in
bn e 2011 (not discounted).
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Figure 3.9: Redistributional effects accumulated up to 2050 (not discounted) [bn
e 2011]
The producer rent increases by 19 bn e 2011 in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’ since the
decrease in the producer’s costs exceeds the decrease in the producer’s revenue (see Table
3.19). Specifically, the producer’s revenue for providing electricity decreases by 25 bn
e 2011, but annualized investment costs, variable generation costs and fixed O&M costs
decrease by 22, 7 and 10 bn e 2011, respectively, in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’. Moreover,
the producer’s compensation for providing renewable energy capacity increases since
the market value of the renewable energy generation (based on renewable capacities
promoted via the feed-in tariff to achieve the 2020 NREAP targets) decreases (see Section
3.3).
Chapter 3. The economic inefficiency of grid parity - The case of German photo-
voltaics 85
Table 3.19: Change in the single components of the producer profit, the consumer
rent and the rent of ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’ accumulated up to 2050
(not discounted) [bn e 2011]
Producers
Decrease in the revenue for providing electricity -25
Decrease in the revenue for providing heat -2
Increase in the revenue for providing securley available capacities 2
Increase in the renewable energy compensation 6
Sum: Decrease in producer revenue -20
Decrease in the annualized investment costs 22
Decrease in the variable generation costs (including fuel and CO2 costs) 7
Decrease in the fixed operation and maintenance costs 10
Sum: Decrease in producer costs 39
Net effect: Increase in producer profit 19
Consumers
Decrease in the costs for being provided with electricity (from the wholesale market) 9
Increase in the costs for being provided with securly available capacities -13
Increase in the costs for being provided with renewable capacities -21
Sum: Decrease in consumer rent -25
HH producers and in-house consumers
Increase in the revenue from the wholesale market 3
Sum: Increase in the revenue of HH producers and in-house consumers 3
Decrease in the costs for being provided with electricity (from the wholesale market) 26
Decrease in the costs for being provided with securely available capacities 12
Decrease in the costs for being provided with renewable capacities 13
Increase in the costs for PV and storage capacities -163
Sum: Increase in costs of HH producers and in-house consumers -113
Net effect: Decrease in the rent of HH producers and in-house consumers -110
The consumer rent, in contrast, decreases by 25 bn e 2011 due to the single household’s
optimization behavior. Although the costs of being provided with electricity from the
wholesale electricity market decreases by 9 bn e 2011 due to the higher PV electricity
generation in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’, the costs of being provided with renewable
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and securely available back-up capacities increase by 21 and 13 bn e 2011, respectively,
for consumers. This is due to the fact that the (residual) consumers have to bear a
higher share of both the (increased) additional costs of renewable energy and back-up
capacities, as the total amount of grid-supplied electricity (on which these costs are
apportioned) decreases.
Besides the consumer rent, the rent of ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’ also
decreases by more than 110 bn e 2011 in the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’. This is due to the
high investment (and fixed O&M) costs for the households’s PV and storage capacities
of 157 bn e 2011, which compensate (i) the decrease in the costs of being provided with
electricity from the wholesale electricity market (26 bn e 2011), (ii) the decrease in the
costs of being provided with renewable and securely available capacities (13 and 12
bn e 2011, respectively) and (iii) the revenue from selling surplus PV electricity on the
wholesale market (3 bn e 2011).
In sum, the single household’s optimization behavior (induced by the indirect financial
incentive for in-house PV electricity consumption) reduces overall economic welfare by
116 bn e 2011.95 The welfare loss is due to the fact that the single household’s PV and
storage capacities are not yet cost-efficient investment options from the total system
perspective in 2020.
However, despite the decrease in the rent of ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’,
investments in PV and storage capacities are nevertheless profitable from the perspective
of ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’, as illustrated in Figure 3.9. This is due to the
fact that the in-house consumption of self-produced PV electricity allows ‘HH producers
and in-house consumers’ to reduce their payments to the public sector and network
operators. Overall, ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’ reduce their payments to
the public sector by more than 87 bn e 2011 and to the network operators by more than
69 bn e 2011. This is because of the exemption from taxes, levies and surcharges for the
amount of self-produced PV electricity generation consumed in-house and the allocation
of grid costs via energy- rather than capacity-related network tariffs. In contrast, the
consumers’ payments to the public sector slightly increase by 10 bn e 2011, which is
primarily explained by the fact that the total amount of value-added tax payments
increase (see Section 3.3).
In total, ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’ save 47 bn e 2011 in the ‘Grid Parity
Scenario’ compared to the ‘Reference Scenario’. The financial burden of the (residual)
95The welfare loss (excess costs) corresponds to the accumulated change in the consumer rent, the
rent ‘HH producers and in-house consumers’ and the producer profit between the ‘Grid Parity Scenario’
and the ‘Reference Scenario’ (see Equation (3.41) in Section 3.3).
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electricity consumers, in contrast, increases by 35 bn e 2011. Moreover, the public sector
and network operators face revenue losses of 77 and 69 bn e 2011, respectively.
Note that in our analysis, we capture feedback effects of the in-house consumption of
self-produced PV electricity generation for four components of the residential electricity
price: the base price (which serves as a proxy for the average costs of electricity pro-
curement), the renewable energy surcharge, the back-up capacity payment and the value
added tax (see Table 3.11). All other components of the residential electricity tariff are,
in contrast, exogenously assumed and do not differ between scenarios.96 This assump-
tion aims at illustrating the potential revenue loss experienced by the public sector and
the network operators as a consequence of an increased consumption of self-produced
(instead of grid-supplied) electricity on the household level in Germany. However, if, con-
trary to our assumption, the public sector would raise the taxes and levies on electricity
consumption or if the network operators would raise the (energy-related) network tariffs
(to cover their revenue losses of 77 and 69 bn e 2011, respectively), the financial burden
of the residual electricity consumers would further increase. Moreover, just like in the
case of the renewable energy surcharge, an increase in public taxes and levies or network
tariffs would constitute a self-reinforcing effect since a higher residential electricity ta-
riff increases the attractiveness of consuming self-produced (rather than grid-supplied)
electricity from the single household’s perspective. Hence, our quantified welfare effects
(excess costs of 116 bn e 2011) may be interpreted as lower-bound estimates.
In summary, the unequal treatment of grid-supplied and self-produced electricity with
respect to public taxes, levies and surcharges as well as the allocation of grid costs via
energy- rather than capacity-related network tariffs constitutes a considerable distortion
of competition. Accumulated up to 2050, excess costs associated with the massive
expansion of combined PV and storage capacities on the household level by 2020 amount
to more than 116 bn e 2011, corresponding to 0.44 % of the German gross domestic
product from 2012 (DESTATIS (2013)). These significant excess costs can be explained
by the fact that PV systems in Germany become efficient from 2030 only (see Figure
3.6), once PV investment costs may have fallen further and CO2 reduction targets
become more ambitious. Likewise, electricity storage is not a cost-efficient flexibility
option before 2040, i.e., not until the share of fluctuating renewable energy technologies
has further increased. However, instead of small-scale battery storage capacities (on
the household level), large-scale compressed air energy storage (CAES) capacities are
installed in the Reference Scenario, which are characterized by higher investment costs
but significantly higher technological lifetimes, rendering CAES storage a less costly
96The exogenously assumed components of the residential electricity tariff include the concession levy,
the offshore liability surcharge, the costs of distribution (margin included), the electricity tax, the CHP
surcharge, the §19 surcharge and the network tariff (see Table 3.11).
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flexibility option than battery storage. Moreover, while the battery storage capacities
on the household level are dispatched to minimize the single household’s electricity costs,
the CAES capacities are optimally dispatched from total system perspective.
3.5 Conclusion
The paper has analyzed the consequences of exempting in-house PV electricity consump-
tion from taxes, levies and surcharges and allocating grid costs via energy- rather than
capacity-related (cost-reflective) network tariffs in a case study for Germany up to 2050.
We find that single households are able to avoid on average 10 % - 18 % of their accu-
mulated electricity costs up to 2050 by covering (on average) 38 - 57 % of their annual
electricity demand with self-produced PV electricity. In total, cost savings on the house-
hold level amount to more than 47 bn e 2011 up to 2050 in our scenario analysis. However,
while the installation of PV and battery storage capacities on the household level for
the consumption of self-produced instead of grid-supplied electricity is beneficial from
the single household’s perspective, it is inefficient from the total system perspective. In
total, the single household’s optimization behavior is found to cause excess costs of 116
bn e 2011 accumulated up to 2050.
Moreover, we find that the single household’s optimization behavior leads to redistribu-
tional effects that may be undesirable from the overall economic perspective. Specifically,
the single household’s optimization behavior raises the financial burden for the (resid-
ual) electricity consumers by more than 35 bn e 2011 up to 2050. In addition, it yields
massive revenue losses on the side of the public sector and network operators of more
than 77 and 69 bn e 2011, respectively.
In order to enhance the overall economic efficiency, we argue that the financial incentive
for in-house PV electricity consumption should be abolished. This implies that either the
consumption of self-produced electricity should be burdened with taxes, levies and other
surcharges, as in the case of the consumption of grid-supplied electricity, or that the res-
idential electricity price should be reduced to the ‘true’ costs of electricity procurement.
Moreover, since grid costs are primarily fixed costs, the traditional energy-related net-
work tariff should be replaced by a cost-reflective tariff corresponding primarily to the
grid connection capacity. As a result, competition between PV and all other electricity
generation technologies would be ensured and inefficient investments avoided.
Future research could address the following issues: Firstly, the consequences of a change
in the network tariff structure from energy- to capacity-related tariffs on the overall sin-
gle households optimization behavior and the overall welfare effects could be quantified.
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Secondly, the effect of active demand side management measures could be analyzed.
More specifical, the option to shift the deferrable electricity demand of households from
the evening hours to the maximum PV electricity generation hours would be an in-
teresting point of investigation. Thirdly, the implications of a time-dependent residen-
tial electricity tariff on the single household’s optimization behavior could be analyzed.
With increasing penetration of PV capacities, hourly solar generation and wholesale
electricity prices may become negatively correlated. Thus cost savings from consuming
self-produced instead of grid-supplied electricity may be lower under a time-varying res-
idential electricity tariff (instead of a flat residential electricity tariff). All three aspects
are assumed to lower the economic inefficiency associated with the indirect financial
incentive for in-house PV electricity consumption.

Chapter 4
An illustrative note on the
system price effect of wind and
solar power - The German case
4.1 Introduction
The competitiveness of wind and solar power technologies is often evaluated in public de-
bates by comparing levelized costs of electricity (LCOE). However, as argued by Joskow
(2011), comparing the economic attractiveness of fluctuating wind and solar power units
to that of conventional dispatchable generation capacities based on the LCOE is flawed
since it fails to account for the fact that the value of electricity supplied (i.e., the whole-
sale market price) varies over the course of the day and the year. Similarly, renewable
energy support schemes are often designed to incentivize investors to only account for
the marginal costs (MC) but not for the marginal value (MV el) of renewable energy
technologies, i.e., the revenue from selling electricity on the wholesale market during
their technical lifetime.
Whereas it is commonly recognized that dispatchable renewable energy technologies such
as biomass power plants should be exposed to the price signal of the wholesale market,
exposing fluctuating wind and solar power technologies to the market price signal is often
argued to have no merit (e.g., Klessmann et al. (2008)). This statement is partly true
from a short-term perspective since wind and solar power have no short-run marginal
costs of power production, which incentivizes wind and solar power generators to produce
electricity whenever the wind is blowing or the sun is shining – irrespective of the current
market price signal (Hiroux and Saguan (2010)). On the other hand, exposing fluctuating
renewables to the market price signal at least induces wind and solar power generators
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to voluntarily curtail their power generation in response to negative prices (e.g., Hiroux
and Saguan (2010), Klessmann et al. (2008)) and to align their maintenance planning
to hours in which their power generation is less valuable for the system (e.g., Gawel and
Purkus (2013), Hiroux and Saguan (2010)). Most importantly, however, exposing wind
and solar power to the market price signal allows for cost-efficient investment decisions,
as it incentivices investors to account for the marginal value (MV el) of renewable energy
technologies (see also Chapter 6).
As shown by Lamont (2008), the MV el of wind and solar power units depends on their
penetration level. More specifically, the MV el of wind and solar power units is a function
of the respective unit’s capacity factor and the covariance between its generation profile
and the system marginal costs. The latter component of the MV el (i.e., the covariance)
declines as the wind and solar power penetration increases, displacing dispatchable power
plants with higher short-run marginal costs of power production and thus reducing the
system marginal costs in all generation hours. This so called ‘system price effect’ is
analyzed in more detail in this paper.97
Our analysis complements the work Lamont (2008) in two regards. First of all, we derive
an alternative expression for the MV el of wind and solar power units, which shows that
the MV el of wind (solar) power technologies depends not only on their own penetration
level but also on a variety of other parameters that are specific to the electricity system.
Second, based on historical wholesale prices and wind and solar power generation data for
Germany, we present a numerical ‘ceteris paribus’ example for Germany which illustrates
the decrease in the MV el of wind and solar power units as penetration increases (as a
consequence of the system price effect).
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the marginal value (MV el)
of wind and solar power from a theoretical perspective, before Section 4.3 numerically
illustrates the system price effect of wind and solar power in Germany. Section 4.4 draws
conclusions.
4.2 Theoretical analysis
In the following we first derive the characteristics of a cost-efficient renewable energy
mix (Section 4.2.1), before we analyze the determinants of the marginal value (MV el)
97In contrast to Lamont (2008), Hirth (2013) and Nicolosi (2012) analyze the annual ‘value factor’ of
wind and solar power in Northwestern Europe and Germany, respectively, which can be understood as a
proxy/indicator for the MV el of wind and solar power, as it is defined as the average hourly revenue of
wind and solar power generators relative to the time-weighted average wholesale price (base-price) per
year. Both papers apply a linear dispatch and investment model and find that the annual value factor
of wind and solar power decreases with increasing penetration of these technologies.
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of wind and solar power in more detail (Section 4.2.2).
4.2.1 What characterizes a cost-efficient renewable energy mix?
The analysis complements the work of Lamont (2008) in accounting for politically im-
plemented renewable energy (RES-E) targets. Just as in Lamont (2008), the optimality
condition for renewable energy expansions is analyzed for the example of fluctuating
wind and solar power units. The focus on wind and solar power is motivated by the
fact that they differ from conventional dispatchable power plants in the sense that their
power production is weather dependent (i.e., it depends on the availability of wind and
solar power resources, which differs between regions) and that they are associated with
(almost) no short-run marginal costs of power production. Moreover, given limited po-
tentials for hydro power and low-cost biomass resources in generating electricity, wind
and solar power are expected to account for the largest share of renewable energy ca-
pacity additions in the coming years.
The optimality condition for the expansion of fluctuating wind and solar power units
(Cf ) with an hourly power output of pffy,h under a technology- and region-neutral RES-
E target can be derived by minimizing total system costs (as demonstrated in Appendix
C, see Eq. (C.1) - (C.8)).98
In the optimum, fluctuating renewable energy units (Cf ) are expanded up to the point
at which their marginal costs (MC) correspond to the sum of their marginal value of
power supply (MV el) and their marginal value of renewable energy supply (MV ren),
given a technology- and region-neutral RES-E target (see Eq. (4.1)).99 This reflects a
basic economic principle under perfect competition: Marginal profits are zero for the
capacity level at which marginal costs equal marginal value, which implies that profits
are maximized or (alternatively) costs are minimized.
In general, the competitive equilibrium is characterized by a market clearance and a zero
profit condition. Market clearance refers to the condition that (i) a wholesale price for
electricity (µy,h) is established through competition such that the amount of electricity
demanded is equal to the amount of electricity produced, and (ii) that a market price
for ‘green electricity’ (green certificates) (ρy) is established such that the amount of
‘green electricity’ demanded (by the RES-E target) is equal to the amount of ‘green
electricity’ produced. Moreover, in line with the zero profit condition, investments in
98Due to the assumption of perfect competition and a price-inelastic electricity demand the cost-
minimization approach corresponds to a welfare-maximization approach. Alternatively, the optimality
condition for the expansion of fluctuating wind and solar power units could be derived by maximizing
profits (assuming perfect competition and a price-inelastic electricity demand).
99The term ‘technology- and region-neutral’ indicates that each kWh of renewable electricity produced
contributes to achieving the RES-E target irrespective of the technology or the region of its deployment.
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fluctuating renewable energy capacities (Cf ) take place as long as investments break
even, i.e., up until the point the sum of their marginal value of power supply (MV el)
and their marginal value of renewable energy supply (MV ren) corresponds to the unit’s
marginal costs (MC). This corresponds to the result of Lamont (2008) who showed that
the costs of an additional unit of wind and solar power capacity should be equal to the
benefits that it provides to the system. However, in contrast to our analysis, Lamont
(2008) only accounted for the benefits of meeting electricity demand (MV el) but not
for the benefit of meeting renewable energy targets, i.e., the benefit of supplying ‘green
electricity’ (MV ren).
∑
y∈Y
fcfy︸ ︷︷ ︸
MC
Cf
!
=
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
pffy,h · µy,h︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV el
Cf
+
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
pffy,h · ρy︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV ren
Cf
(4.1)
While the MC are defined as the unit’s accumulated annualized investment costs (fcfy)
over all years (Y) of its technical lifetime, the MV el of wind and solar power units corre-
sponds to the accumulated revenue from selling electricity (pffy,h) at the wholesale market
at price µy,h in all hours (H) and years (Y) of the unit’s technical lifetime. Assuming
perfect competition and a price-inelastic electricity demand, the shadow variable of the
power balance constraint (see Eq. (C.4) and (C.7) of the Appendix) – which represents
the system’s marginal costs associated with meeting the hourly electricity demand at a
specific point in time – serves as proxy for the wholesale price (µy,h). Hence, the MV
el
of wind and solar power units reflects the accumulated value of the good ‘electricity’
(wholesale price) supplied by wind and solar power units during their technical lifetime.
In contrast to the MV el, the MV ren of wind and solar power units represents the ac-
cumulated value of the good ‘green electricity’ supplied by wind and solar power units
during their technical lifetime under politically implemented RES-E targets. RES-E
targets can hardly be justified from a climate protection perspective, given the imple-
mentation of a CO2 emission cap which limits the overall CO2 emissions (see, e.g.,
Chapter 2 or Ja¨gemann et al. (2013a)). However, if renewable energy targets are never-
theless implemented, they may reflect the society’s preference for electricity generation
from renewable energy sources over electricity generation from non-renewable sources
(i.e., fossil fuels or nuclear power). As such, electricity produced from wind and solar
power units may have an additional value for the society (compared to electricity pro-
duced from non-renewable sources), which is derived from its property of being ‘green’.
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Just as in the case of the good ‘electricity’, which is traded and priced on the wholesale
electricity market, the good ‘green electricity’ can be traded and priced on a market for
‘green electricity’. Such markets exist, for example, in countries where governments have
implemented renewable energy quota obligations in combination with tradable green cer-
tificates (TGC) which generators receive from the government for each kWh of ‘green
electricity’ produced.100 In this case, the MV ren of wind and solar power units corre-
sponds to the accumulated revenue from selling TGC on the green certificate market.
The price of TGC is given by ρy, which corresponds to the shadow variable of the re-
newable energy constraint (see Eq. (C.6) and (C.7) of the Appendix) and indicates the
marginal system costs associated with the achievement of the politically implemented
RES-E target. Overall, the MV ren of wind and solar power units represent the part of
the MC that cannot be covered by the revenue from selling electricity on the wholesale
market during the unit’s technical lifetime (i.e., the MV el), as shown by Equation 4.2.
MV renCf = MCCf −MV elCf (4.2)
Summarizing, while the MC reflect the unit’s capital costs, the MV el of wind and
solar power units is defined as the accumulated revenue from selling electricity on the
wholesale market during the unit’s technical lifetime. Hence, in contrast to the MC, the
MV el of wind and solar power units depends on a variety of parameters that are specific
to the electricity system. In the next section we analyze the determinants of the MV el
of wind and solar power units to gain a better understanding of what drives the MV ren
of renewable energy technologies, i.e., the part of the MC that needs to be covered by
renewable energy support payments to incentivice investments.
4.2.2 What determines the marginal value of power supply (MV el)?
In the following two alternative theoretical definitions of the marginal value of wind and
solar power units (MV el) are derived.
100Quota obligations in combination with tradable green certificates (TGC) fix the quantity of renew-
able electricity to be generated. The supply of TGC is ensured by giving producers a certificate for
each unit of renewable energy sold. The demand for TGC is induced by transferring the politically
implemented RES-E target to distribution companies (electricity suppliers), who are then required to
prove that a certain proportion (quota) of the electricity supplied to their final consumers was generated
from renewable energy sources.
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4.2.2.1 Definition 1
The marginal value of power supply (MV el) is defined as the accumulated revenue from
selling electricity on the wholesale market at price µy,h in all hours (H) and years (Y)
of the unit’s technical lifetime (Eq. (4.3)).
MV elCf =
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
pffy,h · µy,h (4.3)
Let us assume that the hourly power output of wind or solar power units (Gfy,h) is given
by the production factor (pffh) in the equilibrium (Eq. (4.4)), which implies that no
curtailment of wind and solar power generation takes place.
Gfy,h = pf
f
y,h · Cf (4.4)
Hence, the equilibrium output of dispatchable generators (
∑
d∈DG
d
y,h), which corre-
sponds to the residual load (RLy,h), is given by Equation (4.5).
∑
d∈D
Gdy,h = lh,y −
∑
f∈F
pffy,h · Cf = RLy,h (4.5)
In our modeling framework, dispatchable generators offer their output at a price equal
to their short-run marginal costs of power production, which are assumed to be a linear
function of the total dispatchable power output (
∑
d∈DG
d
y,h), see Equation (4.6).
101
The function represents a merit-order curve of dispatchable power plants with different
short-run marginal costs of power production.102
101The assumption that dispatchable generators offer their output at a price equal to their short-run
marginal costs of power production reflects the assumption of perfect competition.
102The assumption of a linear function is in line with Bode (2006). However, in reality, the shape of
the merit-order curve is rather staircase-shaped. More specifically, with every generator bidding its total
capacity at a price equal to its short-run marginal costs of power production, the aggregate supply is a
staircase function.
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dV Cd
d
∑
d∈DG
d
y,h
= a+ b ·
∑
d∈D
Gdy,h (4.6)
The parameter a reflects the short-run marginal costs of power production from the
dispatchable power plant with the lowest short-run marginal production costs. Moreover,
given the linear approximation of the (staircase-shaped) merit-order curve, b reflects the
difference in the short-run marginal production costs between the dispatchable power
plant with the lowest and the highest short-run marginal production costs. Hence,
the larger the difference between the short-run marginal production costs between the
dispatchable power plants is, the higher the slope of the linear (approximated) merit-
order curve becomes.
Since the short-run marginal costs of wind and solar power production are zero, the
wholesale price (µy,h) is assumed to always be set by a dispatchable generator.
µy,h = a+ b ·
∑
d∈D
Gdy,h (4.7)
Thus, the equilibrium wholesale price (µy,h) is given by Equation (4.8).
µy,h = a+ b · (lh,y −
∑
f∈F
pffy,h · Cf ) = a+ b ·RLy,h (4.8)
Equation (4.9) (i.e., the derivative of the wholesale price function with respect to Cf )
illustrates the short-term merit-order effect: The wholesale price decreases as (ceteris
paribus) the penetration of fluctuating wind and solar power capacities (Cf ) with no
short-run marginal costs of power production increases.103
103The effects of wind and solar power generation with (almost) no variable generation costs on the
wholesale price has been examined by, e.g., Gil et al. (2012), Woo et al. (2011), Jonsson et al. (2010),
MacCormack et al. (2010), Munksgaard and Morthorst (2008), G. Saenz de Miera and P. del Rion
Gonzalez and I. Vizcaino (2008) or Sensfuß et al. (2008), based on historical as well as simulated data.
All papers confirm the decreasing effect of increased wind and solar power generation on the wholesale
price (short-term merit-order effect).
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dµy,h
dCf
≤ 0 (4.9)
Inserting Equation (4.8) in Equation (4.3) shows that the marginal value (MV el) of
fluctuating renewables (Cf ) can generally be expressed as follows:
MV elCf =
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
(pffy,h · µy,h) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
(pffy,h · (a+ b · (lh,y −
∑
f∈F
pffy,h · Cf ))). (4.10)
The MV el of wind (Cw) and solar (Cs) power capacities is given by Equations (4.11)
and (4.12), respectively.
MV elCw =
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
(pfwy,h · (a+ b · (lh,y − pfwy,h · Cw − pfsy,h · Cs))) (4.11)
MV elCs =
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
(pfsy,h · (a+ b · (lh,y − pfsy,h · Cs − pfwy,h · Cw))) (4.12)
Equations (4.11) and (4.12) demonstrate that the MV el of wind power and solar power
units is a function of the penetration of wind and solar power capacities (i.e., the level
of Cw and Cs), the wind and solar power production factor profiles (pfwy,h and pf
s
y,h) and
the load profile (ly,h). Moreover, the MV
el depends on the shape of the wholsale price
function (Eq. (4.8)), based on the level of a (intersection) and b (slope).104
Due to the short-term merit-order effect, the MV el of wind power (ceteris paribus) de-
creases not only as wind power penetration increases but also as solar power penetration
increases (and vice versa) (see Eq. (4.13) - (4.14)). Equally, the MV el of wind and solar
power (ceteris paribus) decreases as the hourly load (ly,h) decreases. This result reflects
a basic economic interdependence: Assets (i.e., in this case ‘electricity’) decrease in value
as their scarcity decreases, i.e., if supply increases or demand decreases. Thus, an asset
essentially has no value if it abundant.
104The wholsale price function corresponds to the merit-order curve of dispatchable power plants and
reflects the short-run marginal costs of power production of the respective electricity system’s dispatch-
able power plants
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Moreover, the MV el of wind and solar power (ceteris paribus) increases as the slope (b)
of the wholesale price function (i.e., the merit-order curve) increases, meaning that the
difference in the short-run marginal production costs between the single dispatchable
power plant capacities increases.
δMV elCw
δCw
≤ 0; δMV
el
Cw
δCs
≤ 0; δMV
el
Cw
δlh,y
≥ 0; δMV
el
Cw
δb
≥ 0 (4.13)
δMV elCs
δCs
≤ 0; δMV
el
Cs
δCw
≤ 0; δMV
el
Cs
δlh,y
≥ 0; δMV
el
Cs
δb
≥ 0 (4.14)
To summarize, Equations (4.11) and (4.12) show that system effects are very relevant
when discussing the MV el of renewable energy technologies. Overall, the MV el of wind
power capacities decreases as their penetration (Cw) increases. However, the level of the
MV el of wind power units depends on the wind power production factor profile (pfwy,h),
the solar power penetration (Cs), the solar power production factor profile (pfsy,h), the
load level (ly,h) and the structure of the marginal costs of the dispatchable capacity mix.
The same holds true for the MV el of solar power capacities.
4.2.2.2 Definition 2
An alternative expression for the MV el of fluctuating wind and solar power units is
derived by Lamont (2008). Equation (4.3) can be rewritten as follows:
MV elCf =
∑
y∈Y
H · E(pffy,h · µy,h) (4.15)
As explained in Lamont (2008), the term E(pffy,h · µy,h) from Equation (4.15), which
reflects an expected (average) value, is a component of the correlation between the hourly
production factor of fluctuating renewable energy technologies (pffy,h) and the wholesale
price (µy,h) (Eq. (4.16)). The correlation coefficient (cor(pf
f
y,h, µy,h)) is obtained by
dividing the covariance of the two variables (cov(pffy,h, µy,h)) by the product of their
standard deviations (σ
pffy,h
· σµy,h).
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cor(pffy,h, µy,h) =
cov(pffy,h, µy,h)
σ
pffy,h
· σµy,h
=
E(pffy,h · µy,h)− E(pffy,h) · E(µy,h)
σµy,h · σpffy,h
(4.16)
Thus, the MV el of fluctuating renewable energy technologies (Cf ) can alternatively be
expressed by Equation (4.17).
MV elCf =
∑
y∈Y
H · (E(pffy,h) · E(µy,h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
First component
+ cor(pffy,h, µy,h) · σpffy,h · σµy,h︸ ︷︷ ︸
Second component
) (4.17)
This expression (Eq. (4.17)) differs from the one originally derived by Lamont (2008)
with regard to the second component. More specifically, we take the correlation coef-
ficient between the production factor profile and the wholesale price (i.e., the system
marginal costs) instead of the covariance. This is motivated by the fact that the co-
variance only shows the sign of the linear relationship between the two variables, while
the normalized version of the covariance, i.e., the correlation coefficient, is indicative of
the strength of the linear relationship. More specifically, in contrast to the covariance,
the correlation coefficient shows the strength of the linear relation by its magnitude. As
such, the correlation coefficients of alternative fluctuating renewable energy technologies
can be better compared and interpreted than the covariances, which is advantageous for
the numerical analysis in Section 4.3.
As explained by Lamont (2008), the first component of Equation (4.17) is a function
of the capacity factor, i.e., the expected (average) production factor of the fluctuating
renewable energy technology (E(pffy,h)) over all hours (H) of the year, and the base
price, i.e., the expected (average) wholesale price (E(µy,h)) over all hours (H) of the year.
This component is independent of the actual profile of the hourly power production of
fluctuating renewable energy technologies and only reflects the technology’s full load
hours (FLH). It shows that the MV el of a technology increases as (ceteris paribus)
its capacity factor or number of FLH increases. The second component, however, is a
function of the correlation between the hourly production factor profile (pffy,h) and the
wholesale price profile (µy,h) and reflects the ‘price matching’ or ‘residual-load matching’
capability of a fluctuating power generation unit. Hence, the better the production factor
profile of a wind (solar) power unit matches the residual load (and thus the hourly
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wholesale price) profile, the larger (ceteris paribus) the correlation and thus the higher
the MV el of the wind (solar) power unit becomes.
After having analyzed the MV el of the wind (solar) power units in detail via a theoretical
framework, we provide quantitative evidence for the theoretical results derived so far.
Using historical data for Germany, we illustrate the change in the MV el of wind and
solar power technologies as a consequence of increased wind and solar power penetration
in a ‘ceteris paribus’ example (i.e., keeping all other determinants/parameters constant).
4.3 Numerical illustration for Germany
4.3.1 Methodology
In the numerical example for Germany we use Equation (4.18) to determine the MV el
of wind and solar power technologies (i.e., the annual revenue from selling electricity on
the wholesale market) for exogenously varied onshore wind and solar power capacities
(Cf ).
MV el =
8760∑
h=1
(pffy,h · µy,h) (4.18)
The corresponding wholesale price (µy,h) in e ct/kWh, which depends on the residual
load (RLy,h), is determined by Equation (4.19) (see also Eq. 4.8).
µy,h = −1.37 + 1.31 · 10−07 · (lh,y − pfwy,h · Cw − pfsy,h · Cs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
RLy,h
(4.19)
The coefficients of the wholesale price function (Eq. (4.19)) are derived by an ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression based on historical wholesale price data (EEX (2013c))
and residual load data for Germany in 2011 and 2012 (ENSTO-E (2013), EEX (2013a)
and EEX (2013b)).105 More specifically, we apply an OLS regression of the wholesale
105The restriction to the years 2011 and 2012 is due to the fact that solar power generation data from
EEX (2013a) are only available from 2011 onwards.
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price on the residual load (i.e., total electricity demand minus wind and solar power
generation) which is assumed to serve as a proxy for the output of dispatchable power
plants (
∑
d∈DG
d
y,h).
106 Modeling wind and solar power generation as a reduction from
total electricity demand reflects the German renewable energy law which guarantees
fixed feed-in tariffs (FIT) and implies a priority infeed of renewable generation.107
Table 4.1: Results of the OLS regression
Wholesale price (µy,h) Coefficient
Residual demand (RDy,h) 1.31e-07***
(7.21e-10)
Constant -1.37***
(0.034182)
Remarks: Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***Significant at the 1 %-level; Number of
observations: 17544; R-squared: 0.6526; Adjusted R-squared: 0.6526.
Figure 4.1: Scatter plot with linear regression line
The scatter plot of historical wholesale prices and residual load data (Figure 4.1) shows
negative prices at very low residual load levels (below 20 GWh) due to the priority infeed
of renewable generation under the German renewable energy law, and exponentially
106Another application of least-squares regressions of the wholesale price on the residual load can, for
example, be found in Wagner (2012). Alternative empirical functions from hourly wholesale prices and
(residual) load data are, for example, derived by Barlow (2002), Burger et al. (2006) and Elberg and
Hagspiel (2013).
107We note that production from wind and solar power generation (with marginal production costs of
zero) would be offered at a price of zero on the energy exchange if there was no such system. In this case,
our approach would only be suitable when additionally assuming that no negative prices are allowed at
the energy exchange.
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increasing prices at very high residual load levels (above 65 GWh). Between those
extremes, the plot suggest a fairly linear relation.
For reasons of model validation, historical wholesale prices (for 2011 and 2012) are
compared to the simulated wholesale prices (on basis of the residual load in 2011 and
2012). As can be seen in Figure 4.2, which illustrates the annual price duration curve of
the historical wholesale prices and the corresponding fitted values, wholesale prices are
underestimated for very high residual load levels and overestimated for very low residual
load levels in our model.108
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Figure 4.2: Annual price duration curves: Comparison of simulated and real wholesale
prices in 2011 and 2012
Overall, however, the applied linear function provides a reasonable fit to the data. As
illustrated in Table 4.1, the (adjusted) R-squared, which measures the quality of fit,
amounts to 0.65. Hence, 65 % of the variation in the wholesale price can be explained
by the residual load in our model.
We note that there might be a problem of endogeneity in OLS regressions which describes
the circumstance that the independent variable (here the wholesale price) is correlated
with the error term in the regression model and which implies that the regression coef-
ficients are biased. Important sources of endogeneity are omitted explanatory variables
and simultaneity. As explained in McMenamin et al. (2006), explanatory variables for
electricity prices can basically be divided in two categories: The first set of explanatory
factors is related to the demand-side. The hourly load reflects people’s life-patterns
and industrial production processes interacting, for example, with the day of the week
or the weather. In our model hourly electricity demand (lh,y, see Eq. (4.19)) is used
108This is primarily due to the application of a linear regression function.
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as explanatory variable, rather than indirect variables for calendar and weather effects.
The second set of explanatory factors refers to the supply-side. These factors include,
for example, wind and solar power generation, fuel prices, generation unit availability
and transmission constraints.109 In this analysis only wind and solar power generation
is included as explanatory variables (pfwy,h · Cw and pfsy,h · Cs, see Eq. (4.19)). Other
important supply-side factors, such as natural gas prices or un-/planned power plant
outages, are not considered. However, omitted variables only cause problems of endo-
geneity (i.e., lead to biased regression coefficients) if they are correlated with at least
one of the explanatory variables (i.e., the level of hourly demand or the level of hourly
wind and solar power generation) which is arguably not the case in this analysis. More
specifically, power plant outages and fossil fuel prices are assumed to be not correlated
with the level of hourly demand or hourly wind and solar power generation. Hence, we
argue that no problem of endogeneity exists in our analysis as a consequence of omit-
ted variables. However, endogeneity problems might exist due to simultaneity, as the
electricity demand itself might be dependent on the wholesale price if the electricity
demand is price-elastic in the short-term. However, short-term price elasticity is found
to be rather low in today’s electricity system (see, e.g., Lijesen (2007)). Hence, we ar-
gue that the potential problem of endogeneity due to simultaneity is negligible in our
analysis.
Besdies the potential problem of endogeneity, it should be stressed that the applied
wholesale price function reflects the current capacity mix in Germany (as it was es-
timated based on historical data from 2011 and 2012) and thus does not account for
an adaptation of the capacity mix as the renewable energy penetration increases (shift
towards peak-load capacities). Therefore, the derived decrease in the MV el as a con-
sequence of increased wind and solar power penetration should be interpreted as an
upper-bound estimate.
4.3.2 Results
In the numerical example for Germany we use Equations (4.18) and (4.19) to determine
the MV el of wind and solar power technologies (i.e., the annual revenue from selling
electricity on the wholesale market) for exogenously varied onshore wind and solar power
capacities (Cf ) for three regions in Germany (north, central and south), taking the actual
wind and solar power capacity mix in 2012 as a reference point.110 The three regions
109Moreover, in periods of high demand the load levels in neighboring countries can have a significant
impact on national electricity prices (McMenamin et al. (2006)).
110Appendix C provides a detailed discussion of the exogenous variation of wind and solar power
capacities assumed in the numerical example (see also Table C.2).
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differ with regard to the production factor profile of wind and solar power units (pffy,h)
and the number of full load hours (based on data for 2008 from EuroWind (2011)).
We note that the wind and solar power capacities are proportionally increased as to
generate the same amount of electricity with each technology (between 19 TWh and
58 TWh) in the numerical example. Moreover, to illustrate the benefits of regional
diversification, an average production factor profile is included for wind and solar power
across the three regions. As such, the average production factor profile for wind/ solar
power implicitly assumes an equal distribution of wind/ solar power capacities across
the three regions.111
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Figure 4.3: MV el of wind and solar power units depending on their penetration level
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Figure 4.3 illustrates three effects: First, the MV el of wind power and solar power units
decreases (ceteris paribus) as their penetration increases. As shown in Figure 4.4, the
decrease in the MV el can be explained by the decrease in the correlation between the
wind/ solar power production factor profile (pfwy,h/pf
s
y,h) and the wholesale price profile
(µy,h). The higher the penetration of wind or solar power units becomes the lower their
price matching or residual-load matching capability will be.112 In addition, the base
111The benefits of regional diversification with respect to the smoothing out of fluctuations in wind
power generation are, for example, discussed in Liu et al. (2013), Grothe and Schnieders (2011) Katzen-
stein et al. (2010) and Roques et al. (2010).
112We note that the correlation between the wind/ solar power production factor profile and the
wholesale price profile (illustrated in Figure 4.4) corresponds to the correlation between the wind/ solar
power production factor profile and the residual load profile in the numerical analysis.
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price (i.e., the time-weighted wholesale price E(µy,h)) also decreases, as shown in C
(Figure C.1).113
Second, the decrease in the MV el is more pronounced for solar power than for wind
power units as penetration increases (see Figure 4.3). For example, while the MV el of
a wind power unit in central Germany decreases by only 26 % (to 74 %) as the overall
wind power generation in central Germany increases from 19 to 58 TWh, the MV el of
a solar power unit in central Germany decreases by more than 44 % (to 56 %) as the
overall solar power generation in central Germany increases from 19 to 58 TWh. This
is due to the fact that the decrease in the correlation between the production factor
profile and the wholesale price profile is more drastic for the case of solar power than
for wind power (see Figure 4.4). More specifically, as a consequence of high solar power
generation during midday, the residual load pattern reverses, as illustrated in Figure
4.5 (i) and (ii). The former midday-peak of the residual load curve (under moderate
solar power penetration) becomes a trough. The wind power production factor profile,
in contrast, is more volatile and follows no such distinct daily pattern like solar power
(with zero output during the night and peak generation at midday). Hence, high wind
power penetration does not result in such a pronounced structural change in the residual
load curve, as shown in Figure 4.5 (i) and (iii). The effect can also be seen in Figure
C.2 of the Appendix, which illustrates the impact of increased wind and solar power
penetration on the annual residual load profile for 8760 hours of the year.
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113The level of decrease in the MV el of wind/ solar power units differs between the single regions due to
differences in the correlation of the regional production factor profiles and the load profile, as illustrated
in Table C.3 of the Appendix.
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(iii) Average daily profile
High annual wind power (58 TWh) and low annual solar power (19 TWh)
(i) Average daily profile
Low annual wind power (19 TWh) and low annual solar power (19 TWh)
(ii) Average daily profile
Low annual wind power (19 TWh) and high annual solar power (58 TWh)
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Figure 4.5: Impact of an increased wind and solar power penetration on the average
daily residual load profile (based on 8760 h)
Third, there are benefits of regional diversification which become evident when com-
paring the full load hours (FLH) and the MV el of units with region-specific production
factor profiles and units with the average production factor profile. For example, the
MV el of a wind power unit with the average production factor profile is more than 10 %
higher than the MV el of a wind power unit in central Germany at a penetration level of
58 TWh (71.6 thousand e /MW vs. 64.9 thousand e /MW), although the wind power
unit with the average production factor profile has only 2 % higher FLH than the wind
power unit in central Germany in the numerical analysis.114
Moreover, when looking at the combination of wind and solar power generation which
best matches the historical wind and solar power mix in 2012 in Figure 4.3, it becomes
114Equally, the MV el of a solar power unit with the average production factor profile is more than 14
% higher than the MV el of a solar power unit in central Germany at a penetration level of 58 TWh
(32.6 thousand e /MW vs. 28.5 thousand e /MW), although the solar power unit with the average wind
production factor profile has only 2 % higher FLH than the solar power unit in central Germany (1,072
h vs. 1,055 h).
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evident that the system price effect of wind and solar power is already highly relevant for
both wind and solar power in Germany. Hence, the MV el of additional wind and solar
power units in Germany has significantly decreased in recent years. As a consequence,
the level of renewable energy support payments needed to incentivize further investments
in wind and solar power technologies increases as (ceteris paribus) penetration increases,
see Equation (4.2).
4.4 Conclusion
The marginal value (MV el) of wind and solar power technologies depends on wide range
of parameters that are electricity system specific. Most importantly, the MV el of wind
and solar power technologies decreases as penetration increases. The higher the overall
installed capacity of wind and solar power becomes, the lower the correlation between the
production factor profile and the wholesale electricity price and thus the marginal value
of an additional unit of wind and solar capacity becomes. This so called system price
effect is already highly relevant for both wind and solar power generation in Germany
and suggests that renewable energy support payments needed to cover costs increase as
(ceteris paribus) penetration increases.
Overall, the results highlight the need to expose wind and solar power to the market
price signal if a cost-efficient renewable energy mix is to be achieved. Only if investors are
incentivized to account for the marginal value (MV el) of renewable energy technologies,
they chose the technologies which are cost-efficient from the total system perspective.
However, renewable energy support schemes are often designed to incentivize investors
to only account for the marginal costs (MC) but not for the marginal value (MV el)
of renewable energy technologies. Future research could thus address the following re-
search question: What are the excess costs if renewable energy support schemes fail to
incentivize investments in those renewable energy technologies which are most attractive
from the total system perspective?
Chapter 5
A note on the inefficiency of
technology- and region-specific
renewable energy support - The
German case
5.1 Introduction
Renewable energy (RES-E) support schemes have to meet two requirements in order to
lead to a cost-efficient renewable energy mix. First, RES-E support schemes need to
expose RES-E producers to the price signal of the wholesale market, which incentivizes
investors to account not only for the marginal costs (MC) but also for the marginal
value (MV el) of renewable energy technologies (see Chapter 4). Second, RES-E sup-
port schemes need to be technology- and region-neutral in their design (rather than
technology- and region-specific). That is, the financial support may not be bound to a
specific technology or a specific region.115
Germany, however, is committed to reach technology-specific targets for wind and solar
power by 2020. Moreover, wind and solar power generation is currently incentivized via
technology- (and region-)specific feed-in tariffs (FIT), which are coupled with capacity
support limits. For example, in 2012, a photovoltaic (PV) capacity support limit of
52 GW was implemented in order to control escalating support costs. At this point,
incentives will no longer be available for new PV projects in Germany. Moreover, the
115This is based on the assumption of imperfect information on the side of the government regarding
the MC and MV el of alternative technologies and regions, which prohibits the government to implement
technology- and region-specific support schemes that lead to the cost-efficient renewable energy mix.
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annual expansion of onshore wind capacities is forseen to take place along a predefined
corridor of 2.5 GW per year (BMU (2014)), which would result in a total onshore wind
power capacity of 50 GW installed by 2020.116 With regard to offshore wind power, an
overall capacity of 6.5 GW is targeted by 2020 (BMU (2014)).
While the level of the technology-specific FIT for PV generation is independent of the full
load hours and the location of the PV system, the technology-specific FIT for onshore
wind power generation is determined via a so called ‘reference yield model’.117 As
such, the technology-specific FIT for onshore wind power generation is dependent on
the annual output (full load hours) of the respective wind power project, which differs
across regions. More specifically, under the current reference yield model, incentives
for onshore wind power are designed in such a way as to only suffice the generation
costs at sites with high full load hours (FLH), but not the generation costs at sites with
less favorable wind resources (see, e.g., Frontier Economics (2012)). As such, Germany
basically grants a region-specific FIT that incentivizes onshore wind investments at sites
with the lowest marginal costs per kWh (MC) (due to highest FLH) without accounting
for differences in the marginal value per kWh (MV el) of onshore wind investments at
different sites.
According to the coalition agreement of the German government from November 2013,
financial support for onshore wind power should be decreased (CDU/CSU/SPD (2013)).
However, favorable wind regions with a reference yield of 75 % to 80 % (of the bench-
mark) should still be operated profitably. This implies that investments in regions with
less favorable wind resources (annual output below 75 % of the benchmark) are not
attractive from the investor’s perspective, although it may be beneficial from the total
system perspective.
Summarizing, the current FIT in Germany (which is coupled with capacity support
limits) fails to expose wind and solar power producers to the price signal of the wholesale
market. Moreover, it is technology- and region-specific in its design, i.e., the support
level for each kWh differs between wind and solar power technologies and the location
of their deployment (at least for onshore wind power). As a consequence, excess costs
occur which are burdened by society.
In the following, we illustrate the economic consequences associated with Germany’s
technology- and region-specific wind and solar power targets for 2020. By applying
116By the end of 2013, 32 GW of onshore wind power was installed in Germany (ISE (2014)).
117As explained, for example, in Deutsche Bank (2012), all onshore wind projects currently receive the
same FIT level (initial payment) for the first five years of operation. Afterwards, sites with highest full
load hours (FLH) are paid a lower FIT level for the remaining 15 years of the contract (base payment).
Sites with lower FLH, in contrast, are paid the initial payment for a longer period of time before they
decline to the base payment. The period for which wind turbines receive the initial payment is determined
by comparing each project’s FLH against a benchmark for the annual output (i.e., a reference yield).
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an electricity system optimization model, we quantify the excess costs associated with
(i) the technology-specific (but region-neutral) solar power target (of 52 GW), (ii) the
technology-specific (but region-neutral) offshore wind power target (of 6.5 GW) and
(iii) the technology- and region-specific target for onshore wind power in regions with
comparatively high full load hours (of 50 GW).
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the theoretical background
regarding the cost-efficient achievement of renewable energy targets. Section 5.3 provides
a numerical analysis of the economic inefficiency associated with Germany’s renewable
energy support scheme and its failure to incentivize renewable energy investments that
are most attractive from an economic perspective. Section 5.4 draws conclusions and
identifies a number of issues for further possible research.
5.2 Theoretical Background
Referring to the theoretical analysis of Chapter 4, fluctuating renewable energy units
(Cf ) are expanded up to the point at which their marginal costs (MC) correspond to
the sum of their marginal value of power supply (MV el) and their marginal value of
renewable energy supply (MV ren) in the optimum (see Eq. (5.1)).
MCCf = MV
el
Cf +MV
ren
Cf (5.1)
While the MC are defined as the unit’s accumulated annualized investment costs over
all years of its technical lifetime, the MV el of wind and solar power units corresponds to
the accumulated revenue from selling electricity at the wholesale market in all hours and
years of the unit’s technical lifetime. The MV ren of wind and solar power units, however,
represents the accumulated value of the good ‘green electricity’ supplied by wind and
solar power units during their technical lifetime under politically implemented RES-E
targets. Alternatively, the MV ren of wind and solar power units can be interpreted as
the part of the MC that cannot be covered by the revenue from selling electricity on
the wholesale market during the unit’s technical lifetime (i.e., the MV el) and thus need
to be supplied by renewable energy support payments to incentivize investments. For
the following discussion we define the difference between the MC and the MV el as the
net marginal costs NMC (see Eq. (5.2)).
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MV renCf = MCCf −MV elCf = NMCCf (5.2)
Given a technology- and region-neutral RES-E target which prescribes the minimum
amount of renewable energy generation (in kWh) (and not the minimum amount of
renewable energy capacities (in kW)), the NMC per kWh are equalized across all re-
newable energy technologies and regions in the optimum (see Eq. (5.3)).118 In the
following, the NMC per kWh are denoted as NMC. Equally, the MC per kWh are
denoted as MC and the MV el per kWh as MV el. 119
NMCCf1 = MCCf1 −MV elCf1 (5.3)
!
= NMCCf2 = MCCf2 −MV elCf2
Figure 5.1 (i) illustrates the cost-efficient renewable energy mix, which is achieved when
the NMC are equalized across technologies and regions. For reasons of clarity, note
that in Figure 5.1 (i) power generation of technology 1 (in region 1) increases from left
to right, while power generation of technology 2 (in region 2) increases from right to
left. While the MC are independent of the respective technology’s penetration, the
NMC increase with penetration. This is due to the fact that the MV el decreases as
the technology’s penetration increases, which is shown in Chapter 4.120 Technology 1
(in region 1) is associated with lower MC than technology 2 (in region 2) due to both
lower investment costs and higher full load hours (FLH) than technology 2. However,
the higher the penetration of technology 1 becomes, the lower its MV el and thus the
higher its NMC are. At some point of penetration of technology 1, technology 2 is thus
associated with lower NMC than technology 1. Hence, even though technology 2 is
associated with higher MC than technology 1, the cost-efficient renewable energy mix
includes technology 2. The optimum, when NMC are equalized across technologies (and
118The term ‘technology- and region-neutral’ indicates that each kWh of renewable electricity produced
contributes to achieving the RES-E target irrespective of the technology or the region of its deployment.
119The unit e /kWh is derived by dividing the NMC/MC/MV el by the accumulated full load hours
over all years of the unit’s technical lifetime.
120The assumption that theMC are independent of the respective technology’s penetration level implies
that no space potential restrictions are binding, i.e., that favorable locations with high full load hours
(FLH) are not limited. If, however, locations with high FLH are limited, the MC would increase as the
penetration increases since wind turbines/ solar power system would need to be deployed at locations
with lower FLH.
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regions), is (for example) achieved under a (technology- and region-neutral) renewable
energy quota obligation in combination with tradable green certificates.
Figure 5.1 (ii) illustrates the excess costs arising when investment decisions are based
on MC rather than on NMC. Since technology 1 (in region 1) is associated with lower
MC than technology 2 (in region 2), only technology 1 would be expanded which causes
excess costs. This would, for example, be the case if renewable energy investments were
promoted via a (technology- and region-neutral) feed-in tariff (FIT) system that fixes
a price paid for renewable electricity and thus fails to incentivize investors to account
for the MV el of renewables which differs between technologies and regions. Rather
than choosing the technology (in that region) with the lowest NMC, profit maximizing
investors are incentivized to build that technology (in that region) with the lowest MC
under a FIT system.
Technology 1* Technology 2*
€/kWh
RES-E target
MCେభMCେమ
NMCେభ
NMCେమ
Technology 1
€/kWh
RES-E target
MCେభMCେమ
NMCେభ
NMCେమ
Excess
costs
(i) Cost-efficient 
renewable energy mix
(ii) Inefficient 
renewable energy mix
Figure 5.1: Cost-efficient renewable energy mix (i) vs. inefficient renewable energy
mix (ii)
To summarize, politically implemented RES-E targets are achieved at minimal costs if
the NMC across all renewable energy technologies and regions are equalized. Hence,
we conclude that comparing the economic attractiveness of wind and solar power units
(in different regions) on the basis of MC is incorrect, as doing so neglects the MV el
of the respective technology, which may be very different between technologies and
regions. Instead, the economic attractiveness should be determined on the basis of
the NMC, i.e., the difference between the MC and the MV el. These results present
an extension of the argumentation by Joskow (2011), who claims that comparing the
economic attractiveness of fluctuating wind and solar power units to that of conventional
dispatchable generation capacities based on the levelized costs of electricity (LCOE) is
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flawed since it fails to account for the fact that the value of electricity supplied (i.e., the
wholesale price) varies over the course of the day and the year.
5.3 Numerical analysis for Germany
5.3.1 Electricity system optimization model
The electricity system optimization model used in this analysis is a linear investment
and dispatch model, incorporating conventional, thermal, nuclear, storage and renew-
able technologies. The model is an extended version of the long-term investment and
dispatch model of the Institute of Energy Economics (University of Cologne), as pre-
sented in Richter (2011). The possibility of endogenous investments in renewable energy
technologies has been added to the investment and dispatch model through the work of
Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a), Ja¨gemann et al. (2013a), Ja¨gemann et al. (2013b) and Nagl et al.
(2011a).
In the following, an overview of the applied electricity system optimization model is
given, which has been adapted to accurately address the needs of the current analysis.
5.3.1.1 Technological resolution
The model incorporates investment and generation decisions for conventional power
plants (potentially equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS)), combined heat
and power plants (CHP), nuclear, renewable energy and storage (pump, hydro and com-
pressed air energy (CAES)). The expansion of interconnector capacities, which limit the
inter-regional power exchange, is exogeneously defined. Several vintage classes for hard
coal, lignite and natural gas-fired power plants represent today’s power plant mix. With
regard to renewable energy technologies, the model encompasses onshore and offshore
wind power plants, PV systems, biomass (CHP-) power plants (solid and gas), hydro
power plants, geothermal power plants and concentrating solar power (CSP) plants (in-
cluding thermal energy storage devices). With respect to existing capacities of renewable
energy technologies, the model considers all installations developed by the end of the
year 2011.121
121Hence, all renewable energy capacity expansions after 2011 are endogenously determined by the
model and do not necessarily correspond to the (real-world) capacity expansions actually realized in
2012 and 2013.
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5.3.1.2 Regional resolution
The simulation is run for Germany and three neighboring countries that were considered
most relevant for dispatch and investment decisions in Germany.122 To account for local
weather conditions, the model accounts for several subregions for wind and solar power
within each country. In Germany, for example, two onshore wind, two offshore wind and
two solar power subregions are modeled, each differing with regard to both the full load
hours and the profile of the wind and solar power generation, as illustrated in Figure
5.2 and Table 5.1.123
2
1
3
4
Solar region 1 (northern Germany)
Solar region 2 (southern Germany)
Wind onshore region 2 (southern Germany)
Wind onshore region 1 (northern Germany)
Wind offshore region 3 (North Sea)
Wind offshore region 4 (Baltic Sea)
Figure 5.2: Modeled renewable energy regions
Table 5.1: Potential full load hours of wind and solar power plants
Solar power Onshore wind power Offshore wind power
Region 1 Region 2 Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4
(northern (southern (northern (southern (North Sea) (Baltic Sea)
Germany) Germany) Germany) Germany)
992 1,084 1,528 1,448 3,423 3,349
Source: based on EuroWind (2011).
122Overall, we model Germany, Austria, France and the Netherlands. Given limited computational
ressources, there is a trade-off between manageable calcualtion times on the one hand side and a high
regional and temporal resolution on the other hand side. For the analysis of the marginal value of
renewables, a high temporal resolution – which captures the fluctuating characteristic of wind and solar
power supply – was considered more important than modeling a large number of countries (see Section
5.3.1.3).
123The wind and solar power generation profiles are based on historical hourly meteorological wind
speed and solar radiation data from EuroWind (2011).
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5.3.1.3 Temporal resolution
Investment and dispatch decisions are simulated in 5-year time steps until 2050. For the
analysis, the daily and hourly temporal resolution of the model has been significantly
increased. While previous analyses with this model (such as Ja¨gemann et al. (2013a),
Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a) and Nagl et al. (2011a)) were based on 4-12 typical days per year
(96-288 h) which were scaled to 365 days (8760 hours), the investment and dispatch
decisions of this analysis are based on 42 typical days per year (or 1008 h), i.e., six
weeks per year. The increased temporal resolution allows us to better capture the
characteristics of the electricity demand and production factor profiles of wind and
solar power units over the year, such as the correlation between the wind and the solar
production factor profiles. At the same time, the chosen temporal resolution presents
a trade-off between an accurate reproduction and manageable calculation times. Under
the given regional and temporal resolution, the calculation time amounts to 44 hours.
The applied 42 days (i.e., six weeks) are based on historical hourly electricity demand
profiles (ENSTO-E (2013)) as well as historical hourly electricity generation profiles of
hydro, wind (on- and offshore) and solar power (PV and CSP) technologies for 8760
h per year (EuroWind (2011)). The six weeks were chosen as to reflect the following
characteristics: the (potential) full load hours of wind and solar power turbines, the
annual correlation between the wind and the solar production factor profiles as well
as the annual correlation between the wind (solar) production profile and the demand
profile.
5.3.1.4 Objective function and techno-economic constraints
The objective of the model is to minimize accumulated discounted total system costs,
which include investment costs, fixed operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, variable
production costs and costs due to ramping thermal power plants. The discount rate
amounts to 5 % in the model.124 Costs for new investments in generation and storage
units and are annualized with a 5 % interest rate (nominal) for the depreciation time.
124The model’s optimization premise (minimization of accumulated discounted total system costs)
implies a cost-based competition of electricity generation and perfect foresight.
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min TSC =
∑
y∈Y
∑
c∈C
∑
a∈A
(discy · (ADy,a,c · ana · ica + INy,a,c · fca (5.4)
+
∑
h∈H
(GEy,h,a,c · (fuy,a
ηa
) + CUy,h,a,c · (fuy,a
ηa
+ aca)−GEy,h,a,c · hra · hpy)))
discy =
1
(1 + dr)y−ystart
(5.5)
ana =
(1 + ir)dpa·ir
(1 + ir)dpa − 1 (5.6)
The accumulated discounted total system costs are minimized, subject to several techno-
economic constraints:
s.t.
∑
a∈A
GEy,h,a,c +
∑
c′∈C
IMy,h,c,c′ −
∑
s∈A
STy,h,s,c = dy,h,c (5.7)
GEy,h,a,c ≤ avd,h,a,c · INy,a,c (5.8)
GEy,h,a,c ≥ mla · avh,a,c · INy,a,c (5.9)
CUy,h,a,b ≤ INy,a,c − CRy,h,a,c
sta
(5.10)
CRy,h,a,c ≤ avh,a,c · INy,a,c (5.11)∑
h∈H
GEy,h,a,c
ηa
≤ fpy,a,c (5.12)
ADy,r,c =
∑
e∈E
ADy,r,c,e (5.13)
INy,r,c =
∑
e∈E
INy,r,c,e (5.14)
GEy,h,r,c =
∑
e∈E
GEy,h,r,c,e (5.15)∑
h∈H
∑
r∈A
∑
e∈E
GEy,h,r,c,e ≥ xy,c (5.16)∑
h∈H
∑
e∈E
GEy,h,r,c,e ≥ xxy,r,c (5.17)∑
h∈H
GEy,h,r,c,e ≥ xxxy,r,c,e (5.18)
∑
a∈A
∑
c∈C
∑
h∈H
GEy,h,a,c
ηa
· efa ≤ ccy (5.19)
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Table 5.2: Sets and parameters of the electricity system optimization model
Abbreviation Dimension Description
Model sets
a ∈ A Technologies
s ∈ A Subset of a Storage technologies
r ∈ A Subset of a RES-E technologies
c ∈ C (alias c’) Market region
e ∈ E Subregion within a market region (for RES-E technologies)
h ∈ H Hours
y ∈ Y Years
ystart ∈ Y Starting year (2010)
Model parameters
aca [e 2010 /MWhel] Attrition costs for ramp-up operation
ana Annuity factor for technology-specific
investment costs
avh,a,c [%] Availability
ccy [t CO2 ] Cap for CO2 emissions
dy,h,c [MW] Total demand
discy Discount factor
dr [%] Discount rate (5 %)
dpa [years] depreciation period
efa [t CO2 /MWhth] CO2 emissions per fuel consumption
fca [e 2010/MW] Fixed operation and maintenance costs
fuy,a [e 2010/MWhth] Fuel price
fpy,a,c [MWhth] Fuel potential
hpy [e 2010/MWhth] Heating price for end-consumers
hra [MWhth/MWhel] Ratio for heat extraction
ir [%] Interest rate (5 %)
ica [e 2010/MW] Investment costs
mla [%] Minimum part load level
xy,c [MWh] Technology- and region-neutral RES-E target
xxy,r,c [MWh] Technology-specific but region-neutral RES-E target
xxxy,r,c,e [MWh] Technology- and region-specificl RES-E target
sta [h] Start-up time from cold start
ηa [%] Net efficiency (generation)
αa,h [%] Capacity factor
Power balance constraint (Eq. (5.7)): The match of electricity demand and supply
needs to be ensured in each hour and country, taking storage options and inter-regional
power exchange into account.
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Table 5.3: Variables of the electricity system optimization model
Abbreviation Dimension Description
Model variables
ADy,a,c [MW] Commissioning of new power plants
ADy,r,c,e [MW] Commissioning of a new RES-E technology r in subregion e
CUy,h,a,c [MW] Capacity that is ramped up within one hour
CRy,h,a,c [MW] Capacity that is ready to operate
FLHy,r,c,e [h] (Actual) annual full load hours
of a RES-E technology r in subregion e
GEy,h,a,c [MWel] Electricity generation
GEy,h,r,c,e [MWel] Electricity generation of a RES-E technology r in subregion e
Os,y,h,i [MW] Consumption in storage operation
IMy,h,c,c′ [MW] Net imports
INy,a,c [MW] Installed capacity
INy,r,c,e [MW] Installed capacity of a RES-E technology r in subregion e
STy,h,s,c [MW] Consumption in storage operation
TSC [e 2010] Accumulated and discounted total system costs
Capacity constraint (Eq. (5.8)):The maximum electricity generation by dispatchable
power plants (thermal, nuclear, storage, biomass and geothermal power plants) per hour
is restricted by their seasonal availability (which is limited due to unplanned or planned
shutdowns, e.g., because of repairs), while the availability of wind and solar power
plants is given by the maximum possible electricity feed-in per hour. The maximum
transmission capability per hour between two neighboring countries is given by the net
transfer capacities.
Minimum load constraint (Eq. (5.9)): The minimum electricity generation per hour
of dispatchable power plants is given by their minimum part-load level.
Ramp-up constraints (Eqs. (5.10) and (5.11)): The start-up time of dispatchable
power plants limits the maximum amount of capacity ramped up within an hour.
Fuel potential constraint (Eq. (5.12)): The fuel use is restricted to a yearly potential
in MWhth per country, with different potentials applying for lignite, solid biomass and
(low-cost) gaseous biomass sources.
In addition to techno-economic constraints, various politically implemented restrictions
can be modeled:
Technology- and region-neutral renewable energy constraint (Eq. (5.16)): A
certain amount of electricity per year y and market region c (xy,c) needs to be supplied
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by renewable energy resources irrespective of the RES-E technology r used to produce
electricity or the region of its deployment, i.e., the subregion e within the market region
c.
Technology-specific but region-neutral renewable energy constraint (Eq. (5.17)):
A certain amount of electricity per year y and market region c (xxy,r,c) needs to be sup-
plied by a specific RES-E technology r irrespective of the region of its deployment, i.e.,
the subregion e within the market region c.
Technology- and region-specific renewable energy constraint (Eq. (5.18)): A
certain amount of electricity per year y and market region c (xxxy,r,c,e ) needs to be
supplied by a specific RES-E technology r in a specific subregion e.
CO2 emission constraint (Eq. (5.19)): The accumulated CO2 emissions (of all mod-
eled market regions c) may not exceed a certain CO2 cap per year (ccy).
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In contrast to other applications of the model (e.g., Ja¨gemann et al. (2013a) and
Ja¨gemann et al. (2013b)), neither a space potential constraint for wind and solar power
units nor a security of supply constraint is implemented in this analysis. The space po-
tential constraint (which restricts the deployment of wind and solar power technologies
per region by area potentials in km2 per subregion) is disregarded in order to prevent
any distortion of the model’s economic investment calculus. For example, the switch
between technologies (e.g., from wind to solar power) or regions (e.g., from northern
Germany to southern Germany) should be driven solely by economic reasons (compar-
ison of net marginal costs per kWh (NMC)) rather than the fact that the maximum
area potential of a specific technology within a region has been reached (which prohibits
further capacity expansions).
The abandonment of the security of supply constraint is motivated by the aim to keep
the analysis of the net marginal costs of wind and solar power capacity additions as
close to the theoretical model as possible.126 As explained in Ja¨gemann et al. (2013b),
the shadow variable of the security of supply constraint reflects the system’s marginal
costs associated with supplying securely available capacities. It typically serves as a
proxy for the capacity price which producers receive for their efforts in ensuring security
of supply. Given the usual assumption of a positive capacity credit of wind power
125The approach of modeling a quantity-based regulation (CO2 cap) rather than a price-based regula-
tion (CO2 price) ensures that the CO2 emissions reduction target is met in all scenarios simulated, which
allows the results to be compared to one another. It reflects the market outcome of a CO2 cap-and-trade
system.
126The security of supply constraint prescribes that the peak demand level is met by securely available
capacities. Whereas the securely available capacity of dispatchable power plants within the peak-demand
hour is assumed to correspond to their seasonal availability, the securely available capacity of fluctuating
wind and solar power plants within the peak-demand hour is assumed to amount to the unit’s capacity
credit, which typically varies between 0 % and 10 % (e.g., Ja¨gemann et al. (2013b)).
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plants (see, e.g., Ja¨gemann et al. (2013a)), wind power generators would receive a third
revenue stream from the reserve market by offering securely available capacity. Hence, in
a addition to the marginal value of power supply (MV el), the marginal value for offering
securely available capacity would also need to be considered. Moreover, a security of
supply constraint is typically only implemented in models in which the annual dispatch
is simplified to a very limited amount of typical days, which leads to the problem that
potential peak demand is not considered as a dispatch situation in the investment part of
the model.127 In this analysis, however, the investment and dispatch decisions are based
on 42 typical days per year, which account for peak demand as a dispatch situation.
The numerical model assumptions are listed in Table D.2 - D.8 of the Appendix.
5.3.1.5 Quantification of variables used to illustrate the economic ineffi-
ciency associated with technology- and region-specific RES-E tar-
gets
In the following, we shortly describe how the MC, the MV el and the NMC are quan-
tified, which are used to illustrate the economic inefficiency associated with technology-
and region-specific RES-E targets for the example of wind and solar power in Germany.
• The MC of wind and solar power units r in subregion e of market region c are
calculated by dividing the unit’s accumulated and discounted (discy) annualized
investment costs (icr) and fixed O&M costs (fcr) by the unit’s accumulated (ac-
tual) annual full load hours (FLHy,r,c,e) during all years of its technical lifetime
(Eq. (5.20)). We note that the difference between the potential FLH (see Table
5.1) and the actual FLH (see Table 5.7) of wind and solar power units corresponds
to the endogenous wind and solar power curtailment in the model. Hence, the
higher the curtailment of wind and solar power units becomes, the lower their
actual FLH and thus the higher their MC will be.
MCr,c,e =
∑
y∈Y discy ·ADy,r,c,e · (anr · icr + fcr)∑
y∈Y FLHy,r,c,e
(5.20)
• The MV el of wind and solar power units r deployed in subregion e of market region
c are calculated by dividing the unit’s accumulated and discounted revenue from
127For example, the model applied in Ja¨gemann et al. (2013a) and Ja¨gemann et al. (2013b) accounts
for a peak capacity constraint as it simulates the dispatch of only 4 and 8 typical days, respectively.
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selling electricity (GEy,h,r,c,e) on the wholesale market by the unit’s accumulated
(actual) annual full load hours (FLHy,r,c,e) during all years of its technical lifetime
(Eq. (5.21)). The shadow variable of the power balance constraint (see Eq. (5.7)),
which reflects the discounted system costs associated with supplying an additional
unit of electricity at a specific point in time, serves as a proxy for the (discounted)
hourly revenue, i.e., the (discounted) hourly wholesale price (µy,h).
128
MV elr,c,e =
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H(GEy,h,r,c,e · µy,h)∑
y∈Y FLHy,r,c,e
(5.21)
• The NMC of wind and solar power units deployed in Germany correspond to the
difference between the MC and the MV el (Eq. (5.22)). As such, the NMC reflect
the (accumulated and discounted) markup on the MV el that is needed in order for
the last renewable energy capacity (that is built to achieve the RES-E target) to
cover its costs. Under a technology- and region-neutral RES-E target, NMC are
equalized across wind and solar power technologies and regions, which indicates
that a cost-efficient renewable energy mix is achieved (see Section 5.2). In contrast,
under a technology- and/ or region-specific RES-E target, NMC differ between
technologies and regions, which implies that excess costs occur.129
NMCr,c,e = MCr,c,e −MV elr,c,e (5.22)
In the following, we quantify the excess costs associated with Germany’s technology-
and region-specific wind and solar power targets for 2020. Since this requires the con-
sideration of all cost and revenue streams throughout the technical lifetime of the wind
and solar power units deployed in Germany by 2020 the model is run up to the year
2050.130
128We note that the objective of the model is to minimize accumulated discounted total system costs.
129We note that under a technology- and region-neutral renewable energy RES-E target, the marginal of
the technology- and region-neutral renewable energy constraint (Eq. (5.16)) corresponds to the NMC.
Equally, under a technology- and region-specific RES-E target, the marginal of the technology- and
region-specific renewable energy constraint (Eq. (5.18)) corresponds to the NMC of the respective
RES-E technology deployed in the respective subregion.
130The technical lifetime of both wind and solar power capacities is assumed to amount to 20 years in
this analysis.
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5.3.2 Scenario definitions
To analyze the economic inefficiency associated with Germany’s technology-and region-
specific wind and solar power targets for 2020, two scenarios are defined (see Table
5.6).
Both scenarios assume a CO2 emission constraint (Eq. (5.19)), which limits the com-
bined CO2 emissions of all modeled countries per year (see Table 5.4) in order to incorpo-
rate the target of the European Union (EU) to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
by 80 % - 95 % in 2050 compared to 1990 levels (EU Council (2009)). As a consequence
of the CO2 emission constraint, the short-run marginal production costs of fossil-fuel
fired (CO2 -emitting) power plants increase.
131 This, in turn, leads to an increase in
the shadow variable of the power balance constraint (see Eq. (5.7)), which indicates
the system’s marginal costs associated with meeting the hourly electricity demand and
serves as a proxy for the (discounted) hourly wholesale price. As a consequence, the
MV el of renewable energy technologies increases in comparison to a scenario without a
CO2 emission constraint.
Moreover, in both scenarios, Germany is assumed to achieve the technology- and region-
neutral RES-E targets for 2025 and 2035 defined in the coalition agreement from Novem-
ber 2013 (i.e., 40 - 45 % of gross electricity demand by 2025 and 55 - 60 % by 2035).132
Table 5.4: CO2 reduction targets compared to 1990 levels
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
30 % 40 % 50 % 58 % 65 % 73 % 80 %
Table 5.5: Technology- and region-neutral RES-E targets
2025 2030 2035
40 % 48 % 55 %
As illustrated in Table 5.6, the target year 2020 differs for each scenario. The ‘EEG
Scenario’ reflects the current technology- and region-specific design of the German pro-
motion scheme for wind and solar power technologies. It assumes technology-specific
131The increase in the short-run marginal costs of power production of fossil-fuel fired (CO2 -emitting)
power plants arises from incorporating the costs of emitting CO2 , reflected by the price of CO2 emission
certificates.
132We note that the modeled technology- and region-neutral RES-E targets for 2025 (40 %) and 2035
(55 %) (see Table 5.5) cover wind and solar power generation only. This reflects the assumption that
wind and solar power are expected to account for the largest share of renewable energy capacity additions
up to 2035, given the limited potentials for hydro power and low-cost biomass resources in generating
electricity. Moreover, we note that the modeled RES-E targets (40 % in 2025 and 55 % in 2035) are
related to the net electricity demand, while the German RES-E targets for 2025 (40 - 45 %) and 2035
(55 - 60 %) are related to the gross electricity consumption (CDU/CSU/SPD (2013)).
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(but region-neutral) solar and offshore wind power targets (56 TWh and 22 TWh, re-
spectively), as well as technology- and region-specific onshore wind power targets for
northern Germany (73 TWh) by 2020.133 The technology- and region-specific onshore
wind power targets for northern Germany (region 1) are motivated by the fact that
under the current reference yield model, only projects in favorable wind regions (with
high full load hours) can be operated profitably (CDU/CSU/SPD (2013)), which are
primarily located in northern Germany.
Table 5.6: Scenario definitions: Targets for 2020 [TWh]
EEG Scenario Efficient Scenario
Technology-specific (but region-neutral)
56 TWh
-
solar power target -
Technology-specific (but region-neutral)
22 TWh
-
offshore wind power target
Technology- and region-specific onshore wind
76 TWh
-
power target in northern Germany
Technology- and region-neutral RES-E target - 154 TWh
In the ‘Efficient Scenario’, in contrast, a technology- and region-neutral RES-E target
for 2020 is implemented. As illustrated in Table 5.6, the technology- and region-neutral
RES-E target assumed for 2020 amounts to 154 TWh, which corresponds to the sum of
the technology- and region-specific wind and solar power targets for 2020 assumed in the
‘EEG Scenario’. As such, in both scenarios the same level of total wind and solar power
generation (i.e., 154 TWh) is achieved in 2020. However, in contrast to the ‘Efficient
Scenario’, the technological (and regional) mix of wind and solar power generation is
predefined in the ‘EEG Scenario’ via technology-specific (and region-specific) wind and
solar power targets.
The chosen scenario definition aims to quantify the economic inefficiency associated
with Germany’s technology- and region-specific wind and solar power targets for 2020.
It needs to be stressed that the results derived by modeling technology- and region-
neutral RES-E targets (i.e., by implementing renewable energy constraints as explained
in Section 5.3.1.4) do not reflect the market result of a feed-in tariff system. For this, the
applied electricity system model would need to maximize profits instead of minimizing
total system costs. This can best be explained by the following example: Under a
technology-specific FIT system and the choice between two regions, profit maximizing
investors do not account for differences in the MV el of the specific technology between
133The TWh targets are derived by multiplying the 2020 capacity targets for solar power (52 GW),
onshore wind power (50 GW) and offshore wind power (6.5 GW) with the full load hours assumed in
the model; see also Table D.1 of the Appendix.
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two regions, but rather choose the region with the highest full load hours and thus
the lowest MC.134 However, when modeling technology-specific RES-E targets in an
electricity system optimization model that minimizes total system costs (rather than
maximizing investors’ profits), the investment decisions are always based on NMC, i.e.,
on a comparison between the respective technology’s MC and MV el. Hence, electricity
system models that minimize total system costs are not capable of simulating the market
result of feed-in tariff systems.
In the following, the scenario results are discussed.
5.3.3 Scenario results
Figure 5.3 illustrates the development of the capacity and generation mix in the ‘EEG
Scenario’ and the ‘Efficient Scenario’ up to 2030.135 In both scenarios, baseload ca-
pacities/ generation (lignite, coal and nuclear) decrease, while peak-load capacities/
generation (gas) increase, as the wind and solar power penetration increases.136 More-
over, in both scenarios, the total dispatchable capacity stays essentially equal to the
peak demand level, reflecting the model assumption of comparatively low wind and so-
lar power generation (i.e., a low production factor) at times of peak demand. These
results are in line with Lamont (2008) who showed that baseload capacities/generation
decline in proportion to the increase in fluctuating wind and solar power capacities/
generation, while the intermediate capacity/ generation increases with increased wind
and solar power penetration.137
In the ‘EEG Scenario’, Germany achieves commitment with its (region-neutral) solar
and offshore wind power targets (56 TWh and 22 TWh, respectively) and its (region-
specific) onshore wind power target for northern Germany (region 1) of 76 TWH by
2020. In the ‘Efficient Scenario’, which assumes a technology- and region-neutral RES-
E target for 2020 (154 TWh), only onshore wind power investments in northern Germany
(region 1) take place up to 2020, supplying in total 113 TWh in 2020. This highlights
the comparative cost advantage of onshore wind power generation over offshore wind
and solar power generation in reaching politically implemented RES-E targets by 2020.
134Note that theMV el of a specific technology varies between the two regions because of both differences
in the level of full load hours and differences in the production factor profile.
135The development of the capacity and generation mix up to 2050 is shown in Figure D.1 of the
Appendix.
136We note that the nuclear capacities are exogenously decommissioned in the model by 2022 reflecting
current legislation in Germany.
137Lamont (2008) applies an illustrative optimization model to determine the cost-efficient capacity mix
for five technologies (baseload, intermediate and peaking generators along with wind and solar power)
using a greenfield approach to examine the effects of increased wind and solar power penetration.
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Figure 5.3: Development of Germany’s capacity [GW] and generation [TWh] mix up
to 2030
The high economic attractiveness of onshore wind power in comparison to solar power
and offshore wind power up to 2020 also becomes evident when comparing the net
marginal costs per kWh (NMC). Figure 5.4 illustrates the NMC of all renewable
energy capacities built in 2020, 2025 and 2030 in the ‘EEG Scenario’ and the ‘Efficient
Scenario’. We note that the scenarios differ only with regard to the RES-E targets for
2020, which are either technology- and region-specific (‘EEG Scenario’) or technology-
and region-neutral (‘Efficient Scenario’). For the years 2025 and 2030, however, both
scenarios assume the same technology- and region-neutral RES-E target of 40 % and 48
% respectively (see Table 5.5).
In the ‘EEG Scenario’, NMC are not equalized across RES-E technologies and regions
in 2020, which implies that the cost-efficient renewable energy mix is not achieved. As
can be seen, all technologies differ with regard to both their MC – which depend on
the technology’s capital costs and full load hours – and their MV el – which depends on
the unit’s revenue from selling electricity at the wholesale market. As such, the MV el is
driven by the unit’s electricity generation profile or, more specifically, by the correlation
between the unit’s hourly production factor profile and the wholesale price profile (i.e.,
the unit’s ‘price matching’ or ‘residual-load matching’ capability), see also Chapter 4 .
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Figure 5.4: MC, MV el and NMC of RES-E technologies built in 2020, 2025 and
2030 (discounted with 5 %)
Offshore wind power (in the North Sea (region 3) and Baltic Sea (region 4)) exhibits by
far the highest MC (2.75 e ct2010/kWh), followed by solar power (2.37 e ct2010/kWh
in southern Germany (region 2)), onshore wind power (1.97 e ct2010/kWh in northern
Germany (region 1)) and low-cost biogas power plants (0.71 e ct2010/kWh). However,
offshore wind power is also characterized by the highest MV el (1.15 e ct2010/kWh in the
North Sea and 1.18 e ct2010/kWh in the Baltic Sea), followed by solar power in south-
ern Germany and onshore wind power in northern Germany (1.08 e ct2010/kWh and
0.98 e ct2010/kWh, respectively). Dispatchable (low-cost) biogas power plants exhibit
a MV el of 1.03 e ct2010/kWh. Overall, it can be seen that the difference in the MC
between technologies (and regions) is more pronounced than the difference in the MV el
between technologies (and regions) in 2020. This effect, however, diminishes over time
since wind and solar power capacities are assumed to realize investment cost reductions,
which are relatively higher for the less mature technologies (solar power and offshore
wind power) than for onshore wind power which is a comparatively mature technology
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(see also Table D.4 of the Appendix).138
In sum, offshore wind power capacities (built to achieve commitment with the offshore
wind power target by 2020) are associated with the highest NMC (1.60 e ct2010/kWh
in the North Sea and 1.57 e ct2010/kWh in the Baltic Sea), which arises from the
comparatively high capital costs of offshore wind turbines which include the costs of
the onshore grid connection (see Table D.4 of the Appendix). Solar power capacities
(built in order to achieve the solar power target by 2020) exhibit the second highest
NMC (1.28 e ct2010/kWh in southern Germany), followed by onshore wind power (0.99
e ct2010/kWh in northern Germany). Hence, the NMC of onshore wind power capacties
(built to achieve commitment with the onshore wind power target for northern Germany
by 2020) are 38 % lower than the NMC of offshore wind power units and 23 % lower
than the NMC of solar power units. Interestingly, these differences in the NMC in the
‘EEG Scenario’ by 2020 are primarily driven by a comparatively wide divergence of the
MC between the technologies (rather than by a wide divergence of the MV el).
In contrast to wind and solar power technologies, which face no space potential con-
straints in the model, biomass (low-cost biogas and biosolid) generation is restricted
by a fuel potential constraint. As a consequence, low-cost biogas generators are able
to earn (windfall) profits (i.e., negative NMC of -0.32 e ct2010/kWh). As explained in
Section 5.3.1.4, space potential constraints for wind and solar power are explicitly disre-
garded in the model in order to prevent distortions of the economic calculus. However,
if we would have accounted for space potential constraints, also wind and solar power
generators would be able to earn (windfall) profits in those regions where the space
potential constraint is binding. As such, binding space potential constraints for wind
and solar power would prevent an equalization of NMC across technologies and regions.
More specifically, those technologies which are characterized by binding space potential
constraints would be able to earn windfall profts, i.e., their MV el would exceed their
MC.
In the ‘Efficient Scenario’, commitment with the technology- and region-neutral RES-E
target for 2020 is achieved with onshore wind power capacity expansions in northern
Germany. The NMC amount to 1.03 e ct2010/kWh. The difference in the NMC of on-
shore wind power in northern Germany between the ‘EEG Scenario’ (0.99 e ct2010/kWh)
and the ‘Efficient Scenario’ (1.03 e ct2010/kWh) by 2020 is due to the fact that the on-
shore wind power penetration in northern Germany is higher in the ‘Efficient Scenario’
(74 GW or 113 TWh) than in the ‘EEG Scenario’ (50 GW or 76 TWh), which implies
that the MV el of an additional onshore wind power unit in northern Germany is lower
138Between 2020 and 2050, solar power and offshore wind power investment costs are assumed to
decrease by 31 % and 38 %, respectively, while onshore wind power investment costs are assumed to
decrease by only 11 %.
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in the ‘Efficient Scenario’ than in the ‘EEG Scenario’. This result reflects the finding of
the numerical ‘ceteris paribus’ example of Chapter 4 , i.e., the MV el and thus also the
MV el of wind power decrease as penetration increases.
As can be seen in comparing the development of MV el over time in Figure 5.4, the
MV el of wind and solar power capacities decreases as penetration increases. This is
also in line with the results of the numerical ‘ceteris paribus’ example of Chapter 4.
However, there are several differences between the numerical ‘ceteris paribus’ example
of Chapter 4 and this scenario analysis, which are shortly described. First, in contrast
to the numerical ‘ceteris paribus’ example which uses the revenue from selling electricity
on the wholesale market within one year (8760 hours) as a proxy for the MV el of wind
and solar power units, the MV el derived using the electricity system optimization model
corresponds to the accumulated and discounted revenue per kWh from selling electricity
on the wholesale market during all hours and years of the unit’s technical lifetime (20
years). Second, the MV el determined with the electricity system optimization model
accounts for an optimal adaptation of the electricity system over time as wind and solar
power penetration increases. Third, the scenario analysis examined with the electricity
system optimization model also accounts for endogenous curtailment of wind and solar
power generation, which also differentiates our scenario analysis from that of Lamont
(2008).
As illustrated in Table 5.7, the actual full load hours (FLH) vary across the years in
both scenarios.139 In contrast to the potential FLH shown in Table 5.1, the actual FLH
account for wind and solar power curtailment.
Interestingly, while onshore wind power investments up to 2020 are only located in
northern Germany (region 1), onshore wind turbines built from 2020 onwards are pri-
marily deployed in southern Germany (region 2), although southern Germany (region
2) is associated with lower (potential) full load hours (FLH) and thus higher MC.140
This illustrates the benefit of regional diversification. The significant expansion of on-
shore wind power in northern Germany in 2020 causes the MV el of an additional onshore
wind power unit in northern Germany to decrease.141 As a consequence, the comparative
cost advantage of onshore wind power in northern Germany over onshore wind power in
southern Germany – which was originally driven by higher potential FLH and thus lower
MC – diminishes. In fact, at some penetration level of onshore wind power in northern
Germany, onshore wind power in southern Germany begins to have a comparative cost
advantage over onshore wind power in northern Germany. Hence, investments in onshore
139The amount of wind and solar power curtailment in GWh is shown in Table D.9 of the Appendix.
140See Table 5.1 and Figure 5.3.
141We note that all wind turbines within a region are assumed to have the same production factor
profile.
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Table 5.7: Actual annual full load hours of wind and solar power plants [h]
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
‘EEG Scenario’
Onshore wind power region 1 1,528 1,510 1,484 1,478 1,479 1,519 1,491
Onshore wind power region 2 1,440 1,448 1,446 1,445 1,445 1,448 1,444
Offshore wind power region 3 3,420 3,418 3,409 3,249 3,268 3,420
Offshore wind power region 4 3,349 3,349 3,344 3,345 3,342 3,349 3,348
Solar power region 1 992 991 990 962 964
Solar power region 2 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084
‘Efficient Scenario’
Onshore wind power region 1 1,525 1,499 1,480 1,465 1,463 1,519 1,496
Onshore wind power region 2 1,448 1,448 1,447 1,444 1,444 1,448 1,444
Offshore wind power region 3 3,418 3,338 3,243 3,149 3,420
Offshore wind power region 4 3,349 3,234 3,344 3,341 3,343 3,349 3,347
Solar power region 1 992 988 980 943 957
Solar power region 2 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084 1,084
wind power turbines in southern Germany become efficient, although southern Germany
exhibits lower potential FLH and thus higher MC than onshore wind power turbines
in northern Germany.142 This is due to the fact that the production factor profile of
onshore wind turbines in southern Germany is characterized by a higher price-matching
(or residual-load matching) capability than the production factor profile of onshore wind
turbines in northern Germany – given the comparatively large penetration of onshore
wind power in northern Germany and the associated short-term merit-order effect. As a
consequence, the MV el of onshore wind turbines in southern Germany exceeds the MV el
of onshore wind turbines in northern Germany, which compensates for the higher MC
in southern Germany. A second factor which deteriorates the economic attractiveness
of additional onshore wind power capacities in northern Germany (as penetration in-
creases) is the increasing curtailment of onshore wind power in northern Germany, which
reduces the actual FLH (see Table 5.7). As a consequence, the difference in the (ac-
tual) FLH between onshore wind power in northern and southern Germany diminishes.
Moreover, the MC of onshore wind power in northern Germany increases.
In addition to onshore wind power, solar power is also expanded in southern Germany
142The potential FLH of onshore wind power plants in southern Germany are assumed to be more than
5 % lower than the potential FLH of onshore wind power in southern Germany.
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(region 2) under the technology- and region-neutral RES-E target by 2025 despite com-
paratively high MC (see Figure 5.3). This reflects the benefit of technological diversi-
fication in reaching politically implemented RES-E targets. Overall, onshore wind and
solar power capacity expansions in 2025 take place up to the point at which the NMC
are equalized (see Figure 5.4), which is in line with the economic theory discussed in
Section 5.2. The same holds true for the year 2030, in which the NMC are equalized
across solar power, onshore wind power and offshore wind power units.
As a consequence of the technology- and region-specific RES-E targets for 2020 – which
prevent the equalization of the NMC across renewable energy technologies and regions
(see Figure 5.4) – excess costs of 6.6 Bn e 2010 occur. These are defined by the difference
in accumulated discounted system costs between the ‘EEG Scenario’ and the ‘Efficient
Scenario’.
The comparison of NMC between technologies and regions in 2020 shows that excess
costs are driven by the technology-specific offshore wind and solar power targets for
2020 (of 22 and 56 TWh, respectively). Although the onshore wind power penetration
is much higher in 2020 than the offshore wind and solar power penetration in the ‘EEG
Scenario’ (in terms of TWh), NMC of onshore wind power is significantly lower than
the NMC of offshore wind and solar power (see Figure 5.4). This illustrates the low
economic attractiveness of offshore wind and solar power in comparison to onshore wind
power up to 2020.
Figure 5.5 shows the interdependence between the wind and solar power penetration
(i.e., the annual wind and solar power generation) and the annual correlation (between
the wind and solar power generation profile and the wholesale price profile) for both
scenarios. Overall, the annual correlation tends to decrease as the annual wind and
solar power generation increases, which is in line with the results derived in Chapter
4. This can, for example, be seen in the ‘Efficient Scenario’: Between 2015 and 2020,
onshore wind power in northern Germany (region 1) is significantly expanded, which
leads to a drop in the correlation (between the onshore wind power production factor
profile in northern Germany (region 1) and the wholesale price profile). The same effect
can be observed for solar power in southern Germany (region 2) between 2020 and 2025.
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Figure 5.5: Annual generation [TWh] and annual correlation between the wind/solar
power generation profile and the wholesale price profile
However, Figure 5.5 also illustrates the importance of cross-technological effects. For
example, between 2020 and 2025, the correlation of onshore wind power in northern
Germany (region 1) increases, although the penetration of onshore wind power in north-
ern Germany slightly increases (from 74 GW in 2020 to 85 GW in 2025). This is due to
the significant increase in solar power generation in southern Germany (region 2) which
is negatively correlated with the onshore wind production factor profile in northern
Germany (region 1). This is shown in Table 5.8.
Although the correlation between the onshore wind generation profile in northern Ger-
many (region 1) and the wholesale price profile increases between the years 2020 and
2025, this does not mean that the onshore wind power units that were built in 2020 in
northern Germany (region 1) are more profitable in 2025 than in 2020 – profitable in the
sense that the revenue per MW from selling electricity on the wholesale market in 2025
exceeds the revenue in 2020. In contrast, the additional onshore wind and solar power
in southern Germany (region 2) has a downward effect on the wholesale price in 2025,
which lowers the annual revenue of onshore wind power turbines in northern Germany
(region 1) that were built in 2020 (see Figure 5.6).
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Table 5.8: Correlations between production factor profiles of wind and solar power
technologies
Solar Solar Onshore wind Onshore wind Offshore wind
region 1 region 2 region 1 region 2 region 3
Solar
0.8
region 2
Onshore wind
-0.2 -0.1
region 1
Onshore wind
-0.2 -0.2 0.5
region 2
Offshore wind
-0.3 -0.2 0.6 0.4
region 3
Offshore wind
-0.2 -0.2 0.5 0.4 0.6
region 4
Overall, the revenue earned from selling electricity on the wholesale market significantly
varies across the years. The comparatively low revenue of onshore wind power turbines
in northern Germany (region 1) in 2035 is due to the offshore wind power expansion
in the Baltic Sea (region 4) by 2035, which exhibits a high positive correlation with
onshore wind power in northern Germany of 0.5 (see Table 5.8). However, the increase
in the revenue of onshore wind power in northern Germany by 2040 can be explained by
a decrease in the onshore wind power penetration in northern and southern Germany.
Betwen 2035 and 2040, more than 13 GW of onshore wind power capacities are decom-
missioned (9 GW in northern Germany and 4 GW in southern Germany), which are not
replaced. Moreover, electricity generation from flexible gas-fired power plants increases.
The increase in the annual revenue of wind and solar power plants in the longer run can
also be seen in Figures D.2 and D.3 of the Appendix, which show the annual revenue of
onshore wind, offshore wind and solar power plants that were built in 2025 and 2030.
Hence, the optimal adaptation of the dispatchable power plant mix to a system with a
higher share of flexible gas-fired (peak-load) power plants and a lower share of lignite-
fired (base-load) power plants in Germany (see Figure D.1 of the Appendix) benefits
wind and solar power generators in the long-run.
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Figure 5.6: Development of the annual revenue from selling electricity on the whole-
sale market of an onshore wind power turbine built in region 1 in 2020 in the ‘Efficient
Scenario’ [thousand e /MW] (not discounted)
In summary, the presented scenario results derived with the electricity system optimiza-
tion model confirm the theoretical results derived in Chapter 4 and Section 5.2 and
illustrate the economic inefficiency associated with Germany’s technology- and region-
specific RES-E targets for 2020. Due to the significantly higher NMC of offshore wind
and solar power units compared to onshore wind power units in Germany up to 2020,
the technology- and region-specific RES-E targets are associated with excess costs of
more than 6.6 Bn e 2010 (accumulated and discounted).
However, the quantified excess costs of 6.6 Bn e 2010 should be interpreted as a lower
bound estimate for the overall inefficiency associated with Germany’s technology- and
region-specific RES-E targets for 2020. This is due to the fact that power transfers
between the regions within Germany, i.e., from northern to southern Germany and vice
versa, face no transmission constraints.
More specifically, while power exchange between Germany and neighboring countries is
limited by exogenously defined interconnection capacities, a copper-plate with no con-
gestions is assumed for Germany. However, as soon as transmission capacity bottlenecks
between two regions occur, the value of power supply (at a specific point in time) differs
between the regions. As such, the marginal value (MV el) of wind and solar power ca-
pacities between two regions may not only vary because of differences in the production
factor profiles but also due to transmission capacity bottlenecks. The applied model,
however, fails to account for the latter effect.
As such, the large expansion of onshore wind power in northern Germany up to 2020
(realized under the technology- and region-neutral RES-E target in the ‘Efficient Sce-
nario’) may not be optimal (i.e., too large) when accounting for transmission capacity
bottlenecks from northern to southern Germany, which already exist today and which
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are expected to increase as wind power supply in northern Germany rises. More specif-
ically, onshore wind capacities are expected to become efficient in southern Germany
already by 2020 when accounting for transmission capacity bottlenecks from northern
to southern Germany, substituting part of the investments in northern Germany. Hence,
we argue that the economic inefficiency associated with the region-specific onshore wind
power target for northern Germany is underestimated with our model, which implies
that the overall excess costs of 6.6 Bn e 2010 (accumulated and discounted) represent a
lower bound estimate.
Moreover, the model is deterministic and not stochastic in its nature. Hence, no uncer-
tainty about the hourly or yearly electricity generation of wind and solar technologies is
incorporated. In stochastic models, the uncertainty of wind and solar power generation
can be modeled by weighting different scenarios (which vary with regard to the wind and
solar power production factor profiles) by their specific probability of occurence (Nagl
et al. (2013)). As a means to reduce risk, the renewable energy mix determined by a
stochastic model is expected to be more divers (both with regard to technologies and
regions) than the renewable energy mix determined by a deterministic model (given a
technology- and region-neutral RES-E target). However, unlike the impact of disregard-
ing transmission capacity bottlenecks on the level of excess costs, the consequences of
abstracting from uncertainty is not straight forward. Hence, it cannot be said a priori in
which direction the excess costs of technology- and region-specific RES-E targets would
change (in comparison to the present analysis) if a stochastic rather than a deterministic
model would have been applied.
5.4 Conclusion
It has been shown that comparing the economic attractiveness of renewable energy
technologies on the basis of marginal costs per kWh (MC) is incorrect, as doing so
neglects the marginal value per kWh (MV el) of the respective technology. Instead, the
net marginal costs per kWh (NMC) should serve as the reference when discussing the
economic attractiveness of renewable energy technologies. Renewable energy support
schemes that fail to incentivize investors to account for differences in the MV el prevent
an equalization of NMC across technologies and regions in the equilibrium and thus are
associated with excess costs. For the case of Germany and its technology- and region-
specific wind and solar power targets for 2020, excess costs amount to more than 6.6 Bn
e 2010 (accumulated and discounted). These are driven by the comparatively high NMC
of offshore wind and solar power in comparison to onshore wind power in Germany up to
2020. However, given the fact that we abstract from transmission capacity bottlenecks
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within Germany in the model, the quantified excess costs should be interpreted as a
lower bound estimate.
Future research could address the following issues: First, the model could be extended to
acount for both transmission capacity limitations within Germany and stochastic wind
and solar power generation. Second, the technical granularity of wind and solar power
systems could be increased to account for differences in the production factor profiles
of wind and solar power units due to an alternative sizing of the wind power turbine
or due to an alternative orientation of the PV system. This would allow us to analyze,
for example, at which point in time (or at which penetration level) the NMC of PV
systems that are tilted to the east or the west have lower NMC than PV systems that
are tilted to the south. Third, an alternative model could be applied which maximizes
investor’s profits rather than minimizing total system costs. Fourth, as pointed out by
Mitchell et al. (2006) and Klessmann et al. (2008), there is some trade-off associated with
exposing renewable energy investors to market risk as it increases the project’s capital
costs, which may, in turn, deteriorate the (dynamic) efficiency of the support scheme.
This is an important aspect if the goal is to bring new technologies into the market
and gain experience. Meanwhile, however, renewables account for a comparatively large
share of total electricity supply in many countries (e.g., 25 % in Germany in 2013
(Statista (2014))). Hence, efficiency gains due to the consideration of the market price
signal in the generator’s investment decisions are likely to balance potential efficiency
losses due to higher risk premiums and higher required support payments. This could
also be an interesting opportunity for further research.
Chapter 6
The economic value of storage in
renewable power systems – The
case of thermal energy storage in
concentrating solar power plants
6.1 Introduction
In an attempt to fight global warming, many countries try to reduce CO2 emissions
from electricity generation by significantly increasing the proportion of renewable en-
ergy sources (RES-E). One major challenge in this transition is the balancing of fluctu-
ating generation by wind or solar technologies and demand given limited cost-efficient
electricity storage options. One technology that may contribute significantly in solving
these problems in countries or regions with high direct normal irradiance (DNI), are
concentrating solar power plants (CSP) equipped with thermal energy storage (TES)
units. In CSP plants, the sun’s heat is absorbed by collectors and concentrated to heat
a fluid, which is then used to generate electricity in a steam turbine. Specific to CSP
systems is the inherent option to integrate a TES capacity, used to generate electricity
in hours with low or no solar radiation. Dependent on the CSP technology and the site
characteristics, TES can even reduce the site’s production costs per kWh due to a higher
usage of the capital-intensive power plant block.
In electricity systems with low shares of fluctutaing renewable energy generation and
price-inleastic electricity demand, the structure of the hourly electricity price curve fol-
lows the structure of the electricity demand curve. Hence, wholesale prices are highest
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when demand is highest. In today’s electricity systems in Europe, electricity demand
and wholesale prices have a midday peak when solar radiation is also highest. Thus,
wholesale prices are above average during the time at which solar power plants can di-
rectly feed into the grid. As a consequence, the economic value of solar power generation
is comparatively high in today’s electricity systems.
However, many European member states, such as Germany, Spain and Italy, have im-
plemented feed-in tariff (FIT) schemes to promote the deployment of renewable energy
technologies. Under a FIT scheme, renewable energy generators receive a fixed pay-
ment per kWh independent of the actual wholesale price reflecting the economic value
of electricity at a specific point in time. Hence, investors maximize profits by minimizing
production costs per kWh. However, as a consequence of the fact that the price signal
of the wholesale market is not taken into account, FIT schemes fail to guide efficient
investments from a total system perspective. This is analyzed in the following using
the example of thermal energy (TES) storage units installed in combination with CSP
plants.
In the first part of the paper, we illustrate the value of solar power in today’s electricity
markets and discuss the inefficiency associated with FIT schemes to promote electricity
generation from renewable energy sources (RES-E). In the second part, we analyze the
value of thermal energy storages in CSP plants for the case of the Iberian Peninsula as
a function of the share of fluctuating RES-E generation.
A number of studies have analyzed the technical, geographical and economical feasibility
of solar energy to supply a significant share of the electricity demand – either provided
by photovoltaic (PV) systems or concentrating solar power (CSP) plants. Analyses
include the assessment of the technical feasibility of balancing demand and generation
in high-solar scenarios as well as the economic value of PV, CSP and thermal energy
storage technologies, both from an investor’s perspective and for the economy as a
whole. NREL (2003) and Pitz-Paal et al. (2005) describe the functional principles of
different CSP technologies and thermal energy storage options and assess their future
cost development. Fthenakis et al. (2009) and Wang (2010) investigate the technical,
geographical and economical feasibility of solar energy and demonstrate that a significant
percentage of electricity demand can be supplied by PV systems and CSP plants in the
long term.
The value of electricity storage options has been analyzed in a number of papers, as
described in Xi et al. (2011). One of the most common approaches is the so-called
‘energy arbitrage’, which essentially analyzes the option of charging storage when elec-
tricity prices are low and discharging when high (e.g., Graves et al. (1999), Sioshansi
et al. (2009)). The value of thermal energy storage in CSP plants, from an investor’s
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perspective, has been examined by Sioshansi and Denholm (2010), Laing et al. (2010)
and Dominguez et al. (2012). Sioshansi and Denholm (2010) show that the addition
of thermal energy storages increases the value of CSP plants both by allowing CSP
generation to be shifted to hours with higher energy prices and by increasing the us-
age of thermal energy from a CSP plant’s solar field. However, despite these benefits,
their results suggest that at current investment costs, thermal energy storages cannot
be economically justified on energy value alone: Only if the value of ancillary service
sales and capacity are included do thermal energy storages in a number of cases become
cost-effective. The value of concrete thermal energy storage options for parabolic trough
CSP plants has been assessed by Laing et al. (2010). In contrast to Sioshansi and Den-
holm (2010), Laing et al. (2010) and Dominguez et al. (2012), who focus on the value
of CSP systems from an investor’s perspective, Poullikkas et al. (2010) investigate the
economic costs of integrating parabolic trough CSP plants in isolated Mediterranean
power systems using the example of Cyprus. By comparing scenarios that differ with re-
spect to new investments in CSP plants (with and without thermal storage) and natural
gas-fired power plants, the study comes to the conclusion that CSP plants with storage
units are the most cost-effective investment option. However, the results may not be
valid for other power systems, as Cyprus lacks, for example, other storage options such
as large pump-storage plants.
This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, we compare his-
torical hourly wholesale prices of electricity to solar radiation data in France, Germany,
Spain and Portugal from 2007 to 2010 to estimate the value of solar power in today’s
electricity markets with comparatively low shares of fluctuating RES-E generation. Sec-
ond, we are the first to analyze the value of thermal energy storages in CSP plants as a
function of the overall generation mix by using an electricity system optimization model
of the Iberian Peninsula. We see three potential advantages of a simulation with an
electricity system optimization model compared to an econometric ‘energy arbitrage’
analysis: First, empirical data of electricity systems with a large share of fluctuating
renewables are limitedly available, making econometric analysis challenging. Second,
by using an optimization model, the investment decision in TES is cost-efficient – com-
pared to all other investment options that could contribute to meeting demand. Third,
the price curve within our electricity market model is endogenously determined and the
impact of investments in generation and storage technologies is captured by the price
curve.
We find that electricity prices are usually higher than average when solar power plants
can directly feed into the grid in today’s electricity markets with low shares of fluctuating
RES-E generation. Therefore, investments in thermal energy storages in CSP plants are
not cost-efficient in today’s electricity markets. Hence, we argue that feed-in tariffs to
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promote RES-E generation set an inefficient incentive to invest in thermal storages by
neglecting market price signals. However, results of the optimization model show that
thermal storage units in CSP plants may play a significant role in high RES-E and
low-carbon electricity systems. Given a large share of fluctuating RES-E generation,
electricity prices would vary substantially as a result of a volatile residual load. The
results of the model simulation indicate that thermal storage capacities in CSP plants
(in addition to other balancing options such as hydro and pump storage capacities), may
be able to balance generation from fluctuating renewables and demand.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 6.2, we compare historical
hourly wholesale prices of electricity to the solar radiation data in France, Germany,
Spain and Portugal from 2007 to 2010. In Section 6.3, the simulation approach used to
analyze the value of thermal energy storages in CSP plants as a function of the overall
generation mix is presented with a detailed description of the model and the scenario
setup. In Section 6.4, the scenario results concerning the value of thermal storages and
the role of CSP with thermal storage in a high RES-E scenario are discussed. Conclusions
are drawn in Section 6.5, providing an outlook of further possible research.
6.2 The value of solar energy in today’s electricity markets
In liberalized electricity markets, wholesale prices represent the market result of supply
and demand at a specific point in time. Given a large share of dispatchable power
plants, electricity prices are mainly determined by the level of electricity demand in
today’s power markets. As a result, wholesale prices usually have a midday (or early
evening) peak coinciding with the time that electricity demand is highest.
Since solar radiation also has a midday peak, electricity prices are above average when
solar systems are able to directly feed into the grid. Table 6.1 lists average electricity
prices (spot market) for France (FR), Germany (GER), Spain (ES) and Portugal (PT)
from 2007 to 2010 (with comparatively low shares of solar power generation) in compar-
ison to different levels of solar radiation (based on EEX (2012), EPEX (2012), OMEL
(2012) and EuroWind (2011)). For example, in Germany in 2008, electricity prices had
an average of 60 EUR/MWh in situations with low solar radiation (0-100 W/m2) and
were about 10 % lower than the yearly average (66 e /MWh). Consequently, electric-
ity prices were 88 e /MWh, about 34 % higher, in hours with highest solar radiation
(> 800 W/m2). Overall, the data show higher electricity prices (on average) in situations
with high solar radiation in all four listed countries and years. Hence, solar energy has
a relatively high value in systems with low shares of fluctuating renewable generation
due to the typical feed-in during hours with high electricity demand.
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Table 6.1: Average electricity prices [e /MWh] in comparison to solar radiation
[W/m2]
Annual 0-100 100-200 200-300 300-400 400-500 500-600 600-700 700-800 > 800
[EUR/MWh] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2]
2007 41 40 44 48 42 42 41 39 40 42
FR 2008 69 63 73 73 78 81 87 89 87 97
2009 43 39 43 51 53 61 46 45 47 48
2010 48 46 50 50 49 52 50 51 50 54
2007 38 36 47 46 46 46 46 44 44 46
GER 2008 66 60 75 76 78 80 83 85 86 88
2009 39 37 45 46 46 45 45 45 44 45
2010 44 43 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 50
2007 39 38 37 40 42 44 41 40 41 45
ES 2008 64 62 63 64 65 67 69 69 71 72
2009 37 36 36 36 37 39 37 39 39 39
2010 37 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
2007 52 51 54 52 57 59 56 49 49 50
PT 2008 70 69 69 70 72 72 73 74 72 73
2009 38 37 36 37 38 39 39 39 39 40
2010 37 36 37 38 37 39 39 40 42 43
Remarks: In Portugal, only data for the second half of the year 2007 was available. Moreover,
additional data regarding the variance of electricity prices can be found in Appendix D (Table E.2).
Abbreviations: FR - France; GER - Germany; ES - Spain and PT - Portugal.
Source: EEX (2012), EPEX (2012), OMEL (2012) and EuroWind (2011).
In CSP plants, the sun’s heat is absorbed by collectors and concentrated to heat a
fluid which is then used to generate electricity in a steam turbine. Unlike photovoltaic
systems, CSP plants use only the direct component of sunlight. Hence, CSP plants
provide heat and power only in regions with high direct normal irradiance (DNI), such
as North Africa or southern Europe. Specific to CSP systems is the inherent option
to integrate a thermal energy storage capacity, which can then be used to generate
electricity in hours with low solar radiation and/or high electricity demand.
The technical characteristics of the collector field, the thermal energy storage (TES)
unit and the steam turbine of CSP plants are chosen independently from one another.
Depending on the CSP technology and the site characteristics, TES units may reduce
the average generation costs due to the higher usage of the capital-intensive power plant
block. For example, in CSP systems without an integrated thermal energy storage unit,
the steam turbine would be off-line for more than half of the time, regardless of the size
of the collector field, due to the distinct daily solar radiation curve. Given an integrated
storage unit, the large amount of heat absorbed during midday can be stored, even when
the turbine is already running at full capacity. The stored energy can then be used to
generate electricity in hours with little or no solar radiation.
As renewable power generation is usually more costly than conventional power genera-
tion, at least when ignoring external effects, many countries have implemented policies
to incentivize renewable power generation. One common policy is the promotion of re-
newable power generation by feed-in tariffs. Under feed-in tariffs, operators of renewable
energy plants receive a fixed remuneration for their power generation, independent of the
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market price. Thus, investors maximize their profit by simply minimizing the average
production costs, without considering the economic value of electricity supply.
In the case of CSP plants, the installation of thermal energy storage (TES) units can
reduce the average production costs per kWh, as they allow for a higher usage of the
capital-intensive power plant block. As a consequence, investors may have an incentive
to install a thermal energy storage capacity under a FIT scheme without considering
the wholesale price curve and thus the market value of electricity at a specific point in
time.
Today, however, electricity prices are usually above average during the time at which
CSP plants are capable of directly feeding into the grid (see Table 6.1). Therefore, we
argue that FIT schemes set an inefficient incentive, from a system perspective, to invest
in thermal energy storages for CSP plants in today’s electricity markets.
However, given the further deployment of fluctuating renewables with negligible marginal
generation costs, electricity prices will mainly be influenced by the feed-in of fluctuating
renewables rather than the level of electricity demand in the future. In particular, a
large share of solar technologies may even inverse the electricity price curve, resulting
in relatively low wholesale prices during midday. Moreover, electricity prices may vary
substantially from one hour to another in future electricity markets due to the stochastic
and volatile electricity generation from fluctuating renewables. As a result, the value
of storages will arguable increase with higher shares of fluctuating RES-E generation.
Thus, concentrating solar plants with integrated thermal storages may play a significant
role in primarily renewable-based electricity systems.
Summarizing, the numerical analysis in Section 5.3 and 5.4 will focus on the following
two questions:
• Set FIT schemes for power generation from CSP plants an inefficient incentive to
invest in thermal energy units in today’s electricity markets?
• Does the value of thermal energy storages in CSP plants increase with the share
of fluctuating renewable energy generation?
6.3 Approach and model description
To analyze the value of thermal energy storage units in CSP plants, we simulate several
CSP plants with different storage sizes in two scenarios, by applying a linear investment
and dispatch model for the Iberian Peninsula until 2050. The analysis is conducted for
the Iberian Peninsula for mainly two reasons: First, Spain and Portugal are countries
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with comparatively high direct normal irradiance (DNI) (see, e.g., Solargis (2014)); and
second, Spain has the highest installed capacity of CSP plants worldwide due to a feed-in
tariff (FIT) system for renewable energies that has been available for new projects up to
the year 2013.143 A significant number of CSP plants commissioned up to 2013 included
thermal storage units (NREL, 2011), which are profitable from an investor’s perspective
due to the offered feed-in tariff.144
The following scenario analysis provides information as to whether thermal energy stor-
age (TES) units in CSP plants are cost-efficient in today’s electricity system for the
Iberian Peninsula from an overall system perspective. Moreover, it illustrates the pos-
sible future role of CSP plants with TES units in primarily renewable energy based
electricity systems.
6.3.1 Electricity market model
The model used in this analysis is an extended version of the long-term investment and
dispatch model for conventional, storage and transmission technologies of the Institute
of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne. The objective of the model, shown
in Equation (6.1), is to minimize accumulated discounted (5 % dicount rate) total sys-
tem costs while meeting demand at all times.145 An overview of selected model sets,
parameters and variables is given in Table 6.2.
Total system costs are defined by investment and fixed operational and maintenance
costs, variable production costs and costs due to ramping thermal power plants. Invest-
ment costs occur for new investments in generation units and are annualized including
a 5 % interest rate for the depreciation time. The fixed operation and maintenance
costs (fca) represent staff costs, insurance charges and maintenance costs. Variable costs
are determined by fuel prices (fpy,a) and CO2 prices (cpy), CO2 emission factors (efa),
net efficiencies (ηa) and the amount of generation per technology (GE
d,h
y,c,a). Ramp-up
costs are simulated by referring to the power plant blocks and by setting a minimal
load restriction. Depending on the minimum load and start-up time of thermal power
plants, additional costs for ramping occur. Demand characteristics are represented by
modeling the dispatch for three days (Saturday (Sat), Sunday (Sun) and a weekday
(Wd)) per season on an hourly basis (scaled to 8760 hours). Three days per season
are used to account for the different demand structures on weekends and weekdays.
Moreover, typical feed-in structures of each season for wind and solar technologies are
143Spain has suspended all feed-in tariff incentives for renewables in 2013 in response to the country’s
tight economic and financial situation (Brown (2013)).
144A list of current CSP projects in Spain can be found in Appendix D.
145The model’s optimization premise (minimization of accumulated discounted total system costs)
implies a cost-based competition of electricity generation and perfect foresight.
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modeled, including very low and high wind days. Apart from the basic cost equations,
the model incorporates all common elements of linear dispatch models such as storage
equations, net transfer possibilities and restrictions due to local resource availabilities.
A full description of the basic model can be found in Richter (2011).
Total system costs are minimized subject to several techno-economic constraints. For
example, while minimizing total system costs, the model has to ensure that hourly
electricity demand (ded,hy,c ) within each market region is met (‘power balance constraint’,
Eq. (6.2)) and that a minimum share (ωy) of annual electricity demand (de
d,h
y,c ) is met
with renewable energy sources (‘technology-neutral RES-E quota’, Eq. (6.3)).146 The
marginal of the power balance constraint (Eq. (6.2)), i.e., the partial derivative with
respect to the hourly electricity demand (ded,hy,c ) considering the total system costs, is
used as a proxy for the hourly wholesale price in the following.
A detailed description of all techno-economic constraints can be found in Fu¨rsch et al.
(2013a) and Ja¨gemann et al. (2013b).
min TCOST =
∑
y∈Y
∑
c∈C
∑
a∈A
[
discy ·
(
ADy,c,a · ana + INy,c,a · fca (6.1)
+
∑
d∈D
∑
h∈H
(
GEd,hy,c,a ·
(
fpy,a + cpy · efa
ηa
)
+CUd,hy,c,a ·
(
fpy,a + cpy · efa
ηa
+ aca
)))]
s.t.
∑
a∈A
GEd,hy,c,a +
∑
c′∈C
IMd,hy,c,c′ −
∑
s∈A
GEd,hy,c,s = de
d,h
y,c (6.2)∑
c∈C
∑
r∈A
∑
d∈D
∑
h∈H
GEd,hy,c,r ≥ ωy ·
∑
c∈C
∑
d∈D
∑
h∈H
ded,hy,c (6.3)
146The electricity demand is assumed to be price-inelastic. As a consequence, the cost minimization
approach corresponds to a welfare-maximization approach. Moreover, we note that the model’s op-
timization premise (minimization of accumulated discounted total system costs) implies a cost-based
competition of electricity generation and perfect foresight.
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Table 6.2: Model abbreviations including sets, parameters and variables
Abbreviation Dimension Description
Model sets
a ∈ A Technologies
r ∈ A Subset of a RES-E technologies
c ∈ C Countries
d ∈ D Days
h ∈ H Hours
y ∈ Y Years
Model parameters
aca [e 2010/MWhel] Attrition costs for ramp-up operation
ana Annuity factor (5 % interest rate)
cpy [e 2010/t CO2 ] Costs for CO2 emissions
ded,hy,c [MW] Electricity demand
discy Discount factor (5 % discount rate)
efa [t CO2 /MWhth] CO2 emissions per fuel consumption
fca [e 2010/MW] Fixed operation and maintenance costs
fpy,a [e 2010/MWhth] Fuel costs
ηa [% ] Net efficiency
ηˇa [%] Net efficiency of storage in charging operation
ηˆa [%] Net efficiency of storage in discharging operation
vca [MWh/MW] Ratio of storage size and turbine capacity
ωy [%] Quota on RES-E generation
Model variables
ADy,c,a [MW] Commissioning of new power plants
CUd,hy,c,a [MW] Ramped-up capacity
GEd,hy,c,a [MWel] Electricity generation
IMd,hy,c,c′ [MW] Net imports
INJd,hy,c,a [MWel] Absorbed solar power by collectors
INy,c,a [MW] Installed capacity
SINd,hy,c,a [MWel] Charging the storage unit
SLEVELd,hy,c,a [MWhel] Storage level
SOUTd,hy,c,a [MWel] Discharging the storage unit
TCOST [EUR2010] Total system costs
Endogenous investments in renewable energies were recently added to the model (Fu¨rsch
et al., 2013b). The model includes the following renewable energy technologies: roof
and ground photovoltaic (PV) systems, wind (onshore and offshore), biomass (solid
and gas), biomass CHP (solid and gas), geothermal, hydro (storage and run-of-river)
and CSP technologies. Biomass, geothermal and hydro technologies are modeled as
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dispatchable renewables similar to conventional power plants. As the availability of
fluctuating renewable energies (wind and solar technologies) highly depends on weather
conditions, a maximum possible feed-in of wind and solar sites is modeled for each
hour.147 In addition, the model considers several wind and solar regions within the
countries to account for local weather conditions.
To analyze the value of thermal storage units, the possibility to invest in CSP plants
with and without thermal storage units has been added to the model. In CSP plants, the
heat from the sun is absorbed by collectors and is concentrated to heat a fluid, which is
then used to generate electricity in a steam turbine. The heat can be saved in a thermal
energy storage (TES) unit, allowing for the electricity generation to take place later (Eq.
(6.4)). The maximum storage level is determined by the volume factor (vca), which is
the ratio of storage to turbine capacity. Equation (6.5) shows the hourly power balance
of a CSP system. The injection variable (INJd,hy,c,a) represents the solar energy which is
absorbed by the collectors. CSP plants with TES units are able to shift the energy of
the absorbed sun to hours with less or no solar radiation. Losses in storage processes
occur due to energy consumption in pumps during charging and discharging processes,
efficiency losses in heat exchangers and losses of stored energy over time. The latter,
i.e., efficiency losses over time for stored energy in the TES, are negligible (Sioshansi
and Denholm, 2010) and therefore not incorporated into the model. The change in
storage level (Eq. (6.6)) depends on the storage operation in the specific hour taking
into account losses during the charging process.148
SLEV ELd,hy,c,a ≤ vca · INy,c,a (6.4)
INJd,hy,c,a + SOUT
d,h
y,c,a · ηˆa −GEd,hy,c,a/ηa − SINd,hy,c,a = 0 (6.5)
SLEV ELd,h+1y,c,a − SLEV ELd,hy,c,a = SINd,hy,b,a · ηˇa − SOUT d,hy,c,a (6.6)
As we focus on the renewable energy generation of CSP plants in the analysis, the option
of co-firing with natural gas is not included in the model. Natural gas co-firing is another
option to achieve a higher utilization rate of the capital-intensive power plant block and
to increase the capacity factor of the plant.
In general, CSP plants are mainly characterized by three independent components: The
size of the collector’s field, which determines the amount of energy to be absorbed by
147This approach allows for the possibility of wind and solar curtailment when needed to meet demand
or when total system costs can be reduced by avoiding ramping costs of thermal power plants. Wind
sites are usually larger than solar sites and therefore transaction costs for solar curtailment are assumed
to be higher than for wind sites. We use negligible small variable costs for offshore and onshore wind
sites. Therefore, the model chooses wind curtailment first.
148The storage level is set to 10 % at the beginning of each model year, which has to be reached again
in the last modeled hour.
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the sun; the thermal energy storage (TES) units; and the turbine size, which determines
the maximum electricity that can be generated at a specific point in time.
Overall, we model three CSP technologies (A/B/C), which differ with respect to the
size of the collector surface and the storage volume, as shown in Table 6.3. In the
following, all CSP parameters are given for a 1 MW system: CSP A has a collector
surface of 7,376 m2 and no storage capacity and thus the thermal energy has to be
used to generate electricity at the time it is absorbed. CSP B represents plants with
an average solar field of 11,384 m2 and an average storage unit of 20 MWh, and CSP
C has a large solar field of 15,887 m2 and a storage unit of 40 MWh. All three CSP
technologies have a common solar collector and turbine efficiency of 42 % and 37.7 %,
respectively; however, each have a different solar multiple, which indicates the extent to
which the solar field is over-sized in relation to the turbine capacity.149 As depicted in
Table 6.3, the size of the collector field and storage unit has a significant impact on the
plant’s capital costs.
Table 6.3: Characteristics of modeled concentrated solar power plants
Collector Storage Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency Solar Today’s
surface volume solar field turbine load/unload multiple capital costs
[m2] [MWhth] [%] [%] [%] [-] [e 2010/kW]
CSP A 7,376 0 42.0 37.7 - 1.3 3,722
CSP B 11,384 20 (7.5 h) 42.0 37.7 96.0/97.0 2.0 6,794
CSP C 15,887 40 (15.0 h) 42.0 37.7 96.0/97.0 2.8 10,082
Source: Modeled technologies based on Turchi et al. (2010) and Turchi (2010).
6.3.2 Scenario definitions
We simulate two scenarios for the Iberian Peninsula up to the year 2050 in order to
analyze the value of thermal energy storage (TES) units in CSP plants. Both scenarios
assume a technology-neutral renewable energy (RES-E) quota, which prescribes the
minimum share of annual (net) electricity demand supplied by RES-E technologies and
increases from 30 % in 2020 to 80 % in 2050 (see Table 6.4). The simulation of a RES-
E quota serves the purpose of illustrating the effect of an increasing share of RES-E
generation on the value of thermal energy storage (TES) units in CSP plants. The value
of TES is derived from its ability to balance fluctuations in the electricity generation
from solar (CSP and PV) and wind (onshore and offshore) power technologies.
149The solar multiple is defined as the ratio of the actual size of a CSP plant’s solar field compared
to the field size needed to feed the turbine at design capacity at a reference solar irradiance of about 1
kW/m2 (IEA, 2010b).
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Table 6.4: Technology-neutral RES-E quota common to both scenarios
2020 2030 2040 2050
30 % 40 % 60 % 80 %
The first scenario (‘Illustrative Scenario’) is for illustration purposes only. In addition to
the technology-neutral RES-E quota, a CSP quota is modeled, which defines a minimum
share of annual (net) electricity demand (for the Iberian Penisula) to come from CSP
technologies. Moreover, the investment costs of all CSP technologies modeled (see Table
6.3) are assumed to remain at today’s levels. Equally, (net) electricity demand as well
as fuel and CO2 prices are kept constant at 2010 levels (see Table E.5 of the Appendix).
This allows us to isolate the impact of a higher fluctuating RES-E generation on the
value of thermal energy storage (TES) units in CSP plants – irrespective of changes in
other parameters.150 Table 6.5 provides an overview of the assumptions made in the
‘Illustrative Scenario’.
Table 6.5: Framework of the ‘Illustrative Scenario’
Unit 2020 2030 2040 2050
CSP quota [%] 3.5 % 10 % 17.5 % 25 %
Constant capital costs of ‘CSP A’ [e 2010/kW] 3,722
Constant capital costs of ‘CSP B’ [e 2010/kW] 6,794
Constant capital costs of ‘CSP C’ [e 2010/kW] 10,082
Constant (net) electricity demand [TWh] 316.5
In the second scenario (‘Roadmap Scenario’), we analyze the potential role of CSP plants
with thermal energy storage units in a potential transition to a primarily renewable-
based electricity system. In contrast to the ‘Illustrative Scenario’, decreasing investment
costs of CSP technologies due to learning curve effects are assumed (see Table 6.6).
However, CSP plants with TES are assumed to have higher cost reductions than CSP
plants without TES units due to higher learning curve effects in regard to the storage
units. Moreover, in contrast to the ‘Illustrative Scenario’, no CSP quota is included,
but increasing electricity demand, fuel and CO2 prices are assumed (see also Table E.5).
Thus, the ‘Roadmap Scenario’ incorporates two effects potentially favoring CSP plants
with TES units in the long term: First, the share of fluctuating RES-E generation
increases due to the RES-E quota (which is assumed in both scenarios, see Table 6.4).
Second, a decreasing cost-difference between CSP plants with and without storages
occurs due to the assumed investment cost of the storage units. Table 6.6 gives an
overview of the key assumptions in the ‘Roadmap Scenario’.
150These parameters include CSP investment costs, (net) electricity demand, fuel prices and CO2 prices.
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Table 6.6: Framework of the ‘Roadmap Scenario’
Unit 2020 2030 2040 2050
CSP quota [%] - - - -
Decreasing capital costs of ‘CSP A’ [e 2010/kW] 2,220 1,700 1,400 1,290
Decreasing capital costs of ‘CSP B’ [e 2010/kW] 3,437 2,300 2,100 1,963
Decreasing capital costs of ‘CSP C’ [e 2010/kW] 5,500 3,800 3,100 2,693
Increasing (net) electricity demand [TWh] 377.3 432.2 493.3 560.8
It should be noted that the setting of the ‘Roadmap Scenario’ is only one possible option
for the Iberian Peninsula’s electricity system and that it is neither a forecast nor the
most likely outcome. We focus on the role of thermal storage units in CSP plants used
to balance the fluctuating generation of solar and wind technologies.
Further assumptions, which are common to both scenarios, are discussed in the Appendix
(see Tables E.3 - E.5).
6.4 Scenario results
6.4.1 ‘Illustrative Scenario’: The value of thermal storage units in CSP
plants
In the ‘Illustrative Scenario’, we analyze the value of thermal storage units in CSP plants
depending on the share of fluctuating RES-E generation. In the future, CSP plants
with thermal storage units may have a comparative advantage compared to CSP plants
with no storage capacity for two reasons. First, due to learning curve effects of storage
technologies, the cost difference between CSP plants with and without storage capacities
is likely to decrease. Second, the value of thermal storage capacities is likely to increase
with a higher share of fluctuating RES-E generation, as storage aids in balancing supply
and demand. For the exclusive illustration of the later effect, i.e., the development of the
value of thermal storage units as a function of the share of fluctuating RES-E generation,
today’s environment (e.g., investment costs for CSP plants, electricity demand and fuel
prices) is extrapolated until 2050. Hence, the cost differences between CSP plants with
and without storage capacities are kept constant at current levels. However, the share
of renewable and especially CSP generation is increasing over time due to the modeled
RES-E (80 % in 2050) and CSP (25 % in 2050) quota.
Overview of the generation system
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An overview of the cost-efficient capacities and gross electricity generation in the ‘Illus-
trative Scenario’ is given in Figure 6.1 for the Iberian Peninsula up to 2050. Given the
large deployment of renewables, total capacity increases due to lower capacity factors
of wind and solar power plants compared to dispatchable power plants. The conven-
tional generation system is dominated by gas capacities (some equipped with CHP),
since nuclear plants are not considered as an investment option and the combination of
fuel and CO2 prices favors gas rather than coal power plants. To reach the RES-E and
CSP quotas, mostly CSP plants without TES units (CSP A) and wind onshore capaci-
ties are built. Existing photovoltaic (PV) capacities deployed under the Spanish feed-in
tariff system (granted up to 2013) are not endogenously rebuilt in the model after their
technical lifetime ends due to higher investment costs.
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Figure 6.1: Capacities [GW] and generation [TWh] in the ‘Illustrative Scenario’
Remarks: The data for 2000/2008 is based on Eurostat (2010). CHP capacities (generation) are
included in gas and coal capacities (generation) in 2000 and 2008.
Up to 2030, electricity generation is similar to today’s electricity mix. Base-load gen-
eration takes place in nuclear, lignite and coal capacities. After 2030, the conventional
generation occurs mostly in gas-fired power plants and lignite capacities. Renewable gen-
eration is provided by CSP plants (CSP A and CSP B), onshore wind turbines, biomass
and hydro power plants. The generation in pump storages (‘Electricity’) increases in
the long term (by 2050) due to the feed-in of fluctuating renewables.
Despite the constant (net) electricity demand, gross electricity generation decreases over
time due to the transition to a renewable-based electricity system. In particular, there
are two opposing effects determining the development of gross electricity generation. On
the one hand, increasing utilization of pump storage capacities leads to a higher gross
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electricity demand due to efficiency losses during pump operation. However, on the
other hand, the reduction of the amount of electricity consumed by conventional power
plants decreases due to an increased share of RES-E generation. Since the latter effect
compensates for the former, the overall gross electricity generation decreases up to 2050.
CSP plants are built in order to fulfill the increasing CSP quota over time.151 Table
6.7 shows the development of installed CSP capacities. Up to 2040, only CSP plants
without thermal energy storage (TES) capacities (CSP A) are constructed. CSP plants
with small TES capacities (CSP B), which have the ability to shift generation to hours
with no solar radiation and/or higher demand, are cost-efficient from 2040 onwards, once
the penetration of fluctuating RES-E generation has exceeded a certain limit. In this
scenario, about 10 % of the CSP plants are equipped with small storage capacities in
2050 when the RES-E share reaches 80 % and when CSP generation makes up 25 % of
total generation.
Table 6.7: Installed capacities of CSP technologies [GW]
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
CSP A 0.5 3.1 4.6 10.6 14.4 18.7 21.1 24.8 32.3
CSP B 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 3.4 3.4 3.4
CSP C - - - - - - - - -
The value of thermal energy storage units in CSP plants
In the ‘Illustrative Scenario’, CSP technologies with thermal energy storage (TES) units
are not built before 2040. This model result is based on the favorable feed-in structures
of solar technologies (CSP and PV) in the short to medium term when fluctuating
renewable energy supply is comparatively low and thus the residual demand matching
capability of solar power technologies is comparatively high (see also Chapter 4).152
Hence, at a low penetration of fluctuating RES-E technologies, there is no benefit from
having additional storage capacities and being able to shift electricity generation to later
hours.
Figure 6.2 shows the feed-in structures of fluctuating RES-E technologies (wind power,
PV systems and CSP plants without TES (CSP A)), the model demand and the whole-
sale price (i.e., the marginal of the power balance constraint, see Eq. (6.2)) of the
Spanish electricity market in 2015 and 2050 with a comparatively low (2015) and high
(2050) penetration of fluctuating RES-E generation, respectively.
151The CSP quota is binding in all years.
152The residual demand is defined as total demand minus supply of fluctuating RES-E generation with
(almost) no variable generation costs. It determines the amount total demand met with dispatchable
generation technologies with variable generation costs.
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In 2015, the wholesale price is primarily influenced by the level of total demand. This is
due to the fact that generation from wind turbines, PV systems and CSP plants without
TES units (CSP A) is still relatively low compared to the total demand.
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Figure 6.2: Spanish electricity market in 2015 and 2050: feed-in structures of fluctu-
ating RES-E technologies, model demand and wholesale price
By 2050, however, the penetration of fluctuating RES-E generation has increased signif-
icantly, which leads to two effects with respect to the wholesale price curve (Figure 6.2):
First, the wholesale price curve becomes more volatile and second, the structure of the
wholesale price curve is almost reversed compared to today (especially in summer). Addi-
tional CSP capacities without thermal energy storage units (CSP A) and relatively high
generation at midday cause a lower wholesale price during the noon hours.153 Overall,
it can be seen that lower wholesale prices occur when electricity demand is high (around
midday), and, vice versa, that higher wholesale prices occur when electricity demand
is low (during the night). Hence, the wholesale price is no longer primarily influenced
by the level of demand, but the level of solar (and wind) power generation. In contrast
153This so called short-term merit-order effect of wind and solar power generation with (almost) no
variable generation costs on the wholesale price has, for example, been examined by Gil et al. (2012),
Woo et al. (2011), Jonsson et al. (2010), MacCormack et al. (2010), Munksgaard and Morthorst (2008),
G. Saenz de Miera and P. del Rion Gonzalez and I. Vizcaino (2008) or Sensfuß et al. (2008).
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to today, wholesale prices are higher in hours with no solar power generation than in
hours with solar generation. Around midday, when solar power generation is highest,
the wholesale price becomes even lower than at night, especially during the summer.
As a consequence, the value of additional solar power generation during midday is very
limited.154
Table 6.8: Development of correlations (Spanish electricity market)
2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Generation [TWh]
CSP A 7 10 28 42 59
CSP B 1 1 1 10 10
Wind 34 34 29 58 79
Correlation between
demand and wholesale price 0.55 0.54 0.48 0.28 0.23
wholesale price and solar production factor (CSP A) 0.06 0.02 -0.18 -0.23 -0.31
This can also be seen when analyzing the interdependence between solar (and wind)
power generation and various correlation coefficients illustrated in Table 6.8. As fluctu-
ating RES-E generation increases, the correlation between the demand profile and the
wholesale price profile decreases from 0.55 to 0.23. Moreover, as solar power penetra-
tion increases (CSP A), the correlation between the wholesale price profile and the solar
production factor profile (CSP A) decreases and even becomes negative.
Overall, it can be said that the economic attractiveness of CSP plants with TES units
increases in comparison to CSP plants without TES units as solar (and wind) power
penetration increases. This is due to the fact that storage capacities allow shifting
solar electricity to hours with no solar radiation and thus comparatively high wholesale
prices. As explained in Chapter 5, the economic attractiveness of renewable energy
technologies is determined on the basis of the net marginal costs per kWh (NMC),
i.e., the difference between the marginal costs per kWh (MC) and the marginal value
(MV el).155 This presents an extension of the argumention by Joskow (2011), who claims
that comparing the economic attractiveness of fluctuating wind and solar power units
to that of conventional dispatchable generation capacities based on the levelized costs
of electricity (LCOE) is flawed since it fails to account for the fact that the value of
electricity supplied (i.e., the wholesale price) varies over the course of the day and the
year.
154See also Chapter 3 which demonstrates that the marginal economic value of solar power technologies
decreases as penetration increases.
155NMC = MC - MV el.
Chapter 6. The economic value of storage in renewable power systems – The case of
thermal energy storage in concentrating solar power plants 154
In contrast to the MC which reflect the unit’s capital costs, the MV el of an additional
renewable energy unit is electricity system specific (see also Chapter 4) as it corresponds
to the accumulated revenue from selling electricity on the wholesale market during the
unit’s technical lifetime.
Due to the additional costs for the thermal energy storage (TES) unit the MC of CSP
technologies with TES units (CSP B/C) exceed the MC of CSP technologies with no
TES units (CSP A). While the MC of all three CSP technologies (CSP A/B/C) are fixed
for the simulation period in the ‘Illustrative Scenario’ (since investment costs are kept
constant at today’s levels, see Table 6.5), the MV el of the different CSP technologies
changes as the penetration of fluctuating wind and solar power capacities increases. This
can be explained as follows: In electricity systems with low penetration of fluctuating
RES-E generation, electricity prices are highest when solar power generation is highest.
Hence, from total system perspective, there is (almost) no value from storing heat in
order to shift electricity generation of CSP plants to hours with no solar radiation.
Hence, the MV el hardly differ between CSP plants with and without TES units (CSP
B/C vs. CSP A). As a consequence, the NMC of CSP plants without TES units
(CSP A) are lower than the NMC of CSP technologies with TES units (CSP B/C)
in electricity systems with low shares of fluctuating RES-E generation. This, in turn,
means that investments in CSP plants without TES units (CSP A) are more attractive
from total system perspective than investments in CSP technologies with TES units
(CSP B/C) in electricity systems with low RES-E shares.
However, as the share of wind and solar power generation rises, electricity prices are
increasingly driven by the supply of fluctuating RES-E generation. More specifically,
wholesale prices are lowest in hours with high wind and solar power generation. Since
TES units allow shifting electricity generation to hours with high wholesale prices, the
MV el of CSP units with TES units (CSP B/C) increases in comparison to the MV el
of CSP plants with no TES units. As a consequence, the NMC of an additional CSP
plant with a TES device (CSP B/C) are lower than the NMC of an additional CSP
plant without a TES device (CSP A) at some penetration level of fluctuating RES-E
generation (despite higher MC of CSP technologies with TES units (CSP B/C)). Thus,
the increase in the value of thermal storage units in CSP plants as the share of fluctuating
RES-E generation increases can be interpreted as a decrease in the NMC of CSP plants
with a TES device (CSP B/C) in comparison to the NMC of CSP plants with no TES
device (CSP A).
Summarizing, we draw the following conclusions from the results of the ‘Illustrative Sce-
nario’. First, investments in CSP plants with thermal energy storage (TES) units in
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today’s electricity systems for Spain and Portugal are not cost-efficient from a system-
integrated perspective. The historically observed investments in CSP plants with storage
units in the Spanish electricity market up to the year 2012 resulted from the specific
design of the Spanish RES-E promotion system: feed-in tariffs for solar-thermal electric-
ity generation, as granted in Spain up to 2013, do not reflect investment signals of the
competitive electricity market, which would have favored CSP plants without thermal
storage units. Second, we come to the conclusion that the value of storage units in CSP
plants increases when the share of electricity generation by CSP plants without stor-
age units (and other fluctuating RES-E technologies) increases. However, the share of
fluctuating RES-E technologies has to reach a substantial magnitude in order to cause
an almost reverse structure of the wholesale price curve, until CSP plants with storage
units to become cost-efficient.
6.4.2 ‘Roadmap Scenario’: The role of CSP plants in a high RES-E
scenario for the Iberian Peninsula
In the ‘Roadmap Scenario’, we analyze the role of CSP plants and thermal storage units
in a possible transformation to a low-carbon and mostly renewable-based electricity
system for the Iberian Peninsula. In contrast to the ‘Illustrative Scenario’, increasing
electricity demand and decreasing investment costs of CSP technologies due to learning
curve effects are assumed (as described in Subsection 6.3.2). At least 80 % of the elec-
tricity consumption has to be generated by RES-E capacities in 2050, but no additional
CSP quota has to be reached.
Capacities and generation mix
The RES-E quota forces large expansions of RES-E capacities up to 2050, as illustrated
in Figure 6.3. While the (net) electricity demand in 2050 is only twice as high as in
the year 2000, the generation capacities triple by 2050. This is due to the low capacity
factor of fluctuating RES-E technologies in comparison to conventional technologies.
To achieve the implied RES-E quota, mostly wind onshore sites are expanded (retrofit
options are taken as well) and biomass capacities are used in the short term. Starting
in 2020, CSP technologies with small (7.5 hours) storage capacities (CSP B) are con-
structed. Due to the scenario assumptions, the model chooses CSP over PV systems on
the Iberian Peninsula. In the long term, i.e., from 2040 onwards, larger CSP plants with
15 hours of storage capacity (CSP C) are built.
The assumptions concerning the conventional generation technologies, fuel prices and
flexibility requirements of the power plant mix lead to a gas-dominated conventional
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generation system. Lignite and hard-coal capacities (often equipped with CHP tech-
nology) replace nuclear capacities as base-load generation. In addition to large thermal
storage units in combination with CSP plants (CSP C), compressed air energy storages
(CAES) are constructed to integrate the large amount of fluctuating generation from
wind and solar power technologies in 2050. Power balances for Spain and Portugal can
be found in Appendix D.
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Figure 6.3: Capacities [GW] and generation [TWh] in the ‘Roadmap Scenario’
Remarks: The data for 2000/2008 is based on Eurostat (2010). CHP capacities (generation) are
included in gas and coal capacities (generation) in 2000 and 2008.
The usage of storage units in the ‘Roadmap Scenario’
A higher generation by fluctuating RES-E technologies leads to a more volatile resid-
ual demand. This requires a higher share of flexible conventional generation such as
combined cycle or open cycle gas turbines to balance generation and demand.
Figure 6.4 shows
• the model demand (black line),
• the model demand after subtracting the generation by fluctuating RES-E tech-
nologies, i.e., wind power, PV systems and CSP plants without thermal storage
units (CSP A) (grey line) and
• the model demand after subtracting the generation by fluctuating RES-E tech-
nologies, CSP plants with thermal storage units (CSP B/C) and other storage
capacities, i.e., hydro storage, pump storage and compressed air energy storage
(CAES) (yellow line).
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for the Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal) in 2020 and 2050.
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Figure 6.4: (Residual) demand [GW] for the Iberian Peninsula in 2020 and 2050
Note that the grey line reflects the share of total demand that would (hypothetically)
need to be met by conventional power plants in the absence of storage capacities, while
the yellow line represents the actual share of total demand that has to be met by con-
ventional power plants taking storage operations (of TES in CSP plants, hydro, pump
and CAES capacities) into account.
As illustrated in Figure 6.4, a higher share of fluctuating RES-E technologies would lead
to a more volatile residual demand. This is best observed by comparing the grey line
in 2050 with the grey line in 2020. As a consequence, the frequency of quick changes
in the generation of thermal power plants would increase. Moreover, the residual load
gradients would significantly increase as a consequence of a higher share of fluctuating
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RES-E generation. Both effects would cause the ramping costs of thermal power plants
to increase.
However, CSP technologies with storage units (CSP B/C) are able to shift generation
from one hour to another and can therefore help to balance generation and demand in
electricity systems with high shares of fluctuating RES-E generation. In connection with
other storage capacities (hydro, pump and CAES), the residual demand (yellow line) is
kept more or less constant in most hours in 2050.
Summarizing, the economic value of thermal storage units in CSP plants increases as the
penetration of fluctuating RES-E technologies – and in specific solar power capacities –
increases. This can be explained by two effects: First, the economic value of additional
solar power generation at midday decreases as solar power penetration increases. This is
reflected by a comparatively low wholesale price during midday, despite a comparatively
high electricity demand. Hence, wholesale prices are increasingly decoupled from phys-
ical electricity demand and rather determined by the supply of wind and solar power
with (almost) no variable production costs (i.e., the residual load). Thermal storage
units installed in combination with CSP plants allow shifting electricity generation in
hours with lower generation of fluctuating RES-E technologies and thus higher wholesale
prices. Hence, CSP plants with thermal storage units have a higher economic value than
CSP plants without thermal storage units under high penetration of fluctuating RES-E
technologies from total system perspective. Second, as can be seen in Figure 6.4, CSP
plants with thermal storage units (and thus the ability to shift electricity generation)
lead to a smoother residual demand to be met by conventional power plants, even con-
sidering the higher shares of fluctuating RES-E generation. As a consequence, the need
of quick changes in the generation of thermal power plants (due to high load gradients)
decreases which helps limiting the costs of ramping.
6.5 Conclusion
We have shown that implementing CSP plants with thermal energy storage units in
the current electricity system in Spain and Portugal is not cost-efficient (from a system
integrated perspective) due to the relatively high demand at midday when solar radiation
is highest. Hence, we argue that feed-in tariffs granted in Spain up to the year 2013 have
set an inefficient incentive to invest in thermal energy storage (TES) units by neglecting
wholesale price signals. TES can reduce the site’s production costs per kWh due to a
higher usage of the capital-intensive power plant block. Since investors maximize profits
by minimizing production costs per kWh under a feed-in tariff system, CSP plants with
TES may be more profitable from the investor’s point of view than CSP plants without
TES. However, from a total system perspective, CSP plants with a TES unit, which also
produce in hours with comparatively low electricity prices (in the evening or during the
night), realize on average a lower revenue per kWh on the wholesale market than a CSP
plant without a TES unit, which only generates during the day when demand and thus
wholesale prices are highest.
However, the economic value of TES in CSP plants was shown to increase with a higher
share of wind and solar power generation, as storage technologies can help to balance
fluctuating RES-E generation and demand. For example, in systems with large penetra-
tion of solar power technologies, the economic value of additional solar power generation
during midday is comparatively low. Shifting generation to hours with higher wholesale
prices helps to limit the decrease in the economic value of solar power as its penetration
increases. Hence, CSP plants with TES units may have a comparative cost advantage
over CSP plants without TES units in electricity systems with high shares of fluctuating
RES-E generation.
The analysis approach could be improved and extended in several ways. It would be
desirable to include co-firing of natural gas as another option for a more complete under-
standing of the value of storage units in CSP plants. In addition, a more realistic map-
ping of the electricity system could be achieved by modeling transmission constraints. It
would also be interesting to analyze the effects of different locations for energy storages
on transmission requirements, which are expected to be lower if the energy storage is
located closer to the (solar) power plant (Denholm et al., 2009). By neglecting uncer-
tainty, forecast errors of wind and solar power or short notice power plant outages are not
included in the model. Therefore, additional balancing services by thermal storage units
in CSP plants are not fully considered. However, Black and Strbac (2006) or Sioshansi
and Denholm (2010) show that it is preferable to integrate the balancing markets. The
impact of uncertainty and balancing services on the value of thermal energy storages in
CSP plants or other storage options from a system-integrated perspective provides an
interesting area of further research.
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Appendix A
Supplemental data for Chapter 2
Scenario-specific model parameters
Table A.1: Fuel prices [e2010/MWhth]
Economic scenario Nuclear Lignite Coal Gas
2020
Low-cost 3.60 1.40 12.00 23.70
Base 3.70 1.45 12.50 25.20
High-cost 3.70 1.50 12.80 26.60
2030
Low-cost 3.60 1.40 12.10 25.60
Base 3.70 1.45 12.80 28.30
High-cost 3.90 1.50 13.50 30.50
2040
Low-cost 3.60 1.40 12.20 26.50
Base 3.80 1.45 13.00 29.80
High-cost 4.10 1.50 14.00 32.50
2050
Low-cost 3.60 1.40 12.20 27.40
Base 3.90 1.45 13.10 31.30
High-cost 4.20 1.50 14.50 34.60
Source: IEA (2011).
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Table A.2: Overnight investment costs of renewable energy technologies per power
output [e2010/kWel]
Investment costs per year [e2010/kWel] Investment costs degression rates [%]
2020 2030 2040 2050 2020-2030 2030-2040 2040-2050
Biomass gas*
Low-cost 2,306 2,249 2,225 2,224 -2% -1% -0.1%
Base 2,353 2,324 2,313 2,312 -1% -0.5% -0.05%
High-cost 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 - - -
Biomass gas - CHP
Low-cost 2,498 2,436 2,412 2,409 -2% -1% -0.1%
Base 2,549 2,518 2,506 2,505 -1% 0% -0.05%
High-cost 2,600 2,600 2,600 2,600 - - -
Biomass solid*
Low-cost 3,170 3,092 3,061 3,058 -2% -1% -0.1%
Base 3,235 3,196 3,181 3,179 -1% -0.5% -0.05%
High-cost 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 - - -
Biomass solid - CHP
Low-cost 3,362 3,279 3,247 3,243 -2% -1% -0.1%
Base 3,431 3,390 3,373 3,372 -1% -0.5% -0.05%
High-cost 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 - - -
Geothermal (hot dry rock)
Low-cost 10,821 7,980 7,036 6,692 -26% -12% -5%
Base 12,616 11,017 10,475 10,303 -13% -5% -2%
High-cost 14,410 14,054 13,914 13,914 -2% -1% -
Geothermal (high enthalpy)
Low-cost 2,164 1,596 1,407 1,338 -26% -12% -5%
Base 2,523 2,203 2,095 2,061 -13% -5% -2%
High-cost 2,882 2,811 2,783 2,783 -2% -1% -
PV ground
Low-cost 1,234 739 574 546 -40% -22% -5%
Base 1,571 1,276 1,185 1,171 -19% -7% -1%
High-cost 1,907 1,813 1,795 1,795 -5% -1% -
PV roof
Low-cost 1,372 821 638 606 -40% -22% -5%
Base 1,745 1,418 1,316 1,301 -19% -7% -1%
High-cost 2,118 2,015 1,995 1,995 -5% -1% -
Concentrating solar power
Low-cost 3,319 2,206 1,803 1,715 -34% -18% -5%
Base 4,484 3,858 3,629 3,585 -14% -6% -1%
High-cost 5,649 5,510 5,455 5,455 -2% -1% -
Onshore wind
Low-cost 1,108 1,002 929 906 -10% -7% -2%
Base 1,166 1,107 1,071 1,060 -5% -3% -1%
High-cost 1,225 1,213 1,213 1,213 -1% - -
Offshore wind (deep)
Low-cost 2,453 1,809 1,595 1,517 -26% -12% -5%
Base 2,860 2,497 2,374 2,335 -13% -5% -2%
High-cost 3,266 3,186 3,154 3,154 -2% -1% -
Offshore wind (shallow)
Low-cost 2,236 1,649 1,454 1,383 -26% -12% -5%
Base 2,607 2,277 2,165 2,129 -13% -5% -2%
High-cost 2,978 2,905 2,876 2,876 -2% -1% -
Source: EWI (2010), EWI (2011), IEA (2010c) and IEA (2010b).
*Remarks: The difference in the investment costs of biomass gas and biomass solid power plants is due
to the fact that biomass gas power plants are assumed to generate electricity via a gas turbine and
biomass solid power plants via a steam turbine.
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Table A.3: Electricity demand per country and year [TWh]
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Low-cost High-cost Low-cost High-cost Low-cost High-cost Low-cost High-cost
Austria 57.3 56.8 57.9 55.4 59.0 52.7 61.4 48.8 65.9
Belgium 81.4 80.6 82.2 78.6 83.9 74.8 87.3 69.3 93.6
Bulgaria 26.3 26.1 26.6 25.4 27.1 24.2 28.2 22.4 30.2
Czech Republic 57.6 57.1 58.2 55.7 59.4 52.9 61.8 49.1 66.2
Denmark 35.6 35.2 35.9 34.3 36.6 32.6 38.1 30.3 40.8
Estland 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.1 6.5 5.8 6.8 5.4 7.2
Finland 84.9 84.1 85.8 82.0 87.5 78.0 91.0 72.3 97.6
France 421.8 417.6 426.0 407.3 434.6 387.4 452.3 359.3 485.0
Germany 528.8 523.5 534.1 510.6 544.9 485.6 567.1 450.4 608.1
Great Britain 340.4 337.1 343.8 328.7 350.8 312.7 365.0 290.0 391.4
Greece 54.0 53.5 54.5 52.2 55.6 49.6 57.9 46.0 62.1
Hungary 33.0 32.7 33.3 31.9 34.0 30.3 35.4 28.1 37.9
Ireland 24.7 24.5 24.9 23.9 25.5 22.7 26.5 21.1 28.4
Italy 300.7 297.7 303.7 290.3 309.8 276.1 322.5 256.1 345.8
Latvia 5.9 5.8 6.0 5.7 6.1 5.4 6.3 5.0 6.8
Lithuania 8.1 8.1 8.2 7.9 8.3 7.5 8.7 6.9 9.3
Luxemburg 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.4 6.8 6.1 7.1 5.7 7.6
Netherlands 106.7 105.6 107.8 103.0 109.9 98.0 114.4 90.9 122.7
Norway 104.3 103.3 105.3 100.7 107.5 95.8 111.9 88.9 119.9
Poland 115.4 114.3 116.6 111.5 118.9 106.0 123.8 98.3 132.7
Portugal 46.3 45.8 46.8 44.7 47.7 42.5 49.7 39.4 53.2
Romania 41.0 40.6 41.4 39.6 42.2 37.7 44.0 34.9 47.1
Slovakia 24.8 24.5 25.0 23.9 25.6 22.8 26.6 21.1 28.5
Slovenia 13.4 13.3 13.5 12.9 13.8 12.3 14.4 11.4 15.4
Spain 247.4 244.9 249.9 238.9 254.9 227.2 265.3 210.7 284.5
Sweden 131.8 130.5 133.1 127.3 135.8 121.1 141.3 112.3 151.6
Switzerland 57.5 56.9 58.1 55.5 59.2 52.8 61.7 49.0 66.1
Total 2,962.4 2,932.9 2,991.7 2,860.4 3,052.0 2,720.6 3,176.3 2,523.3 3,405.8
Source: EC (2010a).
Remarks: As indicated in Section 2.3, the country-specific demand for electricity is not only defined on
a yearly basis but also on a daily and hourly basis (via country-specific load curves for so-called
‘typical days’). These load curves are based on historical hourly load data by ENSTO-E (2012) and
capture the daily and seasonal characteristics of electricity demand as well as the different load
structures among the various European countries. Scaled to 8760 hours, these load curves correspond
to the yearly electricity demand listed in the table above.
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Model parameters common to all scenarios
Table A.4: Maximum potential for heat generated in CHP plants [TWh]
2020 2030 2040 2050
Austria 41.2 41.5 41.8 42.0
Belgium 14.7 14.8 14.9 14.9
Bulgaria 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.1
Czech Republic 55.1 55.7 56.4 57.0
Denmark 54.7 55.1 55.4 55.7
Estland 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Finland 65.2 65.7 66.1 66.5
France 31.6 31.8 32.0 32.2
Germany 192.4 192.9 192.9 192.9
Great Britain 68.1 68.6 69.0 69.3
Greece 17.4 17.7 17.9 18.2
Hungary 14.2 14.4 14.5 14.7
Ireland 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3
Italy 169.2 171.7 174.1 176.5
Latvia 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.7
Lithuania 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.0
Luxemburg 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Netherlands 114.3 115.1 115.8 116.4
Norway 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7
Poland 93.3 94.4 95.5 96.6
Portugal 13.9 14.1 14.3 14.5
Romania 93.3 94.4 95.5 96.6
Slovakia 17.0 17.2 17.4 17.6
Slovenia 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3
Spain 59.0 59.9 60.7 61.5
Sweden 29.3 29.5 29.6 29.8
Switzerland 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Total 1173.1 1184.0 1193.7 1203.1
Table A.5: Overnight investment costs of conventional, nuclear and storage technolo-
gies per power output [e2010/kWel]
Technologies 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
CCGT 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250
CCGT - CCS - - 1,550 1,500 1,450
CCGT - CHP 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
CCGT - CHP and CCS - - 1,700 1,650 1,600
Hard Coal 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Hard Coal - innov 2,500 2,250 1,875 1,750 1,650
Hard Coal - CCS - - 2,000 1,900 1,850
Hard Coal - innov CCS - - 2,475 2,300 2,200
Hard Coal - innov CHP 2,650 2,650 2,275 2,150 2,050
Hard Coal - innov CHP and CCS - - 2,875 2,700 2,600
Lignite 1,850 1,850 1,850 1,850 1,850
Lignite - innov 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950
Lignite - CCS - - 2,550 2,500 2,450
Nuclear 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157
OCGT 700 700 700 700 700
CAES 850 850 850 850 850
Pump storage - - - - -
Hydro storage - - - - -
Source: IEA (2011), EWI (2011) and PROGNOS/EWI/GWS (2010).
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Table A.7: Techno-economic parameters for RES-E technologies
Efficiency Average saisonal Securely available capacity FOM costs Technical
(generation) availability (peak demand) lifetime
[%] [%] [%] [e2011/kW] [a]
Biomass gas 40.0 85 85 120 30
Biomass gas - CHP 30.0 85 85 130 30
Biomass solid 30.0 85 85 165 30
Biomass solid - CHP 22.5 85 85 175 30
Concentrating solar power - - 40 120 25
Geothermal (hot dry rock) 22.5 85 85 300 30
Geothermal (high enthalpy) 22.5 85 85 30 30
PV ground - - 0 30 25
PV roof - - 0 35 25
Run-off-river hydropower - - 50 11.5 100
Offshore wind 5MW (deep water) - - 5 152 20
Offshore wind 8MW (deep water) - - 5 160 20
Offshore wind 5MW (shallow water) - - 5 128 20
Offshore wind 8MW (shallow water) - - 5 136 20
Onshore wind 6MW - - 5 41 20
Onshore wind 8MW - - 5 41 20
Source: EWI (2011), EWI (2010), IEA (2010c) and IEA (2010b).
Scenario results
Table A.8: National technology-specific RES-E targets [TWh] for 2020 and marginal
costs of compliance [e2010/MWh] (not discounted)
Biomass Geothermal CSP
[TWh] [e2010/MWh] [TWh] [e2010/MWh] [TWh ] [e2010/MWh]
Austria 5.2 70 - - - -
Belgium 11.0 184 0.03 95 - -
Bulgaria 0.9 20 - - - -
Czech Republic 6.2 60 0.02 99 - -
Denmark 8.9 159 - - - -
Estland 0.4 1 - - - -
Finland 12.9 77 - - - -
France 17.2 58 0.5 88 1.0 536
Germany 49.5 99 1.7 69 - -
Great Britain 26.2 188 - - - -
Greece 1.3 60 0.7 133 0.7 213
Hungary 3.3 8 0.4 104 - -
Ireland 1.0 0.3 - - - -
Italy 18.8 119 6.8 - 1.7 150
Latvia 1.2 33 - - - -
Lithuania 1.2 22 - - - -
Luxemburg 0.3 26 - - - -
Netherlands 16.6 163 - - - -
Poland 14.2 79 - - - -
Portugal 3.5 33 0.5 96 - -
Romania 2.9 39 - - - -
Slovakia 1.7 43 0.03 100 - -
Slovenia 0.7 131 - - - -
Spain 10.0 31 0.3 64 15.4 130
Sweden 6.0 61 - - - -
Source: EC (2010b).
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Appendix B
Supplemental data for Chapter 3
Assumptions of the household optimization model
Table B.1: Assumed equipment of households with domestic appliances in Germany
Domestic appliance type Proportion of households equipped with appliance
Chest freezer 19 %
Fridge freezer 59 %
Refrigerator 40 %
Upright freezer 38 %
Answering machine 52 %
Cassette/ CD Player 79 %
Clock 73 %
Cordless telephone 93 %
Hi-Fi system 69 %
Iron 72 %
Vacuum 97 %
Fax 19 %
Personal computer 82 %
Printer 77 %
TV 1 96 %
TV 2 41 %
TV 3 9 %
VCR / DVD 71 %
TV Receiver box 48 %
Hob 46 %
Oven 62 %
Microwave 72 %
Kettle 85 %
Small cooking (group) 100 %
Dish washer 67 %
Tumble dryer 36 %
Washing machine 91 %
Washer dryer 4 %
Electric instantaneous water heater 20 %
Electric shower 0 %
Storage heaters 0 %
Other electric space heating 7 %
Lighting 100%
Source: DESTATIS (2012a), DESTATIS (2012b), DESTATIS (2012c) and Statista (2012).
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Assumptions of the electricity system optimization model
Table B.2: National renewable energy targets for 2020 [MW]
Onshore wind Offshore wind PV Biomass
2015 2020 2015 2020 2015 2020 2015 2020
Austria 2.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.3 1.3
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg 6.0 8.7 1.7 6.9 1.2 2.2 5.4 5.4
Czech Republic 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.0 2.0 1.7 0.3 0.4
Denmark 2.9 2.9 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.8 2.8
France 10.8 19.0 2.7 6.0 2.2 4.9 3.0 3.0
Germany 33.6 35.8 3.0 10.0 34.3 51.8 8.8 8.8
Poland 3.4 5.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.5
Switzerland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: EC (2010b).
Table B.3: CO2 reduction targets (in comparison to 1990 levels)
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
30 % 45 % 60 % 68 % 75% 83 % 90 %
Table B.4: Gross electricity demand [TWh]
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Germany 611 612 621 631 631 631 631 631
Austria 71 78 78 78 80 82 85 87
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg 247 259 259 259 267 275 283 290
Czech Republic 80 88 93 99 105 111 117 124
Denmark 40 41 41 41 43 44 45 46
France 575 599 621 643 662 682 701 721
Poland 178 202 202 202 214 227 240 253
Switzerland 61 65 65 65 67 69 71 73
Source: ECN (2011) (Reference scenario of the EU member states national renewable energy action
plans).
Table B.5: Maximum potential for heat generated in CHP plants [TWh]
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Germany 191.7 192.4 192.7 192.9 192.9 192.9 192.9 192.9
Austria 41.0 41.2 41.4 41.5 41.7 41.8 41.9 42.0
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg 129.0 129.9 130.3 130.8 131.2 131.5 131.9 132.3
Czech Republic 54.5 55.1 55.4 55.7 56.0 56.4 56.7 57.0
Denmark 54.4 54.7 54.9 55.1 55.3 55.4 55.6 55.7
France 31.4 31.6 31.7 31.8 31.9 32.0 32.1 32.2
Poland 92.4 93.3 93.9 94.4 95.0 95.5 96.0 96.6
Switzerland 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
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Table B.6: Overnight investment costs of conventional, renewable and storage tech-
nologies per power output [e 2011/kWel]
Technologies 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
CCGT 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250
CCGT - CCS - - - 1,550 1,525 1,500 1,475 1,450
CCGT - CHP 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
CCGT - CHP and CCS - - - 1,700 1,675 1,650 1,625 1,600
Hard Coal 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Hard Coal - innov 2,250 2,000 1,875 1,800 1,750 1,700 1,650
Hard Coal - innov CHP 2,650 2,650 2,400 2,275 2,200 2,150 2,100 2,050
Hard Coal - innov CHP and CCS - - - 2,875 2,800 2,700 2,650 2,600
Lignite 1,850 1,850 1,850 1,850 1,850 1,850 1,850 1,850
Lignite - innov 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950
Lignite - CCS - - - 2,550 2,525 2,500 2,475 2,450
Nuclear 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157
OCGT 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700
CAES 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850
Biomass gas 2,399 2,398 2,396 2,395 2,394 2,393 2,392 2,390
Biomass gas - CHP 2,599 2,597 2,596 2,595 2,594 2,592 2,591 2,590
Biomass solid 3,298 3,297 3,295 3,293 3,292 3,290 3,288 3,287
Biomass solid - CHP 3,498 3,497 3,495 3,493 3,491 3,490 3,488 3,486
CSP 4,494 3,989 3,709 3,429 3,266 3,102 2953 2805
Geothermal (hot dry rock) 12,752 10,504 10,002 9,500 9,268 9,035 9031 9026
Geothermal (high enthalpy) 1,275 1,050 1,000 950 927 904 903 903
Onshore wind 1,225 1,200 1,175 1,150 1,125 1,100 1,075 1,050
Offshore wind 2,650 2,200 2,050 1,900 1825 1,750 1,725 1,700
PV ground 1,260 1,100 900 810 765 720 675 630
PV roof 1,400 1,200 1,000 900 850 800 750 700
Source: Ja¨gemann et al. (2013a), Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a) and IEA (2011) and PROGNOS/EWI/GWS
(2010).
Table B.7: Techno-economic parameters for conventional and storage technologies
η β ef av FOM-costs Lifetime
[%] [%] [t CO2 /MWhth] [%] [e 2011/kW ] [a]
CCGT 60.0 - 0.201 84.50 28.2 30
CCGT - CCS 53.0 - 0.020 84.50 40.0 30
CCGT - CHP 36.0 - 0.201 84.50 88.2 30
CCGT - CHP and CCS 36.0 - 0.030 84.50 100.0 30
Hard Coal 46.0 - 0.335 83.75 36.1 45
Hard Coal - innov 50.0 - 0.335 83.75 36.1 45
Hard Coal - innov CHP 22.5 - 0.335 83.75 55.1 45
Hard Coal - innov CHP and CCS 18.5 - 0.050 83.75 110.0 45
Lignite 43.0 - 0.406 86.25 43.1 45
Lignite - innov 46.5 - 0.406 86.25 43.1 45
Lignite - CCS 43.0 - 0.041 86.25 103.0 45
Nuclear 33.0 - 0.000 84.50 96.6 60
OCGT 40.0 - 0.201 84.50 17.0 25
CAES 86.0 82.0 0.0 95.00 9.2 40
Pump storage 87.0 83.0 0.0 95.00 11.5 100
Hydro storage 87.0 - 0.0 95.00 11.5 100
Source: Ja¨gemann et al. (2013a), Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a), IEA (2011) and PROGNOS/EWI/GWS
(2010).
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Table B.8: Techno-economic parameters for RES-E technologies
η av Secured capacity Fixed O&M costs Lifetime
[%] [%] [%] [e 2011/kW ] [a]
Biomass gas 40.0 85 85 120 30
Biomass gas - CHP 30.0 85 85 130 30
Biomass solid 30.0 85 85 165 30
Biomass solid - CHP 22.5 85 85 175 30
Concentrating solar power - - 40 100 25
Geothermal (hot dry rock) 22.5 85 85 300 30
Geothermal (high enthalpy) 22.5 85 85 30 30
Offshore wind - - 5 93 25
Onshore wind - - 5 13 25
PV ground - - 0 12 30
PV roof - - 0 12 30
Run-off-river hydropower - - 50 11.5 100
Source: EWI (2010), Fu¨rsch et al. (2013a), Ja¨gemann et al. (2013a), IEA (2010c) and IEA (2010b).
Table B.9: Interconnection expansions between the modeled market regions [GW]
Import country Export country 2015 2020 2025 2030
Austria Germany 3.7
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg Germany 1.9 1.0
Czech Republic Germany 1.9
Denmark Germany 0.6
France Switzerland 1.0
Germany Austria 3.7
Germany Poland 1.9 1.7
Germany Czech Republic 1.9
Germany Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg 1.9 1.0
Germany Denmark 1.0 0.6
Poland Germany 3.7
Switzerland France 1.0
Source: ENSTO-E (2012).
Table B.10: Fuel prices [e 2011/MWhth]
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Coal 12.3 12.5 12.7 12.8 12.9 13.0 13.0 13.1
Gas 23.3 25.2 26.9 28.3 29.1 29.8 30.5 31.3
Lignite 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Nuclear 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9
Oil 90.4 99.0 105.0 110.0 113.0 114.0 115.0 116.0
Source: IEA (2011) and PROGNOS/EWI/GWS (2010).
Iterative approach
From a total system perspective, an increased share of in-house PV electricity consump-
tion causes changes in the residual load (both in volume and structure), which in turn
affects both the wholesale electricity price (via a change in the provision and opera-
tion of power plants) and the residential electricity tariff (via changes in the wholesale
electricity price and the renewable energy surcharge). The latter effect occurs due to
the fact that under the current feed-in tariff system in Germany, the costs associated
with the promotion of renewable energies are passed on to electricity consumers via the
so-called ‘renewable energy surcharge’ as part of the residential electricity tariff (Figure
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3.1).156 As such, the level of the renewable energy surcharge increases if (ceteris paribus)
the annual amount of electricity purchased from the grid by (non-privileged) electricity
consumers decreases.
However, changes in the wholesale electricity price and the residential electricity tariff, in
turn, influence the cost-optimal dimensioning of the PV and battery storage capacities
from the single household’s perspective. In particular, households are assumed to avoid
the residential electricity tariff for the amount of self-produced PV electricity consumed
in-house and receive the wholesale electricity price for the amount of surplus (not self-
consumed) PV electricity that is fed into the grid. Hence, the amount of surplus PV
electricity generation fed in to the grid is asssumed to be remunerated with its actual
market value at a specific hour.
To capture this immanent interdependency, the results of the household optimization
model are iterated with the results of an electricity system optimization model, which
determines (among others) the hourly wholesale electricity prices and the residential
electricity tariff per year for Germany until convergence of results is achieved (see below).
Figure B.1 shows a schematic representation of the iterative process to quantify the
consequences of both exempting in-house PV electricity consumption from taxes, levies
and surcharges and allocating network cost to electricity customers via energy-related
instead of capacity-related (cost-reflective) network tariffs. Overall, the iterative process
can be divided into two seperate steps:
Step 1: Based on the single household’s demand profiles (8760 h), solar radiation profiles
(8760 h), the PV and battery storage system investment costs, the residential electricity
tariff and the hourly wholesale electricity prices (8760 h), the household optimization
model determines the cost-optimal PV and storage capacities from the single household’s
perspective (depending on the number of residents living in the house and the location
of the house). Hourly system performance statistics, including the single household’s PV
electricity in-house consumption and grid feed-in profiles for 8760 h of the year, are also
determined. The initial values for the wholesale electricity price, the renewable energy
surcharge and the residential electricity tariff for the first iteration are shown in Table
B.11.
156Specifically, the revenue from the renewable electricity sold on the power exchange is deducted from
the cost associated with the payment of renewable energy feed-in tariffs. The remainder is passed on to
(non-privileged) electricity consumers as the renewable energy surcharge. Hence, the renewable energy
surcharge [in e 2011/kWh] corresponds to the difference between the annual sum of feed-in tariffs paid
for the renewable energy supply and the annual revenues earned by selling the renewable energy supply
at the wholesale electricity market [e 2011] divided by the annual amount of electricity purchased from
the grid by (non-privileged) electricity consumers [kWh].
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Household 
demand profiles 
(8760 h)
Solar 
radiation profiles 
(8760 h)
PV and storage 
investment costs
Residential 
electricity tariff
STEP1: HOUSEHOLD OPTIMIZATION MODEL
Results
- Cost-optimal PV and battery storage capacity
- PV electricity in-house consumption profiles (8760 h)
- PV electricity grid feed-in profiles (8760 h)
Convergence?
no
Equilibrium solution 
found
yes
i=i+1
STEP 2: ELECTRICITY SYSTEM OPTIMIZATION MODEL
Wholesale 
electricity prices 
(8760 h)
Results
- Wholesale electricity prices (8760 h)
- Renewable energy surcharge
- Back-up capacity payment
- Residential electricity tariff
Figure B.1: Schematic representation of the iterative process
Table B.11: Initial assumptions for iteration step 1
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Renewable energy surcharge [ct/kWh] 6.0 5.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 -
Back-up capacity payment [ct/kWh] 1.5
Average wholesale electricity price [ct/kWh] 5
Step 2: The results of the household optimization model (i.e., the cost-optimal PV
and battery storage capacities as well as the PV electricity in-house consumption and
grid feed-in profiles for 8760 h) serve as input parameters for the electricity system
optimization model.
Based on these input parameters, the electricity system optimization model determines
(among others) the hourly wholesale prices, the renewable energy surcharge, the back-up
capacity payment and the retail electricity tariff per year.
Subsequently, the wholesale electricity prices and the retail electricity tariff are again
taken as input parameters for the household optimization model. Based on the new
hourly wholesale electricity prices and the new retail electricity tariff, the household
optimization model again determines the cost-optimal PV and storage capacities from
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the single household’s perspective and the corresponding PV electricity in-house con-
sumption and grid feed-in profiles for 8760 h of the year (Step 1).
This iterative process (Steps 1 - 2) is continued until convergence of results is achieved.
Formally, the iterative process is stopped after the change in the cost-optimal PV and
battery storage capacities from iteration i to iteration i+1 is smaller than 2 %.
Change in the optimal (scaled-up) capacities of PV and storage systems
during the iterative process
Figure B.2 shows the development of the optimal (scaled-up) PV and storage capacities
during the iterative process. Convergence of results is achieved after nine iteration
steps. Both (scaled-up) PV capacities and storage capacities change by less than 2 %
from iteration step 8 to iteration step 9.
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Figure B.2: Change in the optimal (scaled-up) PV and storage capacities during the
iterative process
Sensitivity analysis and robustness of results
To demonstrate the robustness of results we repeat the iteration for two alternative
starting values. In Sensitivity (i), we assume an initial average wholesale electricity
price of 3 ct/kWh instead of 5 ct/kWh (see Table B.11), whereas in Sensitivity (ii), we
assume an initial back-up capacity payment of 2.5 ct/kWh instead of 1.5 ct/kWh. The
development of the optimal (scaled-up) PV and storage capacities during the iterative
process for an initial average wholesale electricity price of 3 ct/kWh and an initial back-
up capacity payment of 2.5 ct/kWh is shown in Figures B.3 and B.3. As can be seen,
both the (scaled-up) PV and storage capacities converge to the same optimal capacities
despite different initial values.
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Figure B.3: Sensitivity (i) – Change in the optimal (scaled-up) PV and storage
capacities during the iterative process
40
45
50
55
60
65
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
1 2 3 4 5 6
U
ps
ca
le
d 
st
or
ag
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 [G
W
h]
U
ps
ca
le
d 
PV
 c
ap
ac
ity
 [G
W
]
Scaled-up PV capacity
[GW]
Scaled-up storage
capacity [GWh]
Figure B.4: Sensitivity (ii) – Change in the optimal (scaled-up) PV and storage
capacities during the iterative process
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Appendix C
Supplemental data for Chapter 4
Optimality condition for the expansion of wind and solar power units
Given a politically implemented (technology-neutral) RES-E target, the optimality con-
dition for the expansion of fluctuating renewables can be derived by maximizing social
welfare or by minimizing total system costs. The cost-minimization approach corre-
sponds to the welfare-maximization approach given the assumption of perfect competi-
tion and a price-inelastic electricity demand.
In this analysis, we derive the optimality condition for the expansion of fluctuating
renewable energy capacities (Cf ) with no short-run marginal costs of power production
and weather dependent production factor profiles (pffy,h) by minimizing total system
costs which are accumulated over all years (Y) and hours (H) of the capacities’ technical
lifetime (Eq. (C.1)). Assuming two kinds of generation technologies – i.e., dispatchable
power plants and fluctuating renewable energy technologies – total system costs include
annualized investment costs of dispatchable power plants (fcdy) and fluctuating renewable
energy units (fcfy), as well as the variable generation costs (i.e., short-run marginal costs
of power production) of dispatchable power plants (VCd), which are a function of the
dispatchable power plants’ generation level (Gdy,h).
Total system costs are minimized subject to several techno-economic constraints. Equa-
tions (C.2) - (C.3) restrict the hourly output of dispatchable power plants and fluctuating
renewable energy units (capacity constraints), while Equation (C.4) ensures that demand
(ly,h) equals supply (power balance constraint). Equation (C.5) states that the accumu-
lated CO2 emissions may not exceed a certain CO2 cap (coy) per year (CO2 emission
constraint).157 Moreover, Equation (C.6) defines the minimum share (x) of renewable
157The CO2 emission constraint reflects a cap- and trade-system for CO2 emission allowances.
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energy generation in % of the annual electricity demand (
∑
h∈H ly,h) (renewable energy
constraint).158
Table C.1: Model sets, parameters and variables
Sets
h in H Hour H = [1,...,i]
d in D Dispatchable power plants
f in F Fluctuating renewable energy technologies (wind and solar power)
y in Y Technical lifetime of fluctuating renewable energy technologies, Year Y = [1,...,j]
Parameters
coy Cap for CO2 emissions [t CO2 ]
efd CO2 emissions per fuel consumption [t CO2 /MWhth]
ηd Net efficiency (generation) [%]
fcdy Annualized investment costs of dispatchable power plants [e /kW]
fcfy Annualized investment costs of fluctuating renewable energy technologies [e /kW]
ly,h Price-inelastic electricity demand [kW]
pfdh Production factor of dispatchable capacities [kW/kWinst or %]
pf
f
y,h
Production factor of fluctuating renewable energy capacities [kW/kWinst or %]
x (Technology-neutral) renewable energy quota [%]
Variables
Cd Dispatchable capacities [kW]
Cf Fluctuating renewable energy capacities [kW]
Cw Fluctuating wind power capacities [kW]
Cs Fluctuating sola power capacities [kW]
Gdy,h Generation of dispatchable capacities [kWh]
G
f
y,h
Generation of fluctuating renewable energy capacities [kWh]
V Cd(Gdy,h) Variable costs of dispatchable power generation [e ]
RLy,h Residual Load [kW]
pi Profit [e /kWh]
Shadow variables
γy Shadow variable of the CO2 emission consraint [e /t CO2 ]
λdy,h Shadow variable of the dispatchable capacity constraint [e /kW]
λ
f
y,h
Shadow variable of the fluctuating renewable energy capacity constraint [e /kW]
µy,h Shadow variable of the power balance constraint [e /kW]
ρy Shadow variable of the fluctuating renewable energy constraint [e /kW]
Variables calculated ex-post
MV el
Cf
Marginal value of power supply
of fluctuating renewable energy capacities [e /kW]
MV ren
Cf
Marginal value of renewable electricity supply
of fluctuating renewable energy capacities [e /kW]
MC
Cf
Marginal costs
of fluctuating renewable energy capacities [e /kW]
The optimality condition for the cost-efficient expansion of fluctuating wind and solar
power capacities (Cf ) under a (technology-neutral) target for fluctuating renewable en-
ergy generation is derived by differentiating the Lagrangian function (Eq. (C.7)) with
respect to Cf (Eq. (C.8)).
The variable µy,h corresponds to the shadow variable of the power balance constraint
(Eq. (C.4)) and represents the system’s marginal costs associated with meeting the
hourly electricity demand (lh,y). Assuming perfect competition and a price-inelastic
electricity demand, the shadow variable of the power balance constraint (µy,h) serves as
a proxy for the wholesale price. The variable ρy, in contrast, corresponds to the shadow
158The renewable energy constraint reflects a (technology- and region-neutral) quota system for fluc-
tuating rewewable energy generation in combination with tradable green certificates (TGC).
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variable of the renewable energy constraint (Eq. (C.6)) and indicates the marginal
system costs associated with the achievement of the renewable energy target. It may be
interpreted as the price of tradable green certificates (TGC).159 Moreover, λdy,h and λ
f
y,h
are the shadow variables of the capacity constraints (Eq. (C.2)-(C.3)). Following the
explanation of Lamont (2008), λdy,h and λ
f
y,h correspond to the amount of net revenue
that dispatchable generators (Cd) and fluctuating renewable energy generators (Cf )
receive per hour above their operating costs per unit of electricity produced (i.e., above
their short-run marginal costs of power production), assuming that all generators receive
a wholesale price equal to the system’s marginal costs µy,h. Hence, λ
d
y,h and λ
f
y,h are
the difference between the generators’ short-run marginal costs of power production and
the system’s marginal costs µy,h. However, in contrast to dispatchable power plants, the
short-run marginal costs of fluctuating renewable energy generation, i.e., of wind and
solar power production, are zero. As a consequence, the net revenue wind and solar power
generators receive per hour corresponds to the system’s marginal costs µy,h (wholesale
price). Hence, the optimality condition for the expansion of fluctuating renewable energy
generation units – given a politically implemented technology- and region-neutral RES-E
target – can be rewritten as follows:
min TSCCf =
∑
d∈D
∑
y∈Y
Cd · fcdy +
∑
f∈F
∑
y∈Y
Cf · fcfy +
∑
d∈D
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
V Cd(Gdy,h) (C.1)
s.t.
Gdy,h − pfdy,h · Cd ≤ 0 (C.2)
Gfy,h − pffy,h · Cf ≤ 0 (C.3)
ly,h −
∑
d∈D
Gdy,h −
∑
f∈F
Gfy,h = 0 (C.4)
∑
d∈D
∑
h∈H
Gdy,h
ηd
· efd) ≤ coy (C.5)
x ·
∑
h∈H
ly,h −
∑
f∈F
∑
h∈H
pffy,h · Cf ≤ 0 (C.6)
159Alternatively, it may be interpreted as the optimal level of a bonus payment given the analogy of
quantity- and price-based mechanisms under the assumption of perfect information. However, for reasons
of completeness, note that in markets with uncertainties, price-based and quantity-based instruments
are no longer equivalent (Weitzman (1974)).
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min LCf =
∑
d∈D
∑
y∈Y
Cd · fcdy +
∑
f∈F
∑
y∈Y
Cf · fcfy +
∑
d∈D
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
V Cd(Gdy,h) (C.7)
+
∑
d∈D
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
(λdy,h · (Gdy,h − pfdh · Cd)) +
∑
f∈F
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
(λfy,h · (Gfy,h − pffy,h · Cf ))
+
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
(µy,h · (lh,y −
∑
d∈D
Gdy,h −
∑
f∈F
Gfy,h))
+
∑
y∈Y
γy · (coy −
∑
d∈D
∑
h∈H
Gdy,h
ηd
· efd)
+
∑
y∈Y
ρy · (x ·
∑
h∈H
ly,h −
∑
f∈F
∑
h∈H
pffy,h · Cf )
dL/dCf =
∑
y∈Y
fcfy −
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
pffy,h · λfy,h −
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
pffy,h · ρy = 0 (C.8)
∑
y∈Y
fcfy︸ ︷︷ ︸
MC
Cf
=
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
pffy,h · µy,h︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV el
Cf
+
∑
y∈Y
∑
h∈H
pffy,h · ρy︸ ︷︷ ︸
MV ren
Cf
. (C.9)
Assumptions of the numerical example for Germany
Assumed variation of onshore wind and solar power capacities
For reasons of comparability, the onshore wind and solar power capacities across the
three regions are varied in such a way that they produce the same overall power output
(Table C.2).
The logic behind the exogenous variation of onshore wind and solar power capacities
(across the different regions) is as follows: For example, when the impact of increased
penetration of onshore wind power in northern Germany is analyzed, the onshore wind
power capacities in the other two regions (central and southern Germany) are assumed
to be zero, while the solar power capacities are assumed to amount to 33 GW (which
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is the historical installed capacity in 2012). Of these 33 GW solar power capacities one
third is assumed to be located in central Germany and two thirds in southern Germany,
producing a total of 37 TWh per year. Equally, when, for example, the impact of
increased solar power penetration in southern Germany is analyzed, the solar power
capacities in the other two regions (central and northern Germany) are assumed to be
zero, while the onshore wind power capacities are assumed to amount to 32 GW (which
is the historical installed capacity in 2012). Of these 32 GW wind power capacities
two thirds are assumed to be installed in northern Germany and one third in central
Germany, producing a total of 60 TWh per year.
Table C.2: Assumed variation of onshore wind and solar power capacities in Germany
Region Full load hours [h] Exogenous variation of capacities [GW] Annual generation [TWh]
Onshore wind power
North 1,938 10.0/15.0/20.0/25.0/30.0
19/29/39/48/58
Central 1,706 11.4/17.0/22.7/28.4/34.1
South 1,560 12.4/18.6/24.8/31.1/37.3
Average 1,950 11.2/16.8/22.3/27.9/33.5
Solar power
North 992 19.5/29.3/39.1/48.9/58.6
19/29/39/48/58
Central 1,055 18.4/27.6/36.8/45.9/55.1
South 1,169 16.6/24.9/33.2/41.5/49.8
Average 1,072 18.1/27.1/36.2/45.2/54.3
Dependence of the time-weighted average wholesale price E(µy,h) on wind
and solar power penetration
It should be noted that due to the assumed (linear) wholesale price function (Eq. (4.19))
the decrease in the time-weighted average wholesale price (E(µy,h)) does not differ be-
tween the regions (see Figure C.1). However, the level of the time-weighted average
wholesale price (E(µy,h)) differs between technologies. This can be explained by the fact
that the (historical) solar power capacities (33 GW/ 37 TWh), which are held constant
when the wind penetration is increased, differ from the (historical) wind power capacities
(32 GW/ 60 TWh), which are held constant when the wind penetration is increased.
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Figure C.1: Time-weighted average wholesale price E(µy,h)
Impact of increased wind and solar power penetration on the annual residual
electricity demand profile (based on 8760 h)
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(i) Annual electricity demand profile [GW]
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(ii) Annual residual load profile [GW] 
Low annual wind power (19 TWh) and low annual solar power (19 TWh)
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(iii) Annual residual load profile [GW]
Low annual wind power (19 TWh) and high annual solar power (58 TWh)
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(iv) Annual residual load profile [GW]
High annual wind power (58 TWh) and low annual solar power (19 TWh)
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Figure C.2: Impact of increased wind and solar power penetration on the annual
residual electricity demand profile (based on 8760 h)
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Correlation between the demand profile and the production factor profile
Table C.3: Correlation between the demand profile and the production factor profile
wind north 0.19
wind center 0.17
wind south 0.08
wind average 0.17
solar north 0.21
solar center 0.23
solar south 0.28
solar average 0.26
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Assumptions of the electricity system optimization model
Table D.1: Technology- and region-specific wind and solar power targets for 2020
assumed in the ‘EEG-Scenario’
Solar power Onshore wind Offshore wind
(region-neutral) power for power
northern Germany (region-neutral)
(region-specific)
Target for 2020 [GW] 52 50 6.5
Assumed full load hours [h] 1,084 1,528 3,423
Modeled targets for 2020 [TWh] 56 76 22
Source: BMU (2014).
Table D.2: Annual net electricity demand [TWh] (2012 levels)
Germany 560
Austria 69
Netherlands 117
France 495
Source: ENTSO-E (2014).
Table D.3: Maximum potential for heat generated in CHP plants per year [TWh]
Germany 191
Austria 41
Netherlands 113
France 31
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Table D.4: Overnight investment costs of conventional, renewable and storage tech-
nologies per power output [e 2010/kWel]
Technologies 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
CCGT 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175
CCGT - CCS - - - 1,550 1,525 1,500 1,475 1,450
CCGT - CHP 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
CCGT - CHP and CCS - - - 1,700 1,675 1,650 1,625 1,600
Hard Coal 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Hard Coal - innovative 2,500 2,025 1,800 1,700 1,700 1,700 1,650
Hard Coal - innovative CHP 2,650 2,650 2,400 2,275 2,200 2,150 2,100 2,050
Hard Coal - innovative CHP and CCS - - - 2,875 2,800 2,700 2,650 2,600
Lignite 1,850 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Lignite - innovative 1,950 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
Lignite - innovative CHP 4,100 4,100 4,100 4,100 4,100 4,100 4,100 4,100
Lignite - CCS - - - 2,550 2,525 2,500 2,475 2,450
Nuclear 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157 3,157
OCGT 700 700 700 700 700 700 700 700
CAES 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100 1100
Biomass gas 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400
Biomass gas - CHP 2,600 2,600 2,600 2,600 2,600 2,600 2,600 2,600
Biomass solid 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300
Biomass solid - CHP 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500
CSP 4,494 3,989 3,709 3,429 3,266 3,102 2953 2805
Geothermal (hot dry rock) 12,752 10,504 10,002 9,500 9,268 9,035 9031 9026
Geothermal (high enthalpy) 1,275 1,050 1,000 950 927 904 903 903
Onshore wind 1,425 1,350 1,325 1,300 1,275 1,250 1,225 1,200
Offshore wind 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,875 2,750 2,625 2,500
PV 1,500 1,300 1,150 1,090 1,030 980 940 900
Source: The Crown Estate (2012), ISE (2013), Agora Energiewende (2013b), IEA (2011), EWI (2011)
and PROGNOS/EWI/GWS (2010).
Table D.5: Fuel prices [e 2010/MWhth]
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Nuclear 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.9
Lignite 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Oil 90.4 99.0 105.0 110.0 113.0 114.0 115.0 116.0
Coal 12.3 12.5 12.7 12.8 12.9 13.0 13.0 13.1
Gas 23.3 25.2 26.9 28.3 29.1 29.8 30.5 31.3
Source: IEA (2011) and PROGNOS/EWI/GWS (2010).
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Table D.6: Techno-economic parameters for conventional and storage technologies
η β ef av FOM-costs Lifetime
[%] [%] [t CO2 /MWhth] [%] [e 2010/kW] [a]
CCGT 60.0 - 0.201 84.50 28.2 30
CCGT - CCS 53.0 - 0.020 84.50 40.0 30
CCGT - CHP 36.0 - 0.201 84.50 88.2 30
CCGT - CHP and CCS 36.0 - 0.030 84.50 100.0 30
Hard Coal 46.0 - 0.335 83.75 36.1 45
Hard Coal - innovative 50.0 - 0.335 83.75 36.1 45
Hard Coal - innovative CHP 22.5 - 0.335 83.75 55.1 45
Hard Coal - innovative CHP and CCS 18.5 - 0.050 83.75 110.0 45
Lignite 43.0 - 0.406 86.25 43.1 45
Lignite - innovative 46.5 - 0.406 86.25 43.1 45
Lignite - CCS 43.0 - 0.041 86.25 103.0 45
Nuclear 33.0 - 0.000 84.50 96.6 60
OCGT 40.0 - 0.201 84.50 17.0 25
CAES 86.0 82.0 0.0 95.00 9.2 40
Pump storage 87.0 83.0 0.0 95.00 11.5 100
Hydro storage 87.0 - 0.0 95.00 11.5 100
Source: IEA (2011), EWI (2011) and PROGNOS/EWI/GWS (2010).
Table D.7: Techno-economic parameters for RES-E technologies
η av Secured capacity Fixed O&M costs Lifetime
[%] [%] [%] [e 2010/kW] [a]
Biomass gas 40.0 85 85 120 30
Biomass gas - CHP 30.0 85 85 130 30
Biomass solid 30.0 85 85 165 30
Biomass solid - CHP 22.5 85 85 175 30
Concentrating solar power - - 40 100 25
Geothermal (hot dry rock) 22.5 85 85 300 30
Geothermal (high enthalpy) 22.5 85 85 30 30
Offshore wind - - 5 93 25
Onshore wind - - 5 13 25
PV ground - - 0 12 30
PV roof - - 0 12 30
Run-of-river hydropower - - 50 11.5 100
Source: EWI (2011), EWI (2010), IEA (2010c) and IEA (2010b).
Table D.8: Interconnection expansions between the modeled market regions [GW]
Import country Export country 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035
Austria Germany 2.9 1.0 1.3
Netherlands Germany 1.9 1.0 1.0
France Germany 1.9
Germany Austria 2.9 1.0 1.3
Germany Netherlands 1.9 1.0 1.0
Germany France 2.3
Source: ENTSO-E (2012).
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Results of the electricity system optimization model
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Figure D.1: Development of Germany’s capacity [GW] and generation [TWh] mix up
to 2050
Table D.9: Wind and solar power curtailment [GWh]
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Curtailment in the ‘EEG Scenario’ [GWh]
Onshore wind power region 1 1493 3426 3906 3430 428 1020
Onshore wind power region 2 82 7 65 112 81 69
Offshore wind power region 3 14 57 886 755
Offshore wind power region 4 0.3 15 53 87 17
Solar power region 1 11 16 251 214
Solar power region 2 0.5 0.1 23 2 2
Curtailment in the ‘Efficient Scenario’ [GWh]
Onshore wind power region 1 239 2502 3895 5231 4776 395 1013
Onshore wind power region 2 3 16 39 145 125 42
Offshore wind power region 3 1 19 40 59
Offshore wind power region 4 0.01 6 25 120 81 35
Solar power region 1 0.2 33 98 407 265
Solar power region 2 0.2 0.5 1 0.2 13 2 2
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Figure D.2: Development of the annual revenue from selling electricity on the whole-
sale market of capacities built in 2025 in the ‘Efficient Scenario’ [thousand e /MW]
(not discounted)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Th
ou
sa
nd
 €
/M
W
Solar reg 2
Offshore wind reg 4
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Concentrated solar power projects in Spain
Table E.1: Concentrated solar power projects in Spain
Project Start Turbine Solar-Field Storage
Production [MW] [m2] [h]
Alvarado I 2009 50 n.a. 0
Andasol-1 (AS-1) 2008 50 510,120 7.5
Andasol-2 (AS-2) 2009 50 510,120 7.5
Andasol-3 (AS-3) 2011 50 n.a. 7.5
Andasol-4 (AS-4) 2020 50 510,120 7.5
Arcosol 50 (Valle 1) 2010 49.9 n.a. 7.5
Central Solar Termoelectrica La Florida 2010 49.9 552,750 7.5
EL REBOSO II 50-MW 2011 50 319,057 0
EL REBOSO III 50-MW 2012 50 518,469 2.3
Extresol-1 (EX-1) 2010 50 510,120 7.5
Extresol-2 (EX-2) 2010 49.9 510,120 7.5
Extresol-3 (EX-3) 2010 49.9 510,210 7.5
Gemasolar Thermosolar Plant (Gemasolar) 2010 17 318,000 15.0
Helios I (Helios I) n.a. 49.9 n.a. 0
Helios II (Helios II) n.a. 49.9 n.a. 0
Ibersol Ciudad Real (Puertollano) 2009 50 287,760 0
La Dehesa 2011 49.9 552,750 7.5
Lebrija 1 (LE-1) 2010 49.9 412,020 0
Majadas I 2010 50 n.a. 0
Manchasol-1 (MS-1) 2011 49.9 510,120 7.5
Manchasol-2 (MS-2) 2010 49.9 510,120 7.5
Palma del Rı´o I 2011 50 n.a. 0
Palma del Rı´o II 2010 50 n.a. 0
Planta Solar 10 (PS10) 2007 11.02 75,000 1.0
Planta Solar 20 (PS20) 2009 20 150,000 1.0
Puerto Errado 1 Thermosolar Power Plant 2009 1.4 n.a. n.a.
Puerto Errado 2 Thermosolar Power Plant 2012 30 n.a. n.a.
Solnova 1 2009 50 300,000 0
Solnova 3 2009 50 300,000 0
Solnova 4 2009 50 300,000 0
Vallesol 50 (Valle 2) 2020 49.9 510,120 7.5
Source: Listed projects based on NREL (2011).
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Average electricity prices in comparison to solar radiation
Table E.2: Average electricity prices [EUR/MWh]
and variance (in brackets) in comparison to solar radiation [W/m2]
Annual 0-100 100-200 200-300 300-400 400-500 500-600 600-700 700-800 > 800
[EUR/MWh] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2] [W/m2]
2007 41 (2445) 40 (3332) 44 (1388) 48 (1560) 42 (657) 42 (481) 41 (272) 39 (154) 40 (150) 42 (250)
FR 2008 69 (817) 63 (679) 73 (795) 73 (750) 78 (786) 81 (819) 87 (876) 89 (900) 87 (943) 97 (1128)
2009 43 (4416) 39 (391) 43 (456) 51 (16205) 53 (19315) 61 (46032) 46 (169) 45 (135) 47 (125) 48 (110)
2010 48 (290) 46 (298) 50 (328) 50 (343) 49 (281) 52 (341) 50 (154) 51 (101) 50 (85) 54 (117)
2007 38 (921) 36 (1017) 47 (1258) 46 (777) 46 (740) 46 (710) 46 (697) 44 (577) 44 (542) 46 (760)
GER 2008 66 (821) 60 (699) 75 (765) 76 (676) 78 (768) 80 (765) 83 (802) 85 (830) 86 (789) 88 (790)
2009 39 (377) 37 (416) 45 (218) 46 (225) 46 (231) 45 (223) 45 (204) 45 (176) 44 (146) 45 (147)
2010 44 (195) 43 (206) 49 (160) 49 (144) 49 (148) 49 (137) 49 (123) 49 (115) 49 (111) 50 (118)
2007 39 (174) 38 (206) 37 (149) 40 (154) 42 (176) 44 (154) 41 (83) 40 (56) 41 (59) 45 (70)
ES 2008 64 (166) 62 (191) 63 (127) 64 (123) 65 (120) 67 (116) 69 (104) 69 (100) 71 (98) 72 (95)
2009 37 (91) 36 (133) 36 (57) 36 (48) 37 (46) 39 (51) 37 (17) 39 (12) 39 (14) 39 (15)
2010 37 (216) 35 (263) 36 (169) 37 (148) 38 (154) 39 (150) 40 (135) 41 (142) 42 (142) 43 (85)
2007 52 (254) 51 (782) 54 (878) 52 (784) 57 (972) 59 (1044) 56 (937) 49 (643) 49 (615) 50 (657)
PT 2008 70 (116) 69 (128) 69 (100) 70 (101) 72 (99) 72 (101) 73 (92) 74 (85) 72 (81) 73 (85)
2009 38 (81) 37 (115) 36 (53) 37 (57) 38 (56) 39 (43) 39 (32) 39 (16) 39 (16) 40 (15)
2010 37 (216) 36 (259) 37 (173) 38 (151) 37 (162) 39 (162) 39 (144) 40 (166) 42 (129) 43 (111)
Sources: EEX (2012), EPEX (2012), OMEL (2012) and EuroWind (2011).
In Portugal, only data for the second half of the year 2007 was available.
Abbreviations: FR - France; GER - Germany; ES - Spain and PT - Portugal.
Common scenario assumptions
In the following, the technical and economic assumptions underlying the scenario analysis
are described. The assumptions are based on several databases such as EC (2010a), IEA
(2010c), IEA (2010b), IEA (2010a), Schlesinger et al. (2010) and EWI (2010). It is clear
that the scenario setting chosen for this analysis is only one possible outcome.
Assumptions regarding investment costs and techno-economic characteristics of nuclear,
conventional and storage power plants are based on IEA (2010c) and Schlesinger et al.
(2010). Investment costs for already existing conventional technologies are assumed to be
the same as today but learning effects lead to lower investment costs for new technologies.
CCS technologies are assumed to be commercially available and applicable to hard-coal,
lignite and combined-cycle gas power plants starting from 2030. As can be seen in
Table E.3, standard and innovative technologies can be fitted with CCS and/or CHP
technology. Investment costs of CHP plants also include additional costs for the grid and
the extraction of heat. Due to limited potential, pump storage and hydro storage plants
are not an investment option. Compressed air energy storage (CAES) technologies have
investment costs of 850 EUR2010 per kW. Nuclear power plants are not considered as
an investment option for the Iberian Penisula.
The modeled renewable energy technologies and their assumed specific investment costs
over time are based on IEA (2010a) and EWI (2010). Investment costs are assumed
to decrease over time, in particular for photovoltaics and offshore wind. To account
for technological progress apart from cost reductions, we model 6 MW onshore (5 MW
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offshore) wind turbines until 2025 and 8 MW onshore (8 MW offshore) turbines starting
from 2030. Since the annual generation and feed-in structure of wind and solar technolo-
gies depends on local weather conditions, values generally differ between various regions
of a country. To account for these differences, the Iberian Peninsula is divided into five
solar and five wind regions.160
Table E.3: Overnight investment costs of conventional, renewable and storage tech-
nologies per power output [e 2010/kWel]
Technologies 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Lignite 1,850 1,850 1,850 1,850 1,850
Lignite - innovative 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950
Lignite - CCS - - 2,550 2,500 2,450
Hard-coal 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Hard-coal - innovative 2,500 2,250 1,875 1,750 1,650
Hard-coal - CCS - - 2,000 1,900 1,850
Hard-coal - innovative CCS - - 2,475 2,300 2,200
Hard-coal - innovative CHP 2,650 2,650 2,275 2,150 2,050
Hard-coal - innovative CHP and CCS - - 2,875 2,700 2,600
CCGT 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250
CCGT - CCS - - 1,550 1,500 1,450
CCGT - CHP 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
CCGT - CHP and CCS - - 1,700 1,650 1,600
OCGT 700 700 700 700 700
Biomass gas 2,400 2,398 2,395 2,393 2,390
Biomass gas - CHP 2,600 2,597 2,595 2,592 2,590
Biomass solid 3,300 3,297 3,293 3,290 3,287
Biomass solid - CHP 3,500 3,497 3,493 3,490 3,486
Wind onshore 6 MW 1,350 1,221 - - -
Wind onshore 8 MW - - 1,161 1,104 1,103
Wind offshore 5 MW (shallow) 3,200 2,615 - - -
Wind offshore 8 MW (shallow) - - 2,512 2,390 2,387
Wind offshore 5 MW (deep) 3,800 3,105 - - -
Wind offshore 8 MW (deep) - - 2,956 2,811 2,808
Photovoltaics base 3,000 1,796 1,394 1,261 1,199
Photovoltaics roof 3,500 2,096 1,627 1,471 1,399
Hydro (run-of-river) 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500
Geothermal power 15,000 10,504 9,500 9,035 9,026
CSP A 3,722 2,220 1,700 1,400 1,290
CSP B 6,794 3,437 2,300 2,100 1,963
CSP C 10,082 5,500 3,800 3,100 2,693
CAES 850 850 850 850 850
Net efficiency factors of nuclear, conventional and biomass power plants are based on
the specifications of power plants in construction. For ‘innovative’ technologies, higher
efficiencies are assumed due to the described technical developments. The generation
efficiency of plants with CCS are assumed to be lower. Moreover, higher operational and
maintenance costs occur for CCS power plants due to the additional costs for the pipe
and the storage system. Combined heat and power (CHP) generation units have lower
electrical but higher total efficiency factors. Operational and maintenance costs also
include the costs for the heat extraction system. Table E.4 shows the net efficiency fac-
tors, technical availability, operational and maintenance costs and the technical lifetime
for conventional, renewable and storage technologies.
160The regions are based on specific wind and solar data from Sperling and Ha¨nsch (2009). The wind
and solar regions are not identical.
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Table E.4: Economic-technical parameters of generation technologies
Technologies Efficiency Efficiency Avail- FOM-costs Lifetime
generation charging ability [e 2010/kW]
[%] [%] [%] [a]
Nuclear 33.0 - 84.50 96.6 60
Lignite 43.0 - 86.25 43.1 45
Lignite - innovative 46.5 - 86.25 43.1 45
Lignite - CCS 43.0 - 86.25 103.0 45
Hard-coal 46.0 - 83.75 36.1 45
Hard-coal - innovative 50.0 - 83.75 36.1 45
Hard-coal - CCS 42.0 - 83.75 97.0 45
Hard-coal - innovative CCS 45.0 - 83.75 97.0 45
Hard-coal - innovative CHP 22.5 - 83.75 55.1 45
Hard-coal - inno. CHP/CCS 18.5 - 83.75 110.0 45
CCGT 60.0 - 84.50 28.2 30
CCGT - CCS 53.0 - 84.50 40.0 30
CCGT - CHP 36.0 - 84.50 88.2 30
CCGT - CHP/CCS 36.0 - 84.50 100.0 30
OCGT 40.0 - 84.50 17.0 25
Biomass gas 40.0 - 84.50 120.0 30
Biomass gas - CHP 36.0 - 84.50 130.0 30
Biomass solid 30.0 - 84.50 165.0 30
Biomass solid - CHP 22.5 - 84.50 175.0 30
Wind onshore - - - 41.0 25
Wind offshore - - - 130.0 25
Photovoltaics - - - 30.0 25
Hydro (run-of-river) - - - 45.0 100
Geothermal power - - - 300.0 30
Concentrated solar power - - - 70.0 30
Pump storage 87.0 83.0 95.00 11.5 100
Hydro storage 87.0 - 95.00 11.5 100
CAES 86.0 82.0 95.00 9.2 40
Table E.5 shows fuel prices assumed for thermal power plants in the scenarios, as well
as CO2 prices. The price of CO2 emissions is assumed to increase from 14.0 e 2010/t
CO2 in 2010 to 40.0 e 2010/t CO2 in 2050. The assumed fuel prices are based on
international market prices and transportation costs to the power plants.
Table E.5: Fuel prices [e 2010/MWhth] and CO2 price [e 2010/t CO2 ]
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Nuclear 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3
Lignite 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Hard-coal 11.9 13.1 13.6 15.1 17.6
Natural gas 16.9 20.9 22.9 25.6 28.0
Biomass (solid) 27.7 27.7 34.9 35.1 37.5
Biomass (gas) 0.1-70.0 0.1-67.2 0.1-72.9 0.1-78.8 0.1-85.1
CO2 price [e 2010/t CO2 ] 14.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 40.0
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Scenario results
Table E.6: ‘Roadmap Scenario’ - Power balance for Spain [TWhel]
2000 2008 2020 2030 2040 2050
Net electricity consumption 188.5 265.4 298.6 344.9 396.3 453.2
Transformation losses 19.0 20.0 27.1 26.1 18.4 14.7
Thermal plant consumption 14.0 15.0 22.2 21.1 15.9 9.2
other transformation 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Grid losses 20.0 16.0 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5
Storage consumption 2.6 1.1 4.4 2.6 1.7 1.5
Gross electricity consumption 230.1 302.5 342.7 387.1 432.4 482.4
Net imports 4.4 -11.0 -0.4 -0.8 1.3 -0.7
Gross electricity generation 225.6 313.5 344.1 387.8 431.1 483.1
Source: The years 2000 and 2008 are based on Eurostat (2010).
Table E.7: ‘Roadmap Scenario’ - Power balance for Portugal [TWhel]
2000 2008 2020 2030 2040 2050
Net electricity consumption 38.5 48.4 55.9 64.5 74.1 84.8
Transformation losses 2.3 2.4 3.6 3.4 5.4 3.7
Thermal plant consumption 1.7 1.8 3.0 2.8 4.8 3.1
other transformation 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Grid losses 3.6 4.2 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
Storage consumption 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.2
Gross electricity consumption 44.6 55.2 64.1 72.5 84.2 92.5
Net imports 0.9 9.4 0.2 0.7 -1.4 0.6
Gross electricity generation 43.7 46.0 63.9 71.8 85.7 91.9
Source: The years 2000 and 2008 are based on Eurostat (2010).
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